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Preface 
This work examines Finland's relations with the British, United States 
and French Governments during the closing stage of World War I and the 
period immediately after the war. 
Chief attention is directed to the shaping of diplomatic relations, the 
procurement of relief supplies for Finland, the resolution of the problem 
of obtaining recognition for Finnish independence and the issues of the 
Aland Islands (Ahvenanmaa) and East Karelia. The matter of intervention 
in Russia is also dealt with insofar as it relates to military operations 
planned by the so-called White Russians in the Finnish sector and the 
possible participation of Finland in such action as well as to the relations 
between the Western Powers and Finland in this connection. 
The questions involved had by and large emerged in the field of 
international politics before hostilities had ended, but the radical change 
in the world situation in the months of October and November 1918 gave 
them a different position and significance in many respects within the 
framework of relations between the Western Allies and Finland. The scope 
of the present work does not reach beyond the concluding stage of the 
Paris Peace Conference, which produced the Treaty of Versailles. The issues 
of the Aland Islands and East Karelia remained, it is true, to be definitively 
settled. But it has been deemed advisable to separate the early phase of the 
League of Nations from the subject matter here treated. By that time the 
position of Finland as an independent State had become substantially 
stabilized and, following the great global crisis, the international situation 
was showing signs of clearing up and international relations of returning 
to normal. 
From the standpoint of progress in carrying out this work, particularly 
fruitful was the research the author had the opportunity of doing in Eng-
land in the spring of 1959 and in the United States in the fall of the same 
year. From the standpoint of source material, it was of utmost importance 
that I was able to go through the archives of the State Department in 
Washington for the years 1918 and 1919. These records shed revealing 
light on the politics of not only the United States but the Western Powers 
in general and on the conduct of the Paris Peace Conference. In this con-
nection I wish to express my appreciation of the helpfulness of Dr. E. Taylor 
Parks, head of the State Department's Historieal Division. 
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Valuable source material relating to special questions was provided, 
moreover, by the records concerning the operations of General N. Yude-
nitch in 1918 and 1919, which are preserved in the Archives of Russian 
and East European History and Culture, Columbia University, New York. 
I am indebted to Professor Philip E. Mosely for his service in obtaining a 
researcher's permit for me and to the keeper of the archives, Mr. Lev.. F. 
Magerovsky, for his generous assistance while I was at work there. 
My trips abroad further gave me a chance to do research at the Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C., the British Museum in London and other 
libraries, the collections of which naturally contain an abundance of 
literature relating to my field of study that is unobtainable in my own 
country. In addition, their collections of old newspapers enabled me to 
attempt a systematic survey of the treatment of the Finnish question 
during the critical period under examination here by a politically signi-
ficant part of the press in the Allied countries. 
I also wish to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the many research 
historians with whom I was in contact during my sojourns abroad. Two 
of them — Professor Samuel Morison, of Harvard University, and Pro-
fessor Edward Hallett Carr, of Cambridge University — stand in special 
relation to my research project, for they participated in both the prepara-
tions for and the actual work of the Paris Peace Conference, the former 
as an expert on the U.S. Peace Commission and the latter as an assistant 
with the British Delegation; 
 and, among other things, both had been 
entrusted with the task of studying the Finnish question. 
In addition to those already mentioned, I have been in contact with the 
following persons in seeking and clarifying material likely to shed light 
upon background questions pertaining to my study: Professor Hugh Seton-
Watson of the University of London; 
 Professor W. N. Medlicott and Dr. 
R. Hatton, London School of Economics;  Professor Fritz T. Epstein and Dr. 
John Davidson, Library of Congress;  Professor Hans Kohn, City College 
of New York; 
 and Professor Oscar Halecki, Columbia University. To all 
of them I acknowledge my appreciation. 
Following what has now become a valuable tradition, I was able to 
draw on the wise counsel of Professor Arvi Korhonen during my research 
work in my efforts to solve the problems involved and uncover source 
material. I wish to thank him for this and for having read my whole 
manuscript. 
I am indebted to Professor Sven Lindman for his comments. Professor 
Carl Erik Knoellinger was kind enough to check certain portions of my 
manuscript that lay in his special field of study, and so was Väinö Luoma,  
Ph. Lic.  
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Mauno Koski, Ph. Lic., has earned my gratitude by editing the manu-
script as a Finnish expert and Matti Nieminen, archives keeper, by lending 
assistance in many ways in preparing this work for publication. 
Finally, I am pleased to acknowledge the receipt of a research grant 
from the Emil Aaltonen Foundation, an ASLA grant for study in the 
United States and a modest docent's stipend, which was still made avail-
able to me while I was engaged in producing this book. 
Turku, Finland 
November xi, 196o 
1. P. 
P.S. The original manuscript in Finnish was completed by the end of 
August, 196o. During the printing stage a couple of major insertions of 
new material were made in addition to certain minor changes and revisions. 
It was possible to take notice of some works that appeared after the 
dating of the manuscript. 
In preparing the English version, the author added a couple of paragraphs 
to the first chapter in order to acquaint the non-Finnish reader with the 
historical background to the period under examination, and he also deleted 
parts of the text here and there that could be of little or no interest to 
readers not living in Finland. 
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The Development of Finnish Independence Before the Armistice 
Finland's declaration 0f independence 0n December 6, 1917, confronted 
her with a set of political problems that could be divided along geogra-
phical lines int0 four principal parts: there were the problems involved 
in working 0ut diplomatic relations with Russia, Germany and the Western 
Allies, in addition t0 which there were issues t0 be settled between this 
country and Sweden. From the standpoint 0f historical experience, the 
least familiar of the problems were those bound up with the establishment 
of relations with the Allied Powers 0f the West. In the past Finland's 
contact with these Powers had been mostly in the form 0f trade and, to 
some extent, of cultural exchange. 
Before the outbreak 0f World War I, it had been England among the 
countries of the West that had had the liveliest commercial dealings with 
Finland. Interest 0f a political nature in Finland had been evinced, too, in 
Great Britain as well as France  ever  since the beginning of the century, 
but it had been confined to small academic and liberal circles. Finland had 
become known in these circles as an autonomous country with a con-
stitution 0f her own though ruled since 1809 by the Czar 0f Russia. She 
was known to have her own Parliament, which was empowered to pass 
laws and t0 levy taxes, her 0wn administrative system, her 0wn army and 
police, and her 0wn monetary and postal systems. Finland, it was under-
stood, moreover, belonged in the cultural sphere 0f the West! 
When in 1899 Russia began systematically t0 destroy the special status 
0f Finland, the Finnish people won widespread sympathy abroad in their 
struggle t0 defend their constitutional rights. The Finnish question began 
t0 attract the attention 0f the press in various countries, and this led t0 
some extent to a gradual increase in public awareness 0f the existence 0f 
a remote, hyperborean country called Finland. This was true with respect 
t0 England and to France. But in the United States, which had pursued a 
foreign policy 0f splendid isolation in line with the Monroe Doctrine, 
Finland remained a hazy geographical entity, the country of 0rigin of a 
minor group 0f immigrants and little 0r nothing else, even to leading 
political circles. 
During the final stages 0f World War I, the attention 0f the major 
belligerent powers had begun to be drawn to the far northern sphere of 
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Petsamo—Murmansk—East Karelia—Archangel, where the interests of the! 
 
Western Powers, Germany, the Bolsheviks and the White Russians collided 
and which later was destined t0 become a key theater 0f interventionist 
0perations. The emergence 0f this new focal point of power politics was 
bound t0 enhance the importance 0f adjacent Finland and t0 arouse interest 
in the »lines» of the independent politics being formulated by this country 
—• particularly in view of the fact that, in addition t0 everything else, she 
was aspiring to take a hand herself in the goings-on in the area t0 gain 
her 0wn 0bjectives. Consequently, Finland attracted notice for reasons 
beyond her having joined the family 0f independent states. Finland's 
emergence in the international political arena from the limb0 of geo-
graphical 0ddities was thus quite abrupt and rapid. She had become an 
active force with a mind and a will of her own. She had begun to take a 
stand toward issues 0f international consequence and foreign governments 
were obliged t0 sit up and take notice. 
And, among 0ther things, Finland's relations with Great Britain, the 
United States and France were beginning to take shape. 
The ratification 0f the declaration 0f independence by the Finnish Par-
liament 0n December 6, 1917, gave rise t0 the problem 0f obtaining for 
the country the diplomatic recognition 0f foreign governments. And, for 
the first time, Finland was officially committed t0 defining her foreign 
policy.' However much the Government headed by Prime Minister P. E.  
Svinhufvud might have been swayed by sentiment favoring reliance upon 
German support, it was decided t0 pursue an impartial line in this matter 
by stressing Finland's neutrality toward the belligerent powers. This line 
was revealed in the way certain details were handled in requests t0 foreign 
governments for diplomatic recognition. The notes concerning the matter 
addressed t0 Germany, 0n the 0ne hand, and t0 France, Great Britain and 
the United States, 0n the other, were essentially the same in content — 
in fact, almost t0 the letter identical with the ones addressed t0 Sweden 
and the other Scandinavian countries. A similarity of procedure also 
characterized the diplomatic approaches to the various governments, all 
of which were contacted through either their consular representatives in 
Helsinki 0r their missions in Petrograd. Indirect emphasis 0n neutrality 
was also given when in contacting Germany, which had n0 corresponding 
representation, the Finnish Government bypassed Edv. Hjelt, a prominent 
leader of the Activists, an illegal patriotic organization that favored a pro-
German line 0f policy, as an envoy and instead requested Sweden to act 
as intermediary. 
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As strong as the pro-German leanings of certain members 0f the Finnish 
Government were, it was realized that Great Britain, France and the 
United States represented a force in international affairs that could not 
easily be ignored. It was, t0 be sure, only in very limited Finnish circles 
that any sympathy was felt toward the Western Powers, allied as they 
had been with Russia in the war, but n0 intelligent Finn was inclined t0 
underestimate the power and influence 0f Germany's enemies. It was 
seen that their fighting capacity and 0perational capabilities were upheld 
by a supporting area 0f vast geographic extent, which included the in-
calculable resources 0f the British Empire and the United States. With the 
cessation 0f Eastern trade, the 0pening up 0f Western markets was im-
portant t0 Finland's welfare from the standpoint 0f both the procurement 
0f industrial raw materials and food supplies and of finding new buyers 
for Finnish products. 
Even so, Finnish ruling circles gradually began t0 steer a political course 
leading to closer relations with Germany. It was their belief that Germany 
would actively work toward realizing Finnish independence, 0btaining 
recognition from Russia and bringing about a decision t0 remove the Rus-
sian troops from Finland. Germany's Eastern policy, however, took the 
line of military-political realities, which thrust the Finnish question to 0ne 
side. The German objective, bypassing ideological considerations, was to 
conclude peace with the Soviet Government and thereby make it possible 
t0 shift troops t0 the Western front, where hostilities were expected t0 
build up to the climactic stage. 
In connection with the drafting 0f the program 0f diplomatic recognition, 
the Finnish Government had at first dismissed the idea of approaching 
the Soviet Government, whose recognition it considered t0 be 0f secondary 
importance. The Finnish way 0f thinking was that the according 0f recog-
nition by 0ther countries would create a pressure 0f international 0pinion 
likely t0 bend the Russians 0ver t0 a conciliatory frame 0f mind — 0r, 
then, if Russia insisted upon maintaining a negative position, the general 
political climate abroad would deprive it 0f strength. This »general line» 
0f Finnish policy had t0 be revised, however, in the middle 0f December;  
and the prod came in the form 0f comments and suggestions primarily 
from the direction 0f Germany, that is, the power 0n whose support the 
policy-makers 0f Finland mostly wanted t0 depend. It was emphasized in 
Berlin that contacting the Soviet Government was in the interest 0f Fin- 
land and Germany and that recognition 0f Finnish independence by the 
Soviet Government would have t0 be a pre-condition 0f a corresponding 
move by the German Government. 
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It was on December 31, 1917, that the Soviet 0f People's Commissars 
voted in favor 0f recognizing Finnish independence, and 0n January 4, 
1918, that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratified this resolution. Thus 
was created the situation that not only Germany but als0 Sweden had re-
quired as the condition 0f their 0wn decision t0 accord Finland diplomatic 
recognition. Sweden acted 0n January 4, after having been appealed t0 in 
the matter 0n numerous 0ccasions, the last time by Finnish Government 
envoys who turned straight to the Swedish King. Not having allowed the 
ratification of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in Russia t0 delay her 
decision any longer, Sweden thus became the first foreign power — though 
actually 0nly after Russia — t0 recognize Finland. Berlin waited until 
word had come that the Soviet recognition had been ratified. This shows 
how delicately Germany sought t0 handle its relations with Russia. As a 
result 0f Germany's attitude 0f waiting, France, a country 0n the opposite 
side in the war, came across with its diplomatic recognition 0f Finland 
sooner, 0r 0n the same day as Sweden. This seems t0 have taken the Ger-
mans by surprise: upon announcing their recognition 0f Finnish indepen-
dence 0n January 6, they explained that they had actually made their 
decision tw0 days earlier. 
France's action was exceptional in that RuSSian recognition had not been 
imposed as a condition for its 0wn. The French Government also tried t0 
influence the 0ther Western Powers t0 follow its example. The favorable 
stand toward Finland taken by France was apparently due not 0nly to 
idealistic French sympathy for the cause 0f liberty but als0 t0 the hope 
that if the Allies in general gave their recognition 0f Finnish independence 
it might foster pro-Entente sentiment in this country. 
The British Government, which drew the Americans to concur, regarded 
the French point 0f view as based upon dubious wishful thinking. Finland 
was considered in the light of the war within the framework 0f the Russian 
question and against the background 0f the problems 0f the Baltic Sea and 
the Arctic Ocean. »Independent Finland» was a fresh problem for the 
British and their American allies, 0ne that was 0vershadowed by the larger 
issues just mentioned. It was in the main merely a geomilitary »concept» 
situated in the middle of a war between the big powers, where the achieve-
ment of victory was the central objective of all activity. Therein lies 
the explanation to the response given by British Foreign Secretary A. Bal-
four on January 18, 1918, to the Finnish delegation that had arrived in 
London t0 ask for diplomatic recognition. Persistently striving to patch up 
the alliance between Russia and the Western Powers that had remained in 
effect till the fall of Kerenski's provisional government, Lord Balfour ex- 
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plained that the British Government was »tied» to whatever decision the 
coming Russian National Assembly might reach with respect to the Fin-
nish question. The British stand toward recognition 0f Finnish indepen-
dence remained noncommital even though the Bolsheviks broke up the 
National Assembly right after the Foreign Secretary had made the foregoing 
explanation. The British — and the Americans, too — decided t0 wait for 
the Council 0f People's Commissars t0 be replaced by some new organ of 
government that would be interested in restoring the 0ld alliance and wag-
ing war 0n the common enemy again. The situation prevailing in Russia 
was 0bserved to be chaotic, and the policy adopted — notably by the Unit-
ed States — was marked by a desire to avoid premature decisions, which 
might subsequently have to be modified. 
The political 0rientation adopted by Finland was 0ne indication of the 
way the northeastern sector of the European theater 0f hostilities appeared 
t0 the Western Allies from the standpoint of their struggle against Germa-
ny. And it served as the point of departure for Allied policy toward Finn-
ish political aspirations. The circumstance that among the states that 
accorded Finland diplomatic recognition at the beginning of January 1918 
both sides in the war were represented, as well as neutral Sweden and n0 
less an interested party than Russia itself, could be 0ffered as evidence 0f 
a neutral line. 
During the month 0f January, however, the Finnish Government showed 
signs of straying 0ff the course of strict neutrality. As internal tensions 
mounted in Finland, the Government tended to lean toward Germany as 
the 0nly great power likely to support the national existence of this coun-
try with its military resources. The change of course could also be attri-
buted to an increase in the influence 0f the Activist movement. Neutralist 
sentiment grew weaker in proportion t0 the increase in the threat 0f civil 
war. Furthermore, the fact that the British and American Governments 
had refrained from acknowledging Finnish independence carried the indi-
rect effect 0f causing the widening pro-German attitude of the Finnish 
people t0 develop int0 a political 0rientation. 
The outbreak 0f the Civil War 0n January 28, 1918, als0 meant changes 
in the international position 0f Finland. During the spring months the 
Russian troops that had been stationed in this eountry — the total number 
0f which had decreased between the previous September and the end of 
January from some 100,000 to roughly 40,000 — were destined t0 be eva-
cuated t0 the last man, thus eliminating a factor that had tended to limit 
Finnish sovereignty. The German intervention in the Finnish strife at 
about the same time led in the course of developments to advancing Ger- 
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many's military lines to closer striking distance of inflammable Murmansk, 
where a British expeditionary force had landed in November of the pre-
vious year for the purpose of opening up a »new Eastern front». 
The true aims of the German expeditionary force commanded by Gener-
al Rüdiger von der Goltz, which had been sent to Finland ostensibly to 
support the army of White Guards, were, on the one hand, to maintain 
threatening pressure against Petrograd as a means of keeping alive the 
Soviet Government's »love of peace», and, on the other hand, to foil the 
Allied strategy in northern Russia and, ultimately, to utilize the Arctic 
coast for the launching of naval operations and the establishment of sub-
marine bases. In the total German military program, Finland was thus in-
tended to serve as a geographically separate sector of operations, in con-
nection with which it was aimed to establish a preparatory position for 
future action in the Northeast. 
The Western Powers took the view that Finland had forfeited her claims 
to neutrality on account of the foregoing developments and were therefore 
unwilling to improve her status by recognizing her political independence. 
The so-called treaty of peace concluded by the legal Finnish Government 
with Germany on March 7 included a clause worthy of note from the 
standpoint of Finland's future orientation in foreign affairs: in it Germany 
undertook to see to it that Finland's independence would become univer-
sally recognized, and this, it was believed, would be done at the latest 
when the peace conference was convened. This reflected the belief rooted 
in the minds of the pro-German leaders of the winning side in the Finnish 
Civil War that the world conflict would end in victory for the Central 
Powers. And it was such thinking that nourished the hope that the area 
of independent Finland could be enlarged, with the support of Germany, 
by the annexation of East Karelia. 
German policy, for its part, called for strengthening relations with Rus-
sia, where the Bolsheviks represented the only political party which had 
acknowledged the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, with its great territorial 
cessions, comprising the Ukraine and the Baltic countries. It appeared to 
be in the German interest, furthermore, to try to bring Finland and Russia 
closer together toward achieving joint action against the British in the 
region of Murmansk. 
In its striving to establish peaceful relations with Russia, Germany want-
ed to curb the Finns' expansionist demands, and it even sought to exert 
its influence toward having the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus 
shifted in favor of the Russians. The conflict between the objectives of 
Finnish and German policy became evident in the negotiations held be- 
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tween Finnish and Russian delegates toward the end of the summer in 
Berlin. There the Finns found themselves lacking the political support for 
their territorial demands that had been anticipated. 
Finland's pro-German orientation in the spring and summer of 1918 was 
indirectly reflected in the attitude of the Western Allies, specifically Great 
Britain. The attention of the British was increasingly being drawn toward 
the northern European sphere of action. It was the task of the British force 
sent to Murmansk to prevent any advance by the Germans or by Finnish 
troops collaborating with them into Petsamo or into any other area along 
the Arctic coast. The fact that the general situation in the war was such 
as to preclude the sending of Allied troops in very great strength to this 
area caused the British to resort to other means: to collaborate with the 
Regional Council of Murmansk and even to form a special fighting unit, 
the so-called Murmansk Legion, which was made up of fugitives from Fin-
land who had fought in the Red ranks during the Civil War. 
Around the period of April and May, the Western Allies had addressed 
notes to Finland cautioning her against serving as a tool of the Germans 
in the arena of power politics. On the one hand, the British Government 
..solemnly warned» Finland not to interfere in the settlement of the East 
Karelian question; and, on the other hand, it presented conditions the 
fulfillment of which would make possible provisional recognition of the 
country's independence. In matters concerning the British, the Finnish 
Government maintained close contact with the highest German authori-
ties; and since the German stand toward the conditions laid down by the 
British was negative, the Finnish Government reached its decision accord-
ingly. Its reserve in dealings with the Western Allies during this time 
was also shown in its avoidance of direct contact in the matter with British 
diplomatic envoys: the Finnish Government's rejection of the terms of 
recognition was announced through the official Finnish news agency. 
The strong German influence was reflected in this refusal of the Finnish 
Government to enter into negotiations with the Allies at the same time as 
it was enhanced by the Finns' confidence that the support of Germany 
would be sufficient in the future. The British reserve was further strength-
ened by reports from Allied representatives in Russia' and, also, Stock-
holm that the Finns and Germans were preparing to start offensive opera-
tions in the Murmansk sector. The stationing of German military contin-
gents up North as far as Rovaniemi and Kemijärvi was the main basis for 
this idea, although the real reason for this maneuver seems to have been 
to forestall any offensive move by the adversary. 
The situation took a critical turn when, at around the same time, the 
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Finnish Government delivered a note to the British Government demand-
ing that the British troops in Petsamo withdraw and let the Finns take 
over the region. At this juncture the Western Allies, which had consular 
representatives in Helsinki, were poorly informed on developments in 
Finland. The transmission of messages in secret code was banned, and it 
was only through reports received by the respective diplomatic missions in 
Stockholm from go-betweens that the Allied Governments had access to 
information. Illustrative of the Allied outlook, at the end of June their 
consuls in Helsinki, after conferring together, seem to have resigned them-
selves to having their residence permits cancelled by the Finnish Govern-
ment on the first opportune occasion.3 
In the aforementioned note drawn up by the Finnish Government and 
signed June 26, which was handed over by the Finnish Charge d'affaires in 
Stockholm, A. Gripenberg, to the British Minister, Esme Howard, the re-
gion of Petsamo was claimed to be part of Finland. The justification for 
this claim was a promise made by Czar Alexander II in the 1860's to sur-
render Petsamo to Finland at a future date. The chief attention of the reci-
pient was attracted by the sharply worded contents of the note", which 
was given alarming interpretations by Allied diplomatic representatives in 
Stockholm: the British envoy suspected Finland of intending to present an 
ultimatum, while the French Minister described the note as a categorical 
request.4 The presentation of such a demand by a small state that had just 
declared its independence to a major power — and one actively engaged 
in the hostilities of the World War — was certainly quite exceptional. And 
the conclusion reached by the British Government was that Germany was 
backing the move and, perhaps, even inciting the Finns to pick a quarrel 
with the Allies.' 
What happened was that the suspicion nursed by the British around 
the period of April and May that the Finns were political dupes of Ger-
many revived. There was talk of the deterioration of relations to the point 
of the danger of war. Great Britain had no hankering for the spread of 
hostilities in northeastern Europe, but it believed precautions would have 
to be taken against possible offensive action there. From London there 
issued an order not to withdraw from Petsamo, as General C. Maynard, 
commander of the British expeditionary force, had been prepared to do so 
as to be able to concentrate his small army on the defense of Murmansk.° 
British action stemmed from a desire to safeguard the lines of communica-
tion between the Western Powers and Russia and, in particular, to prevent 
the possibility of Germany's gaining access to the Arctic coast for the pur-
pose of building a submarine base there. 
2 
18 	 Juhani Paasivirta 
The worsening of the crisis7 impelled Foreign Minister Otto Stenroth, 
who had been primarily responsible for the note, to bend every effort to-
ward pacifying the situation. For in Finland there prevailed a profound 
desire to avoid getting involved in the fighting, and not even the pro-Ger-
man elements wanted to see relations with the Western Powers completely 
broken. Accordingly, the Finnish Government accepted the Swedish Gov-
ernment's offer to act as mediator. Sweden's aim was to bring her influen-
ce to bear toward dispelling the crisis and settling the East Karelian ques-
tion in Finland's favor and, in the bargain, to promote the realization of 
Swedish interests. In line with the offer of mediation, Sweden was to per-
suade both Germany and Great Britain to give a pledge not to institute 
military operations in the northeastern sector and to give their blessing to 
Finland's expansionist program. In the event of a successful annexation of 
territory in the East by Finland, the Swedish Government expected the 
Finns to show their gratitude by handing the Aland Islands over to Sweden 
as »compensation». 
The Swedish efforts at mediation failed, however, in spite of numerous 
moves made in different directions at different times: neither of the oppos-
ing big powers was willing to make any commitment liable to restrict its 
freedom of military action any more than it was ready to support Finland's 
territorial demands. The British stand toward Finland was one of waiting: 
to find out the true objectives of Finnish policy in the northeastern sector 
and to determine whether the Finnish Government had any desire to take 
a conciliatory step toward the Allies. For its own part, as long as the war 
lasted, the British Government was disinclined to concede anything in 
Finland's favor. 
This the British Foreign Office made plain in the answering note handed  
Gripenberg on August 9. 
The avoidance of any spread of hostilities to a remote area of secondary 
importance, as it was viewed from the West, nevertheless served British 
interests at a juncture when the fortunes of war were taking a fateful turn 
as the great offensive operation launched by the Germans at the end of 
March had begun to lose momentum and the initiative to switch over to 
the Allied side. During her entire campaign of mediation, Sweden's overrid-
ing objective was to get Finland to shift from her pro-German orientation 
to the line of neutrality. In this effort, too, the Swedes failed, for the Finn-
ish Government was not ready for any change of orientation but preferred 
to stick to the fundamental line of foreign policy it had thitherto pursued. 
The pro-German leanings of Finnish Government circles were inspired, 
as pointed out in the foregoing, by a belief that Germany would emerge 
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victorious from the World War and that at the latest in connection with 
the peace conference it would make sure Finland's independence would 
gain universal recognition. By the fall of 1918 this line of thinking was 
put to the test and gradually, along with the inexorable march of events — 
though very slowly on the policy-making level —, its political basis was 
understood to have collapsed. 
As the military situation began to take an unfavorable turn for the Cen-
tral Powers — dramatized by Germany's »black day» of August 8, when 
the Allied forces made their breakthrough in the Battle of the Somme —, 
the Finns felt increasingly insecure. The feeling of apprehension was aggra-
vated by the disappointments experienced by the administration over the 
way the Germans had chosen to »collaborate» with Finland. The intelli-
gence that Germany had refrained from supporting Finland's territorial 
claims at the Finnish-Soviet negotiations that summer in Berlin had come 
as a disagreeable surprise. The explanation for this conflict of interest was, 
of course, that Russia, at whose expense the Finns sought to expand their 
domain, had become a positive factor in Germany's overall plans with 
respect to the war. 
This discrepancy did not become altogether clear to the Finnish circles 
championing collaboration with Germany until that country had, on Au-
gust 27, signed an agreement with Russia supplementing the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk. With its secret exchange of notes, it called for joint military 
action — which would suck in Finnish troops, too — designed to drive the 
British army, which had started to advance southward during the summer 
months, out of Murmansk. Germany, for its part, had further contracted, 
however, to see to it that the German-Finnish reinforcements would with-
draw after the conclusion of this campaign and leave the Russian territory 
inviolate. 
Germany was compelled, however, to abandon the planned march of 
General von der Goltz's force via Petrograd against Murmansk, for at the 
.......... 
very same time the situation on the Western front was beginning to be 
untenable for the Germans, who found themselves facing swift, certain 
defeat. Germany disguised the truth by announcing that its troops would 
not invade East Karelia if the British would withdraw from Murmansk 
within a prescribed period.8  
At the end of August newspapers in the Finnish capital began to give 
expression to growing doubts about the prospect of collaboration with Ger-
many yielding results as far as the annexation of East Karelia by Finland 
was concerned. Simultaneously, critics of Government policy openly began 
to advocate that Finland shift to the pursuit of a neutral line and seek to 
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improve relations with the Western Powers. The first member of the Gov-
ernment to broach the subject of a change in policy was probably Foreign 
Minister Otto Stenroth. Toward the end of September he had intimated to 
the British Consul in Helsinki that Finland ought to try to break loose from 
her close ties with Germany. 
By this Minister Stenroth was not referring to the settlement of the 
question of Finland's Form of Government, which on October 9 led to the 
election of Friedrich Karl, Prince of Hesse, as King of Finland. Rather, 
what Stenroth was driving at was a subsequent overhauling of Finnish 
relations with Germany. In the discussion cited, the Foreign Minister ex-
plained to Consul Henry McGrady Bell that the election of the king would 
give Germany a guarantee that Finland would not join any anti-German 
alliance, and this would justify raising the question of the German troops' 
leaving the country. Stenroth further outlined measures that in connection 
with the king's arrival in Finland would lead to a »declaration of strict 
neutrality»0, which he asserted expressed the desire of the majority of the 
Finnish people. 
The idea stressed by Stenroth that good relations with the Western Allies 
were essential to Finland came to the fore again when, after Bulgaria 
had capitulated and Austria-Hungary had sued for peace, he proposed at 
a session of the Government held on October 1 a re-examination of foreign 
policy. He argued that the position of Germany in international affairs had 
changed, with the result that the basis upon which Finnish foreign policy 
had rested — the expectation of Germany's looking after the matter of 
Finland's being accorded universal diplomatic recognition — no longer 
existed. 
Under the changed circumstances, it was important that Finland gain 
the diplomatic recognition of the American and British Governments be-
fore the peace conference was called and thereby prevent this matter of 
such vital significance to the country's independent political existence 
from becoming enmeshed in the tangle of problems to be dealt with by 
the conference itself. If the Finns succeeded in this, they would be in a 
position to defend their claims in the questions of the Aland Islands and 
East Karelia, which would apparently be taken up for consideration at the 
conference, as a sovereign nation. The key to success in this bid for recog-
nition, however, was a policy of neutrality.10 With a view to getting the 
business of establishing diplomatic relations with the Western Powers off 
to a rapid and auspicious start, Foreign Minister Stenroth proposed that 
General Mannerheim, then resident in Stockholm, be prevailed upon to 
make a trip to England and France for the purpose of sounding out the 
prospects. 
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The Government headed by J. K. Paasikivi was not in its entirety con-
vinced, however, that Finland needed to revise her foreign policy. This 
was also evidenced by the fact that the proposal to appeal to Mannerheim 
failed to gain general support at this juncture.11  Even after a new govern-
ment composed of centrists and right-wing socialists had been formed in 
Germany with Prince Max of Baden at its head and an exchange of notes 
between it and President Woodrow Wilson of the United States had started 
concerning an armistice, the dyed-in-the-wool champions of collaboration 
with Germany in the Finnish Government spoke of »temporary German 
reverses» and continued to cling to their belief that Germany would remain 
a powerful political force in Europe.12 Protagonists of this line would — up 
to the middle of October — acknowledge no change in international affairs 
that might affect Finland's position. 
Discussions held by Finnish political leaders between October 15 and 18 
under Government auspices indicated that the idea of the necessity for a 
revision of foreign policy had begun to make increasing headway among 
pro-German elements, though contrary opinions were still being expressed. 
By this time the Government had been informed of official French and Brit-
ish reactions to the royal election in Finland. The French Government 
minced no words: by holding the royal election, which had been managed 
as a »veritable coup d'état», Finland had thrown her lot in with the Cen-
tral Powers, resigning herself to a condition of »complete dependence on 
Germany». At the same time, it was announced that France would not 
recognize a sovereign who was a native of an enemy country.13 The French 
Government took speedy action, as one might expect from the foregoing, 
by breaking off diplomatic relations with Finland. 
The point of departure for the British Government was different in that 
it had not recognized Finnish independence. The course naturally open to 
it was to remain passive and to avoid making any concessions in Finland's 
favor. The British authorities took the view that the election of Kaiser 
Wilhelm's brother-in-law to the Finnish throne was among German war 
aims and that the British Government was free to decide whether or not to 
deal with a German prince. But, unlike their French ally, the British au-
thorities did not regard the election as sufficient ground for taking action 
but postponed their decision until such time as the prince might actually 
seat himself on the throne of Finland.14 Since the British Government thus 
did not choose to break off the semi-official relations that had till then 
been maintained by the two countries, a line of contact between Finland 
and the Western Powers continued to exist via London. And this kept 
open the door for further negotiations. 
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These reactions among the Allies sufficed to cause certain members of 
the Finnish Government to take stock of their opinions, while other mem-
bers succumbed to the prospect of a clearcut defeat for Germany. Reports 
on the development of the situation on the Western front began to expose 
the inevitability of the outcome, and Wilson's notes in response to the 
German request for armistice negotiations added to the weight of evidence. 
In his first note, dated October 8, the President of the United States had 
demanded that the Central Powers withdraw from all foreign territory 
they had occupied. Considering the relations between the Western Powers 
and Germany as a whole, this demand for withdrawal did not necessarily 
signify a dislocation of the balance of power in Europe. 
Wilson's second note, presented on October 14, took the line, however, 
that no treaty could come into question with Germany unless it secured 
military domination for the Western Allies. This showed a distinct tilting 
of the scales: in the event of an armistice, Germany would categorically 
be the loser. The second note also admonished the Germans to get rid of 
the Hohenzollerns, which displayed the Allied intention of bringing about 
an internal political reform in Germany. The first note could be considered 
to be applicable also to the Baltic Division of the Germany Army stationed 
in Finland, and the second note likewise had obvious repercussions affect-
ing the future of this country. 
On the one hand, Finland stood to lose the support in the arena of power 
politics that she had sought to gain in the pursuit of her territorial objec-
tives. On the other hand, a change in the German political system would 
indirectly undermine the dynastic basis upon which the election of Fried-
rich Karl as King of Finland had been built. The threatening collapse of 
the German military position brought to the fore certain other points of 
view as well. The new German Government headed by Prince .Max depend-
ed for its support on those parties that in previous months had strenuous-
ly protested against letting a German prince ascend the Finnish throne — 
on the ground that it would prove a political embarrassment to Germany. 
In the new situation the Finns could scarcely look forward to receiving 
aid and comfort from ruling German circles — rather the opposite.15 Those 
who in the Finnish Government still opposed a change of course in foreign 
policy put up the argument that the outcome of the World War had not 
been decided even yet.16 Their political outlook was bound up with an 
admiration of the social and political order represented by Germany and 
to a sense of gratitude for the military assistance which the White Guards 
had been given against the Reds in the Civil War. The sympathy they had 
thus cultivated for the German cause inspired them to resist every measure 
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of foreign policy liable to »break the ties» with Germany or that might 
signify leaving the Germans »in the lurch» in their hour of need.17 
The Government debate was bound up with the question as to what to 
do about two proposals. One involved the scheme of approaching the 
Western Powers by using General Mannerheim, who had already visited 
Helsinki to discuss the matter, as emissary. And the other one called for 
persuading Prince Friedrich Karl to defer his acceptance of the Finnish 
throne. No resolution was passed by the Finnish Government on the latter 
issue. The majority viewed the arrival in Finland of Friedrich Karl as a 
natural sequel to his election as king; neither political events nor a revisi-
on of foreign policy should have any obstructive effect; nor, for its own 
part, had the Government any business either hindering or preventing the 
prince's enthronement. Thereby, it was surmised, the future of the mon-
archial system would be safeguarded in this country. 
The Government minority, however, feared that Friedrich Karl's arrival 
in Finland would bring the crisis in foreign relations to a head, resulting 
in his being pressured to renounce the Finnish crown. This would spell 
the doom of the whole monarchical movement. The proposal to send Man-
nerheim to France and England, on the other hand, was voted upon favor-
ably. It proved that the view was gaining that the center of gravity in 
deciding the fate of Finland was shifting from Berlin to the Allied capitals. 
The exchange of opinions described in the foregoing took place wholly 
in the monarchists' camp. Concurrently, starting around the turn of Sep-
tember and October, the republicans could be heard making ever louder 
demands to have the country's foreign policy changed. These demands 
were being pressed by, on the one hand, the Agrarians and the republican 
faction of the party known as Young Finns and, on the other hand, the 
Social Democrats, who were then reorganizing their ranks." The monar-
chists' attempt to extricate themselves from the prevailing crisis by a slight 
shift in the line of foreign policy was also due to a fear that any funda-
mental change in foreign policy might easily lead to a loss of their domi-
nant position in domestic politics. 
The republicans, for their part, hoped that along with the end of the 
Government orientation toward Germany their own voice in political af-
fairs would gain strength. When, toward the end of October, hopes began 
to be expressed that General Mannerheim might be invited to take over 
the political leadership of the country, the enthusiasm of the bourgeois 
republicans was offset by the misgivings, at first, of certain monarchists, 
who were afraid that such a move might not only bring about a drastic 
change of foreign policy but also cause the monarchists' majority in the 
rump Parliament to be thrust into the background." 
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The reformation of the country's administration took place through a 
truce concluded among the bourgeois parties, which called for a postpone-
ment of action on the issue of the Form of Government, the holding of 
new elections in the near future, the setting up of a coalition government 
of monarchists and republicans, and inviting General Mannerheim to ac-
cept the office of Regent. The new Government, headed by Lauri Ingman,  
took office on November 27;  and it was on December 12 that Mannerheim 
was chosen to succeed P. E. Svinhufvud, who had resigned, as Regent. 
The opinion expressed by the Government minority in mid-October 
that Friedrich Karl should put off his decision on the matter of accepting 
the throne of Finland in order not to prevent improved relations with the 
Western Powers and delay the general recognition of Finnish independence 
gradually began to make headway. The prince's own stand contributed 
significantly to the situation. He was at first concerned over domestic Fin-
nish politics: the support he could count on seemed too weak (»Minder-
heitskönig») and he was afraid that later on he would be forced to abdi-
cate. Consequently, upon meeting Svinhufvud in Tallinn on September 
25, Friedrich Karl had decided that he had best wait. 
Little by little the prince's doubts were strengthened by considerations 
of foreign policy. As we have seen, the parties in control of the new Ger-
man Government had previously criticized the scheme to place a German 
prince on the throne of Finland and even condemned such a move as a 
German political »adventure».20 By the time of the armistice negotiations, 
Prince Friedrich Karl thought that his acceptance of the Finnish crown 
might lead to difficulties for Germany in suing for peace. On October 18 
he received word21 concerning the French and British notes to Finland. It 
was Foreign Minister Stenroth who relayed the information with the de-
vious intention of encouraging the prince to say no. In a subsequent brief-
ing of a Finnish delegation preparing to call on the prince, Stenroth said 
that the majority of the members of the Government had by that time 
eome around to the view that Friedrich Karl should not accept the Finnish 
throne, though there was disagreement over the matter of communicating 
this intelligence. He expressed as his personal opinion that Friedrich Karl's 
arrival in Finland would make it impossible to gain the diplomatic recog-
nition of the Western Allies.22 
The prince's decision was evidently hastened by the new German Gov-
ernment's taking a hand in the matter. It did not specifically want to set 
up obstructions, but only after the exchange of notes with President Wil-
son was the question seen in a clear light. The election of Friedrich Karl 
had been thrust into the danger zone by the demanded overthrow of the 
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Hohenzollerns, but his disqualification had not been categorically deter-
mined. Having conferred with the new German political leaders in response 
to a call to Berlin from Prince Max, who was serving as Chancellor of the 
Reich,23 Friedrich Karl on November 4 announced that he would postpone 
his »final decision» regarding acceptance of the royal crown of Finland. 
This decision was made on December 14, when the king-elect announced, 
following confirmation of the unconditional character of the Allied de-
mands, that he was definitively declining the proffered crown. 
Besides the issue of the king's election, an important question in the 
clarification of relations between Finland and Germany in the fall of 1918 
concerned the withdrawal of the German expeditionary force from Finland. 
Wilson's first note to the German Government relating to the armistice 
question had, it will be remembered, included the demand that German 
troops withdraw behind their own borders. The Armistice Treaty con-
cluded on November r r, however, contained different instructions regard-
ing the evacuation of German troops from the Western front, which would 
have to be carried out within short time limits (Articles II and V), and 
their withdrawal from regions that had belonged to Russia before the war 
(Article XII). In the latter case, the withdrawal of the German troops 
should take place as soon as the Western Powers deemed the time ap-
propriate from the standpoint of the internal situation prevailing in the re-
gions concerned. This provision of the Armistice Treaty accordingly pre-
supposed different decisions by the Western Allies as to when the evacu-
ation of various parts of Eastern Europe should be carried out. 
The presence of German troops in Finland since the spring of 1918 was a 
circumstance to which the Allies had pointed in expressing their refusal 
on various occasions to recognize the independence of Finland. The de-
mand for the withdrawal of the German troops had been reiterated at the 
turn of October-November when the Finns contacted the British Govern-
ment. One of the prime conditions requiring fulfillment toward effecting 
the desired revision of Finnish foreign policy was thus the evacuation of 
the German expeditionary force. 
Certain members of the Paasikivi Government had opposed such a mea-
sure, but the new Government under Ingman appeared to adjust quickly 
to this requirement. The fact that the statements emanating from official 
quarters were ineonsistent with respect to the matter can probably be ex-
plained, on the one hand, by the pressure of political necessity as far as 
establishing relations with the Western Allies was concerned and, on the 
other hand, by the strong pro-German sentiment prevailing in bourgeois 
circles combined with the general uncertainty inspired by the critical situ- 
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ation. In content and tone, therefore, these statements were wide open to 
in.terpretation.24 
How did General von der Goltz, for his part, react to this question from 
the time the armistice negotiations started? He represented the type of 
soldier who also had a hankering for political activity and whose trend of 
thought deviated in certain respects from the line laid down by German 
military tradition. Whereas Germany's general policy had, as previously 
noted, been constructed the summer before on the basis of peaceful rela-
tions between the German and Soviet Governments, von der Goltz main-
tained contact with certain White Russian leaders in Finland.25 Concerning 
the matter of preparing in August for what was purported to be a military 
expedition via Petrograd against the British force operating in the Mur-
mansk area, von der Goltz later, in his memoirs, generally spoke about 
making preparations to fight the Bolsheviks.28 
On various occasions during the months of October and November, von 
der Goltz showed that he was not particularly willing to see the German 
troops evacuate Finland — at least not speedily, even after, as soon as the 
Armistice had taken effect, he had given notice of his intention to with-
draw.27 What, then, was von der Goltz's objective at this juncture? Appar-
ently, he was not immune to the hope that, in accordance with Article  
XII of the Armistice Treaty, the Allied High Command might offer his 
force an extra lease on life in view of the need to stabilize the internal 
conditions of the country. This procedure had been followed in some cases 
in the region of the Baltic countries, where the Allies approved of German 
military measures to forestall aggressive Bolshvik action. Moreover, certain 
military minds in Germany, like General Max Hoffman,28 were entertaining 
schemes around this period to make a last-minute attempt to conquer Pet-
rograd from the Bolsheviks. 
At the beginning of December, von der Goltz announced that the Ger-
man troops would have departed from Finland by the r5th of the same 
month. This announcement of evacuation did not, however, satisfy the 
Allied Powers in itself;  they further demanded the resignation of Col. K. 
von Redern, who had served as Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, and 
other German officers serving as military instructors in Finland — which 
demand was also soon carried out. Finland's political and military depen-
dence upon Germany was thus essentially undone. The new situation 
served as a point of departure for the establishment of relations with the 
victorious Allies. 
When von der Goltz announced the deadline for the evacuation of the 
German troops from Finland, he knew about the imminent appearance of 
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Allied military power in the vicinity of this country: a British naval force 
was heading for the Baltic Sea. As the German troops were pulling out of 
the Baltic region, it was simultaneously becoming exposed to the offensive 
operations of the Bolsheviks. Of the Western Allies it was the British who 
at this juncture wanted to take a hand in the progress of events in the 
Baltic sector. The interest of the United States, on the other hand, was 
mainly limited to administering its relief program, while France steered 
clear of this general area, preferring to look after its interests in Central 
Europe. 
The task of the British naval force was to keep an eye on the naval units 
flying the Red flag and based at Kronstadt, guarding the approaches to 
Petrograd, as well as to offer aid in the form of military supplies needed 
for the organization of the defense of Estonia and in general to give moral 
support to the Baltic peoples in their efforts to steer an independent poli-
tical course.29 This did not, in the light of events, signify putting up a 
defense against Soviet attacks alone but also against those German tr00ps 
that under von der Goltz's command at the beginning of February, 1919, 
intervened and later captured objectives like the Latvian capital of Riga. 
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Chapter II 
The Organization of the Peace Conference 
and the Question of the Small States 
Germany's request for an armistice, which was then signed on November 
II, 1918, came as a considerable surprise to the Western Allies. They had 
overestimated the German capacity to wage war to the extent of not ex-
pecting hostilities to end before 1919, and even then they never counted 
on the total collapse of their enemy. When the guns ceased to fire, new 
problems came to the fore. The formulation of Allied peace plans during the 
last stages of fighting had been based on different assumptions. What the 
Allied planners had had in mind for the most part was a compromise peace 
settlement, and they had been prepared to make certain concessions to 
bring it about. The same kind of conciliatory attitude had been in evidence 
when the composition of the league of nations to be established after 
the war had been under deliberation. For it had been assumed that Ger-
many would also be admitted to membership in such an organization. 
When Germany requested armistice negotiations at the beginning of 
October, 1918, the Western Powers reacted in diverse ways, marked by 
conflicting opinions. Idealists hoped that President Wilson's fourteen points 
would be adopted as the basis of the peace — but the British, French and 
Italian national leaders had not been consulted before their publication in 
January of the same year. In asking for an armistice, Germany specifically 
referred to the principles enunciated by Wilson, which seemed to assure it 
of »moderate» terms and a favorable future. An exchange of views ensued 
between the Western Allies, and the result was an exposition of Wilson's 
fourteen points by the President's intimate adviser Col. Edward M. House, 
in response to which the government of each of the Allied nations present-
ed its stand, determined by its own national interests and considerations 
of security.' 
The military terms of the armistice agreement were laid down by the 
top Allied commanders, largely along the lines of Marshal Foch's proposals, 
while the naval stipulations were drafted by the British naval staff.2 The 
severity of these conditions created a situation that made resistance by 
Germany afterward hopeless;  the Western Powers were in absolute control. 
This circumstance was to influence the course of events in many ways 
The Victors in World War I and Finland 
	
31 
later, when the program of the final peace settlement began to be worked 
out in detail. 
The organization of the Peace Conference proceeded slowly and it took 
time to put its machinery into motion. The delay was due mainly to the 
difficulties involved in the practical application of the armistice terms and 
in the arrangement of the modus op e r an di of the conference. The 
very nature of the circumstances forced the organizers to make haste 
slowly. On the other hand, it was not considered expedient to rush matters 
while passions were still inflamed in an atmosphere of nervous tension 
generated by four years of warfare. The political map was still, after all, 
largely unconstructed;  alongside the old states there had appeared new 
ones, like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland and the Baltic countries, where 
conditions had not yet been stabilized. 
The hardest nut to crack, however, was Germany, the position of which, 
as the chief vanquished power, appeared to be extremely uncertain. There 
was no way of telling what sort of political system would replace the 
overthrown Hohenzollern monarchy. Would it be one approximating com-
munism under the revolutionary Spartacists, or would it be a parliamentary 
democracy as urged by the so-called Majority, or right-wing, Socialists and 
the bourgeois liberals? The peace terms dictated by the victorious Allies 
put Germany's fortitude to the test, threatening to paralyze the internal 
resistance of the people and laying the groundwork for Bolshevism. The 
German question weighed upon both sides. The chaotic condition of Rus-
sia also demanded the attention of the Peace Conference — if only as a 
political background factor. 
The cessation of hostilities was followed by a breach of the solidarity of 
the front that had prevailed on the Allied side during the war. In switching 
over from the enforced concentration of strength in the face of common 
peril to the freer situation following the Armistice, a struggle began among 
the victors for the attainment of political and other special national ad-
vantages. This thrust to the fore various problems that split up the com-
mon front. The historian Nicolson has observed that nearly half the time 
consumed by the Peace Conference was spent upon ironing out the wrin-
kles caused by disputes between the victors. 
The Peace Conference turned into a sort of general executive organ for 
a sizable part of Europe.3 In addition to its difficulties settling the prob-
lems generated by the war, it was obliged to wrestle with ever new ones 
arising from revolutions, food shortages and bad hygienic conditions. Areas 
of special annoyance were central and southeastern Europe, where newly 
formed states often resorted to measures of military occupation to clinch 
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their territorial claims rather than await the decisions of the Peace Con-
ference. Owing to the »continuity» of military activity, the program of the 
conference could not be planned precisely in advance, and its agenda had 
to be expanded as fresh problems sprang up from time to time.' As an or-
ganization the Peace Conference was thus subjected to constant changes. 
It was obliged to cope with a dual task: laying a foundation for peace in 
Europe and simultaneously »pacifying» the continent. Everywhere the 
peacemakers were harassed by a restless world on the move. 
The leading Allied Powers, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy 
and Japan, were not destined to make their weight felt at the Peace Con-
ference on a basis of parity. Japan, as a Far Eastern state, was situated at 
too great a distance from the focal point of power politics to be able to 
influence the decisions. Italy was by no means remote geographically but 
nevertheless kept to the sidelines during the most important negotiations, 
except when questions involving territory in which it was particularly 
interested were being examined. Accordingly, it was the »Big Three» — the 
United States, Great Britain and France — that ultimately dictated the 
terms of peace. 
Also participating in the Peace Conference were the small European allies 
of the great Western Powers, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, Serbia and Ru-
mania, as well as, from among the new states, Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
plus certain of the South American states, which were generally referred 
to by Western representatives as »theoretical» belligerents. In November 
of 1918 the idea of inviting representatives of the Central Powers to attend 
the Peace Conference had been considered, but it was subsequently aban-
doned. Neutrals, like the Scandinavian countries, and new arrivals in the 
family of independent states, like Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 
the sovereign aspirations of which had not drawn on the support of the 
Western Powers, were not invited to sit at the conference table, either. 
The leaders of the »Big Three» emerged as the dominant personalities of 
the Peace Conference. It was President Woodrow Wilson who played the 
central role during ist early stage with his program of a »just peace», on 
the basis of the principles of which he believed a better world could be 
created. In line with the historical traditions of the United States, he en-
deavored to raise high the banner of political law and morality and on the 
strength of proclamations and manifestos to lay a foundation of opinion 
for a new order of international justice.° It was from the soil of his political 
faith in liberalism and democracy that his two great idealistic conceptions 
sprang: the self-determination of peoples and the League of Nations, in 
which he envisaged liberalism and democracy realized on an international 
scale. 
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Wilson believed that the principle of self-determination should be adopt-
ed as the guiding light of the Peace Conference: no territories should be 
arbitrarily transferred from the jurisdiction of one state to that of another;  
instead, the will of the inhabitants of such territories should be sounded 
out. During the war Wilson had spoken of a »peace of conciliation» and 
of a »peace without victory». At the same time, it had been his aim to 
prevent »Prussian militarism» from taking root again in the new Europe. 
These objectives were not altogether in harmony as far as their serving as 
bases for the Peace Conference was concerned. The former, stressing as it 
did the demands of justice, rejected the set-up of »victor» versus »van-
quished», whereas the latter called for securing the victory of the Western 
Powers and the construction of the peace treaties on the basis of the 
strength of the victorious states.7 
The right of nations to self-determination, which Wilson developed into 
a political principle, was primarily an ideological watchword of a general 
character rather than a program ready for practical application. The Presi-
dent himself realized the difficulties and conflicts involved in applying it, 
although he did not think they could thwart his creative efforts. It was to 
be expected that in many cases the aspirations of nationalities to self-
determination would not be in harmony with historical points of view, 
especially as far as power-political, social and economic factors were con-
cerned. The heavy contribution of the United States to the joint Allied 
victory in the World War had imbued Wilson with a sense of superiority, 
buoyed up by which he, with his poor knowledge of Europe, aspired to 
carry out a reformation of conditions on the eastern side of the Atlantic 
in line with American traditions. He fancied that the establishment of 
democracy as the predominant system would cause expansionist policies 
to be rejected by the nations and the desire for peace to grow stronger. And 
he did not doubt that nationalities were capable of creating states. He 
even believed that by common effort and following the example of the 
United States it would be possible to mold Europe into a great political 
unit, in the framework of which big and small could co-exist peacefully.8 
Wilson did not, however, entertain the illusion that American ideals 
were in themselves more exalted than European ones. The nucleus of his 
outlook was the view that more fortunate circumstances had given the 
United States a chance to foster ideals that should begin to exert their 
influence in Europe, too, as conditions improved. The principles enunciated 
by Wilson and couched in slogan-like terms — »the right of peoples to 
self-determination» and »nations ripe for democracy» — were rooted in 
the American heritage, and could be traced back to colonial times and 
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the Declaration of Independence of 1776. By contrast, the »league of na-
tions» represented an ideological structure deviating from the traditions 
of American foreign policy. 
The old Monroe Doctrine, which stressed that each nation was entitled 
to govern itself as it saw fit without outside interference, was wholly alien 
to this new planning. Many supporters of the Monroe Doctrine were against 
American meddling in European affairs, and they were even less en-
chanted by the prospect of some sort of »world government» being set up 
under United States leadership. Yet, the vision of a league of nations was 
a fundamental part of Wilson's creative activity. He believed that it could 
benefit mankind by the strength of its sheer moral influence. 
The change from war to peace signified at the same time a change from 
the idealistic thinking kindled during the closing stage of hostilities to a 
practical confrontation of reality. It soon became obvious that the »Wilson-
ian» approach was at a remote distance from the tough attitude taken by 
the men seated around the conference table. The President's worst oppo-
nent proved to be Georges Clemenceau, a nationalist and a statesman 
with his feet firmly planted on solid ground, who viewed the plans to 
create a new Europe according to the principle of self-determination with 
a cynical eye. The »Tiger» of France had no faith in the feasibility of 
»noble principles»;  as he saw it, ideals of justice and morality were unten-
able in making international arrangements. He shook his head warningly 
when the subject of the league of nations was brought up. 
It was Clemenceau's conviction that only by inflicting harsh peace terms 
on the vanquished and by taking precautionary military measures could 
Europe be pacified and lasting security be achieved.° The accentuation of 
the authority of the victorious powers was to be noted also in Clemenceau's 
attitude toward the general modus op e r a n d i of the Peace Conference, 
too: in deciding matters, he demanded compliance with the views of the 
»Council of Ten», which was composed of representatives of the major 
victorious powers. Clemenceau's political experience enabled him to find 
the procedures required in carrying on the work of the conference and the 
political support required in settling each particular issue. 
Clemenceau's main objective was to secure the future of France, which, 
in his opinion, presupposed the complete prostration of Germany. Of the 
Western Powers it was France that had suffered most in the war: its man-
power losses, counting the wounded, too, amounted to millions, in addition 
to which extensive industrial and agricultural areas, especially in the nor-
thern parts of the country, had been devastated. During the severest phase 
of the war, marked by the massive German offensive from May to July on 
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the Western front, Clemenceau had shown unyielding tenacity and energy. 
He had become the symbol of France's resistance, and he imbued his na-
tion with faith in the future. After victory had been achieved, he had his 
own demands to make — branded as his »program of vengeance» — in 
order to lay the enemy low. Germany must be politically encircled: the 
newly independent states of Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as Yugos-
lavia and Rumania must be made to enter into defensive alliances with 
France, besides which Great Britain and the United States must guarantee 
the preservation of France's boundaries. 
The future allies of France referred to must be made strong in order to 
fulfill their function. Accordingly, Clemenceau vigorously pursued this 
line. The coal and iron mines of Silesia, he demanded, should be handed 
over to Poland, which must also be given a »corridor» to the Baltic Sea. 
For France he demanded the cession of Alsace-Lorraine as well as admin-
istrative control of the Saar region to satisfy his country's coal require-
ments. In insisting, on top of everything else, upon the demilitarization of 
Germany and its paying heavy war reparations, Clemenceau was reminded 
that a country subjected to such encirclement and exhaustion measures 
might be driven into the lap of Bolshevism. As fierce an opponent of Bol-
shevism as Clemenceau was, this threat could not induce him to moderate 
his »program of vengeance». 
The head of the British delegation at the Peace Conference was David 
Lloyd George. Up to the World War his sphere of activity had been limited 
to internal politics;  but after he became Prime Minister in 1916, he began 
to pay a prominent role in the arena of international politics. His ideals, 
like Wilson's, were liberalism and democracy, which he believed to have 
supplied much of the spiritual force necessary to achieve victory. In line 
with its political traditions, Britain had steered clear of continental Euro-
pean affairs, but now it was obliged to learn to »listen with continental 
ears» and to speak in matters concerning continental nations». With re-
spect to Lloyd George this change meant that his political outlook had to 
widen to the extens of embracing all Europe. As a statesman he was not, 
like Wilson, any architect of grand designs, nor did he apparently possess 
any general program drawn up in advance, only certain sketchy outlines of 
one. During the course of the negotiations, he frequently changed his po-
sition.10 
Lloyd George was the silver-tongued rhetorician and acknowledged mas-
ter tactician of the Peace Conference, and his debating and maneuvering 
skill brought results.11 Whenever the essential interests of Great Britain 
were involved, as, for instance, in the question of its being given control 
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of the German colonies, in that of extending the British sphere of influence 
at the expense of Egypt and Persia, or in that of the destruction of the 
German navy, his skill as a politician was displayed with dazzling brilli-
ance. 
The British Prime Minister pursued the line of compromise. When con-
flicts of opinion between Wilson and Clemenceau had to be adjusted, each 
of them having insisted upon some one-sided decision, the stand of the 
British leader was that of expediency. In Clemenceau's view, particularly, 
Lloyd George was fickle, downright »opinionless» (on account of his dispo-
sition to make compromises) and unfit to represent a major power. This 
judgment was influenced also by the fact that Lloyd George in participating 
in the decisions being made in Paris felt his responsibility to Parliament, 
with which — unlike Wilson and Clemenceau — he remained in active 
contact and because of which he experienced difficulties, too.'2 
During the war the British and French governments had made certain 
»promises», which they were supposed to redeem when peace came. It 
became hard, however, to live up to these commitments made under the 
pressure of critical situations, so those responsible for them would have 
wanted to forget them. One such promise concerned the cession of Dalma-
tia and the Tyrol to Italy in compensation for its joining the Allies in 1915. 
Lloyd George thought, like Wilson, that when the multifarious problems 
created by the World War came up for solution in connection with the 
peace settlement, it would be difficult to reconcile »secret treaties» with 
-guiding principles». 
Lloyd George advocated more moderate peace terms for the Central 
Powers than Clemenceau did. Accordingly, he resisted the proposal, for 
instance, of strengthening Poland by awarding it extra territory. If Germany 
were deprived of the iron and coal mines situated in the eastern part 
of the country, Lloyd George contended, and Hungary were chopped up 
into insignificance, such a constriction of the means of these nations to 
support their existence could lead to anarchy and even warfare. The British 
Prime Minister pressed his arguments successfully in clarifying the situa-
tion. The Peace Conference decreed, on the one hand, that the territorial 
issue of Upper Silesia would be decided by a plebiscite, while, on the other 
hand, it would not consent to the cession of Dalmatia to Italy. The deci-
sion was partly influenced by the backing given Lloyd. George by Wilson. 
In spite of these arrangements, many an inflammable area was left on the 
political map of Europe, causing statesman at a later date trouble and head-
aches. 
Vittorio Orlando, leader of the Italian peace delegation, was overshad- 
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owed by the »Big Three». The Italian contribution to the Allied war effort 
had been of slight significance;  hence, Italy could not back up its demands 
with military achievements. As a result, Orlando's role was much like 
that of a spectator on the sidelines while the major issues were being set-
tled. He came to life only when the problem at hand touched upon Italy's 
special territorial interests. He was not out to reduce the vital conditions 
of Germany's existence. In siding with the Western Powers in the war, 
Italy had betrayed its ally, so Orlando had no taste for wreaking vengeance 
on the vanquished. 
Orlando had a temperamental character, but in his activities as politician 
and statesman it was exhibited only under special circumstances. When 
Wilson, who championed the principle of self-determination of nationali-
ties, took a stand in opposition to Italy's claims upon Dalmatia, Orlando 
lost his temper and annonunced that he would leave the Peace Conference 
in protest. Since, however, this action did not seem to have any effect on 
Wilson and the others, his absence was cut short. 
When the apportionment of power at the Peace Conference was being 
worked out, Clemenceau, backed up by Foreign Minister S. Pichon, took 
the position that the major powers should be ensured the leading role in 
deciding matters and that the rest of the participating nations should be 
entitled to a voice only in matters directly concerning them. Wilson, on 
the other hand, favored granting the other participants the right to a 
voice in the conference on a basis of »equality» with the big powers. Cle-
menceau believed that the procedure he proposed would expedite the hand-
ling of matters and advance the interests of the victors without trouble. 
Wilson, however, was looking ahead to the situation after the peace settle-
ment, when the small powers would be participating in the work of the 
League of Nations and taking responsibility for the implementation and 
enforcement of the decisions made by the Peace Conference. 
The mode of procedure advocated by Clemeneeau was applied in prac-
tice and the work of the Conference thus became concentrated in the hands 
of the big powers. It was possible for the small powers to express their 
views in the special cases referred to in the foregoing, though the big ones 
even then reserved for themselves the right to make the decisions. It was 
judged by the men in control of the Conference that thereby they could 
make sure that, in concentrating upon the matters of particular interest to 
them, the plenipotentiaries of the small powers could not usurp the floor 
during debate, as had happened a short time before at an Allied economic 
congress in Paris', and thus slow down the machinery of the Peace Confe-
rence. 
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It was deemed expedient to restrict the participation of the small nations 
in three ways: their representatives could be invited for a hearing before 
the Council of Ten;  they could attend the plenary sessions of the Confer-
ence, which, to be sure, were planned to be convened only very seldom;  
and an opportunity would be reserved for them on the basis of their 
membership to bring their influence to bear upon the content of statements 
and reports submitted to so-called special committees for expert treatment. 
Even in the third case, the major powers commanded a substantial majority 
of those participating in the rendering of decisions. Whereas the represen-
tation of each of the chief powers in the plenary assembly had been set at 
five delegates, the basis on which that of the small allies was determined 
was not their geographical size but the extent of their contribution to 
military operations and the magnitude of their war losses. Accordingly, 
states like Belgium and Serbia, which had fought in the war from the 
very beginning and had suffered exceptionally heavy losses, were conceded 
augmented representation at the plenary sessions on these express grounds. 
Estimates regarding the participation of any given small power in the 
war provoked endless controversy. Among South American states asso-
ciated with the war effort of the Western Allies, there were certain ones 
that were deemed, as pointed out earlier, to have waged war only in a 
theoretical sense. The question of the size of any given body of delegates 
represented in the plenary assembly involved, in view of its secondary 
importance, the granting in the main only of symbolic recognition to 
nations that had performed the Western Powers some service rather than 
guaranteeing them a realistic chance to advance special interests of theirs. 
At the session of the plenary assembly held on January 25, 1919, the 
dissatisfaction of the small powers over the rigid control maintained by 
the chief powers was given expression. At issue was the election of repre-
sentatives to the special committees of the Peace Conference. According 
to the plan drawn up by the leaders, the small states would be entitled to 
one-third of the membership of each committee. The right to participate 
in the conference had been granted to all the nations that had fought 
on the Allied side, including those that had »theoretically» waged war, 
as well as Poland and Czechoslovakia, which by virtue of the pro-Western 
orientation of their independence policy had been recognized before the 
Armistice in Paris, London and Washington as belligerents opposed to the 
Central Powers." 
The discussion featuring criticism of the predominant position taken 
by the Big Five was opened by Belgium's Foreign Minister Paul Hymans. 
In his turn on the floor, be demanded that Belgium be given two places 
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on each of two committees, the one dealing with the establishment of the 
League of Nations and the one drafting an international labor code.l" This 
demand was in conflict with the program formulated by the leaders of the 
chief powers, according to which, as mentioned, the small powers would 
be limited to a third, that is, five of the fifteen seats on each committee. 
Hymans' speech, in which his demand was grounded on Belgium's danger-
ous geopolitical situation, led to the release of pent-up feelings, sweeping 
aside the issue under examination and bringing on general censure of the 
control over the Conference exercised by the chief powers. Similarly, the 
representatives of, for example, Poland and Serbia emphasized the exposed 
position of their countries and pointed up the reasonableness of their being 
granted a voice when the question of the League of Nations came up for 
discussion. The speeches delivered by the Brazilian and Canadian plenipo-
tentiaries likewise criticized outspokenly the fact that the Big Five had 
reserved for themselves the authority to decide matters at the Conference 
and that the lesser powers were informed only after the decisions had 
been made."  
Clemenceau responded to these critical attacks in characteristic impetu-
ously sarcastic terms." His tone of finality, moreover, made it clear that 
the controlling powers had no intention of relinquishing their authority. 
The idea embodied in Hyman's demand that the question of the represen-
tation of the small powers on the committees should be dealt with all over 
again and that substantial concessions be made in their favor was thus in 
reality buried. The slight concessions made, with respect to the election 
of additional members to certain committees in some cases," did not alter 
the power relations in the Conference or the arrangements for the exercise 
of authority there. 
Thus did the organization arrived at during the war carry over in the 
Allied camp, having the effect of establishing a tradition, which was 
maintained also in the work of constructing the peace. The counterparts 
of the Western Allies' Supreme War Council in the Peace Conference were 
its leading organs, composed of the top representatives of the chief powers, 
such as the Council of Ten and the »Big Three», who represented the 
former in more compact strength. Among the smaller powers bitterness 
was felt over the attitude of great powers in curtailing their voice in 
matters. A particular target of grumbling was Clemenceau, whose personal 
influence and activity were known to have effectively contributed to this 
state of affairs. 
The states that had gained their independence during the final stages 
of the World War were destined to receive quite varying treatment from 
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the Conference when it assembled. On the one hand, there were Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, on the other, Finland and the Baltic states; with the 
claim of having leaned for support on the Western Allies in their striving 
for sovereignty, the former belonged in a different class in regard to diplo-
matic rights from the latter, which had lacked any high-level contact 
with the West in the pursuit of their independence policy. Thanks to 
their Westward orientation, the Poles and Czechs found themselves in a 
favored position at the end of the war: with the right of representation at 
the Peace Conference. Although these new states generally found them-
selves relegated to the background during negotiations, it did not mean 
that their interests were given no attention. 
A significant factor in drawing the Poles and Czechs together with the 
Western Allies was a community of interests. The aspiration of Poland and 
Czechoslovakia to acquire sufficient living space for themselves was in 
harmony with the aim of the latter to weaken the Central Powers by 
reducing their boundaries. The concentration of control at the Peace Con-
ference in the hands of the chief Western Powers thus was tantamount to 
a guarantee that the territorial interests of certain new states would be 
attended to. 
Compared with the aforementioned new states, Finland was in an ex-
ceptional position in that she had sought political support from Germany, 
which then went on to lose the war. In Finland's case, in contrast to that 
of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the outcome of the war meant the defeat 
of a cause she had l00ked upon as politically favorable. Whereas Poland 
and Czechoslovakia saw many auspicious opportunities opening up for 
themselves when the Peace Conference was called to assemble, Finland 
was forced into an acute crisis of adjustment in her endeavor to restore 
relations with the Western Powers, which had been impaired by her Ger-
man-oriented politics. 
Remotely situated as she was, Finland did not draw the attention of the 
victorious powers the way Poland and Czechoslovakia did on the new 
map of Europe, although she was not without political interest, either. The 
cool reception given Finland by Britain, France and the United States — 
notwithstanding the fact that the principle of self-determination could 
obviously be applied without trouble in establishing Finnish independence 
-- was due mainly to the pro-German orientation of the country in 1918. 
Since Finland had not yet fully shaken off the after-effects of this line of 
policy, she was placed in quarantine until she could get rid of the last 
traces of it; and the duration of this period partly depended on whether 
the Russian question, that »unknown factor», would prevent the pacifica-
tion of conditions in the northwestern corner of East Europe. 
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The interest of the Western Powers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had 
earlier been slight; geographically, they were fairly unknown lands to, for 
example, the United States. At the stage of the signing of the Armistice, 
when the general situation along the western borders of Russia was uncer-
tain, owing to the Bolshevik offensive and subsequent German military 
operations, interest was distinctly on the rise. The three Baltic countries 
constituted a region in which, to be sure, Finland was occasionally included 
by Western observers, although she differed from them not only with 
respect to her unique political heritage, featured by home rule for more 
than a century, but also because geopolitically she was not a »border state» 
but a buffer state between Russia and Scandinavia. 
Historically, the Baltic countries had been important to Russia as a 
military zone of defense and as key links in its chain of trade routes. This, 
in turn, had the effect that the Western Powers treated Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania with more reserve than they did Finland when the question of 
acknowledging their complete independence came up. The final adjustment 
of the situation in Russia reflected in this connection its influence in the 
background. 
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Chapter III 
Finland's efforts to achieve diplomatic contact with the Western Powers 
Following the Finnish Declaration of Independence, the Government 
decided to send delegations to the capitals of the major Western Powers as 
one measure toward gaining diplomatic recognition. It is obvious that the 
members of these delegations were poorly prepared to meet the difficulties 
involved in carrying out their missions. As notable figures in Finland's 
fight for her constitutional rights, they had traveled abroad and had suffer-
ed personally, too, in coping with tasks demanding courage. The unyielding 
faith they continued to show in the victory of justice was a legacy of the 
period of Czarist tyranny, when the Finnish people successfully resisted 
their alien ruler's attempts to Russify their country. And it was in the 
goddess of justice that the delegates continued to see the dominating force 
of the political forum. Idealists that they were, they paid less heed to the 
realistic factors affecting international relations. They gave little notice, 
for example, to Finland's delicate position in the near vicinity of a new 
meeting place of the opposed sides in the World War. And they largely 
failed to reckon with the reactions of opinion stirred up in the nations of 
the West by the increasing pro-German leanings of official Finnish circles. 
In line with the traditions of the period of the struggle to safeguard 
Finland's constitutional rights, the diplomatic activity of the members of 
the delegations was very much in the open: they often freely expressed 
their views, disregarding the caution required by their mission. Inspired by 
their ideas of patriotism, they were apt to say things in an Allied country 
that betrayed their open sympathy for Germany. They represented a breed 
of diplomats whose time was passing away into history. It was their inno-
cent belief that the cause of Finnish independence would win out on its 
own merits. 
Among these pioneer diplomats of independent Finland, who had won 
fame as defenders of the nation's threatened constitutional rights, were L.  
Kihlman and E. Wolff, whose sphere of operations became the countries 
of Western Europe, as well as Professor J. N. Reuter, who was assigned to 
tackle the United States. Of these representatives of the old generation, 
Reuter came nearest to possessing diplomatic skill;  and he was teamed up 
with Dr. Kaarlo Ignatius, who had been stationed on the other side of the 
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Atlantic since the fall of 1917 to deal with matters connected with food 
deliveries. 
Differing in some respects from the old type of diplomat was Rudolf  
Holsti, a liberal in political outlook and a great admirer of the Western 
democracies. His chief base of operations became London. 
Having been in contact with the British Government, Kihlman, Wolff 
and Holsti learned on January 18, 1918, from the Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Balfour, that the question of according Finland diplomatic recognition 
would not be dealt with until a later date. The delegation's journey took it 
after that to the Continent. The situation became rather mixed up at this 
stage, since the members of the delegation were practically cut off from 
contact with their own country and were therefore obliged to act according 
to the instructions given them on December 15, 1917. Thus, they turned 
to the French Government on February r 5 in the matter of diplomatic 
recognition, although as early as January 4 France had announced that it 
had decided to recognize Finnish independence. The call on Foreign Min-
ister S. Pichon accordingly was reduced to a polite round of introductions 
and an expression of thanks by the delegation for the favorable action 
taken by the French.' 
The work of the delegation was continued by its submitting requests for 
diplomatic recognition to the Governments of Belgium, Italy and Spain. 
A favorable response was obtained without difficulty from Spain, which 
simultaneously expressed its readiness to establish relations with Finland 
at once. Belgium and Italy postponed their decision, the former considering 
that the matter required negotiations with other Allied Powers and the 
latter being of the opinion that the matter was one to be decided by the 
Peace Conference. The delegation even turned to the Holy See, on the 
strength of later authorization, requesting its recognition. By this course of 
procedure, the delegation calculated that a successful outcome could have 
a favorable effect on the attitude of Roman Catholic countries. The gamble 
paid off: on March 2 the Vatican announced its recognition of the indepen-
dence of Finland. 
Finland had thus established contact with the states of Western Europe, 
after which the country's diplomatic representation began to shape up on 
a provisional basis. Holsti, assisted by Tancred Borenius, pitched camp in 
London, and Kihlman, with Erik Ehrström as his right-hand man, in Paris. 
The aides of both »charges d'affaires» were Finns who had resided for a 
fairly long time in the respective countries. 
Contact was made with representatives of the United States Government 
after the outbreak of the Civil War in Finland. A political race occurred 
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between delegates representing the legally installed Finnish Government 
(Senate) and the »People's Commissariat», or governing body set up by the 
Red Guards, to gain the ear of Uncle Sam. Santeri Nuorteva, the agent 
appointed by the revolutionary government, visited the State Department 
on February 26 — two days before Reuter and Ignatius were received by 
Secretary of State Lansing for an audience. Nuorteva used tactics based 
upon the line-up of belligerents in the World War: he branded the Finland 
under the White or legal Government as an ally of Germany's and as an 
enemy of democracy, his aim being to arouse unfriendly feeling in the 
United States toward the »Whites».2 The exceptional nature of the Finnish 
situation — what with the Civil War and the uncertainty over whether 
the country had accepted German intervention voluntarily or under ex-
ternal compulsion —, on the one hand, and the particularly critical phase 
of the World War then in progress, on the other, were factors that took 
away American interest in the Finnish question as far as the matter of 
diplomatic recognition was concerned. The envoys of the legal Finnish 
Government were laconically informed that the »internal disorders» in 
Finland barred the road to further negotiations. The audience with Presi-
dent Wilson that they had hoped for accordingly failed to materialize.3 
After that they left Washington and contented themselves with awaiting 
developments. 
There was no lack of difficulties connected with the diplomatic mission 
of Reuter and Ignatius. The approach taken by the latter, in particular, 
resulted in further obstructions to any favorable outcome. A brother of 
General Hannes Ignatius, an officer on the staff of the White Guard Head-
quarters, he took it upon himself to defend the pro-German stand of the 
legal Finnish Government as well as the measures adopted toward estab-
lishing a monarchy. This propagandistic activity of his defeated its own 
purpose of promoting good will toward Finland.' In the summer of 1918 
Ignatius and Reuter returned home convinced that under prevailing condi-
tions nothing could be done by diplomatic means to strengthen the cause of 
Finnish independence in the United States. 
During their sojourn in the United States, the two Finnish envoys 
had also run into troublesome cross-currents of opinion in Finnish-Ameri-
can circles, which were mainly divided into two factions in their attitude 
toward the situation in their native land. A substantial portion of the 
Finnish-American population emphasized their loyalty to official American 
policy, and while supporting the country's war effort also strove to influence 
the administration to adopt a tolerant attitude toward Finland. They did 
not wish to see Finland abandoned to her fate on account of her pro- 
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German orientation but advocated the application of pressure on Svin-
hufvud by, for instance, having the United States Government promise on 
certain conditions to send food supplies to Finland and to recognize her 
independenee. This, it was felt, would encourage resistance to the pro-
German policies of the legal Finnish Government.° Activity along these 
lines was viewed by Reuter and Ignatius with misgivings.7 Whereas the 
Finnish-Americans behind such activity condemned the abortive coup 
d'état of the Red Guards, the faction led by Nuorteva openly displayed its 
sympathy with the revolution;  and even after the end of the Civil War it 
endeavored, through its leader, to dissuade certain of the states bordering 
on the United States, notably Mexico, from hastening to recognize the 
independence of the Finland under the Government headed by Svinhufvud 
and Paasikivi.°  
Ignatius and Reuter could report no favorable results under prevailing 
conditions upon returning from their mission.° After their departure from 
the United States, the only person in that country with credentials from 
the legal Finnish Government was P. J. Valkeapää, who had been sent 
there to purchase grain. As of the summer of 1918, Finland was without 
any pOlitical representative in the United States. 
The landing on Finnish soil of German troops under General von der 
Goltz in April and the climactic event of the pro-German phase, the 
election on October 9 of Friedrich Karl, Prince of Hesse, as King of Finland, 
were developments that laid the basis for a suspension of Finnish diplo-
matie activity in Western capitals on both sides of the Atlantic. 
German intervention in the Finnish Civil War also had a chilling effect 
on relations with France, which had been among the first countries to 
accord diplomatic recognition to independent Finland. The souring of the 
French attitude in the new circumstances was given expression when 
Kihlman appeared in Paris to present his credentials as Charge d'affaires  
for Finland — the French Government did not want to acknowledge his 
status.10 After serving as an unofficial envoy" until the middle of July,  
Kihlman returned to Finland for consultations with the Government. He 
appears to have worked out a scheme for Finland's improving her relations 
with the Western Powers on condition that the German troops were made 
to withdraw from the country. 
Upon his return to Paris, Kihlman nevertheless openly championed the 
policy of his Government as far as the issue of the election of the king, in 
particular, was concerned.12 His attitude exasperated the French authorities. 
Accordingly, the French Foreign Ministry, »infinitely offended», made it 
known that it did not want to have anything to do with Kihlman.13 Seeing 
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how he had forfeited his chances of operating in France, Kihlman moved 
to Madrid, capital of neutral Spain, which had kept out of the World War. 
Finland was thus left without diplomatic representation in Paris as well as 
in Washington. Kihlman's aid, Ehrström, who had been stationed in Paris 
to handle commercial matters, remained at his post there so that, despite 
the breach in Franco-Finnish relations, he might seek to establish contact 
with the French Foreign Ministry." 
Holsti's position as the Finnish envoy in London was rendered diffi-
cult by the development of the situation at home in 1918. His predi-
cament was complicated further by his personal views. As a whole-
hearted champion of the republican form of government, he was dis-
tasteful to the conservative members of the Finnish Government, who 
idealized the monarchical system. And as an Entente sympathizer, he 
was known to oppose pro-German policies. As a diplomat, be became cut 
off at this stage from many of the vital issues of Finnish politics, which 
he found himself observing from the sidelines as if he were nothing better 
than a supernumerary. The crisis over Petsamo was dealt with, for example, 
by the Finnish Chargd d'affaires in Stockholm, A. Gripenberg;  and Holsti 
was informed on the matter by the British Foreign Office. It was Holsti's 
complaint, moreover, that his queries to the Government were seldom an-
swered,15 and he was not entrusted with certain technical facilities neces-
sary to carry out the duties of a diplomat, such as the right to use a code.1e 
Despite his limited resources, Holsti endeavored to keep active. It was 
his belief that the majority of the Finnish people opposed the pro-German 
orientation of their Government and the establishment of a monarchy;  
and, having been exposed to the ill will of the conservatives, he decided 
that he could count upon the support of what he assumed to be this 
majority of Finns. Holsti's activity in London in the summer and fall of 
1918 disseminating information in line with his own thinking apparently 
had a special significance" when Finland was obliged to proceed through 
the tumultuously emotional period experienced after the War by the West-
ern Allies to a change of political orientation. 
This stage of »retreat» in Finnish foreign policy, which the Government 
was forced to submit to, brought satisfaction not only of a general nature 
but also of a highly personal kind to Holsti, victim that he had been of 
hostile treatment. The repeated warnings he had given the foreign policy 
makers of his country concerning the untenability of the pro-German 
orientation18 had been proven valid. His self-esteem was bolstered by the 
fact that he was the only one of the members of the several delegations 
appointed at the turn of the years 1917-1918 to make overtures to the 
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Allied Governments who succeeded in keeping his post and starting a new 
tour of duty as a diplomat. 
Owing to his individualistic personality and views, which clashed with 
the general trend of opinion prevailing in Finnish bourgeois circles, Holsti 
had plenty of adversaries, who showered him with bitter criticism. They 
did acknowledge his energy, but, as they saw him, there was a good deal 
that was superficial about his character. They accused him of being untrust-
worthy and looked upon him as a person whose self-confidence caused 
him to overestimate his own abilities and to become a »pusher». 
A problem by itself in this connection revolves around the question as 
to whether Holsti's diplomatic activity before the Armistice reflected 
loyalty to the governing authorities then in power in Finland or whether 
he let his personal outlook — as a republican and an Anglomaniac — 
represent the character of these authorities in a one-sided and unfavorable 
light. 
The victory of the Western Allies in the World War brought the prevail-
ing trend of Finnish politics to a halt. The belief, which had sustained 
the Government's line of policy, that Germany would look after the matter 
of international recognition of Finland's independence, in accordance with 
the pact signed by the two countries on March 7, had been shattered by the 
inexorable force of events. In the changed situation, a re-evaluation of 
foreign policy became a sheer necessity, and yet the adjustment could not 
be made by the Finnish policy makers without trouble. The members of 
the Senate, or old Government, had compromised themselves during the 
period of collaboration with Germany and forfeited their chances of devot-
ing themselves to the future administration of their country. 
The phase then finished had been tantamount to a period of training 
rich in experience for Finnish diplomacy. It had been necessary to break 
loose from the deeply rooted idea that the issue of gaining recognition of 
national independence would be resolved by the »victory of justice», which 
Finland could count upon as a matter of course as the fruit of the nation's 
long struggle for political existence. The outlook cleared up only slowly;  
at the same time, it proved an arduous task to choose the lines of proce- 
dure that might yield results. It was suspected that entrusting the settle-
ment of the Finnish question in its entirety to the Peace Conference would 
not be to the advantage of the country, since the Conference would be 
burdened with the task of threshing out the postwar problems of the entire 
continent of Europe. On the other hand, there was no lack of of those, 
either, who in their idealism entertained the belief that the Finnish 
question, including the territorial claims that had been generated during 
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the Civil War to encompass even East Karelia, could be carried to a 
favorable conclusion.1° 
Around November the Finnish Government began to formulate plans 
for diplomatic operations with the Peace Conference in view.20 It remained 
for the future to reveal whether Finland would be allowed to be represented 
at the Conference by any agent authorized to look after her interests. 
Opinions differed regarding the political conditions that might be expected 
to be laid down before Finland's participation could be approved. There 
was talk of the necessity for restoring diplomatic relations between France 
and Finland, of »gaining the confidence of the Entente powers» in gene-
ral,Y1 and even of having the question of diplomatic recognition resolved 
as a pre-condition of participation.22 This exchange of views took place at 
a time when even the general lines along which the composition of the 
Peace Conference would be decided were unknown. Nobody knew, for 
instance, whether small states in the class of neutrals would be admitted 
at all. In the event of a negative decision, Finnish national interests would 
have to be safeguarded by other means. Among such »interests» — in addi-
tion to the matter of diplomatic recognition — were the questions of  
Petsamo, East Karelia and the Åland Islands.23 The line to be pursued in 
particular seemed to be establishing contacts with each of the leading 
Western Powers separately, so that they might be used to l00k after these 
interests at the Peace Conference. 
It was realized that the choice of office holders would be a difficult and 
delicate matter in connection with the change in the trend of foreign poli-
cy. Both Mannerheim, after visiting London and Paris, and Holsti had 
pointed out that accredited representatives of Finland would have to be 
persons enjoying the confidence of the Western Powers. 
Since the principal question remained open, it was generally decided that 
steps would have to be taken without delay to disseminate information 
effectively. Toward this end, plans were made to dispatch diplomatic ob-
servers to Paris; it was thought that thereby the situation might be cleared 
up in general, too. It was further considered a handicap that Finland had 
no political representative in the United States, which was believed bound 
to exercise a strong influence at the Peace Conference.24 The Paasikivi 
Government even appointed two representatives to go to Washington. One 
of them, Kaarlo Ignatius, who had previously been on a mission to the 
United States, was obliged to turn back upon his arrival in London, how-
ever, apparently because of being stigmatized as a pro-German sympathiz-
er."-' The other, Akseli Rauanheimo, continued his journey across the 
Atlantic, but he was prevented from engaging in diplomatic activity by the 
4 
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refusal of the American authorities to accept the credentials that had been 
given him by the Finnish Government in power during the period of 
collaboration with Germany. 
Following the signing of the Armistice, the Finnish Government had 
instructed Holsti to do what he could to enable Finland to participate in 
the Peace Conference. As, for the reasons mentioned in the foregoing, the 
country had no envoy in Paris or Washington, Holsti requested that the 
British Government, which he approached in the matter on November 18, 
transmit corresponding petitions to the American and French authorities.26 
The matter was shelved among questions »to be jointly dealt with by the 
Western Powers» at some future date.27 It was then assumed in Finland 
that the Peace Conference would provide a general forum not only for the 
belligerent powers on both sides in the World War but also for neutrals 
and for the new states seeking recognition of their sovereignty on the 
principle of self-determination. 
Weighed down heavily by uncertainty, the Finnish Government, which 
had been headed since the end of November by Lauri Ingman an, »old 
line» man famous for his flexibility, undertook to select a delegation to be 
sent to Paris. The Government was by no means ignorant of the fact that 
the delegates would have to be men who had not actively supported pro-
German policy.28 The choice further involved taking into consideration the 
candidates' knowledge of foreign languages and their diplomatic skill, 
which, owing to the force of circumstance, was limited by lack of training 
and experience. 
Senator Leo Ehrnrooth had been considered for the post of leader of the 
delegation. But when difficulties arose in securing a visa for him,29 he was 
replaced by Dr. Adolf Törngren, who had been on hand in December r917 
to present Finland's request for diplomatic recognition to the Swedish Gov-
ernment and who enjoyed a reputation as an authority on, for example, 
the Russian question. The other members of the delegation were Stefan  
Söderhjelm, chief of the political section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and Professor Yrjö Hirn, the well-known esthetician, who in connection 
with his travels abroad to do research had gained an insight into the poli-
tical situation prevailing in Western Europe and whose knowledge of 
foreign languages might prove a valuable asset. The visa for Törngren could 
not be arranged without delay, for the French authorities contended that 
at an early stage of the World War he had endeavored to mediate a separa-
te peace between Germany and Russia.3° This allegation, which was aimed 
to compromise him, did not prevent him from reaching Paris in the end, 
but this was not until the beginning of February. 
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The troubles attending the initial stage of Finnish diplomacy — mark-
ed by sharp differences of opinion, surging personal ambitions and, fi-
nally, the uncertainty stemming from inexperience — are illustrated by 
the fact that, at a juncture when outwardly directed activity should have 
been prosecuted with all available means, disagreement among those 
engaged in the diplomatic operations in Paris hampered the work of the 
delegation. The course of events in this case reflects the internal difficulties 
involved in the organization of the administrative apparatus in charge of 
Finland's foreign affairs. 
The Peace Conference consisted mainly of the political leaders of the 
of the Western Allies. In addition, representatives of such nations as 
Czechslovakia and Poland, which had gained their independence as a result 
of the war, were allowed to participate, as already mentioned, in the 
discussion of certain questions, thanks to their having sought the support 
of the Allies in their struggle for freedom. The neutral states, among them 
those of Scandinavia, were not admitted to membership in the Conference. 
Finland, whose neutrality was open to question as a result of her colla-
boration in the Civil War with Germany, was not accorded the right to 
attend the Conference, as were certain of the new states. Accordingly, she 
was obliged to seek unofficial connections with the victorious Allies or 
resort to the use of intermediaries. 
To prevent the Finnish question from being buried, the Governmen t 
endeavored to increase the effectiveness of its diplomatic representation in 
the French capital. Thus, Holsti was instructed, after the practical arrange-
ments relating to grain deliveries had begun to be ready, to shift his base 
of operations from London to Paris, where Foreign Minister Enckell also 
arrived at the end of March. This strengthened Finland's representation in. 
Paris considerably. In addition to the names already mentioned, the Finnish 
delegation included a few experts on special matters, such as J. Uggla, who 
was on hand to deal with the question of the Åland Islands, and Lauri 
Hannikainen, whose specialty was East Karelia. In spite of the added 
personal prestige of its membership, the work of the delegation was never-
theless weakened by constant bickering. 
Foreign Minister Enckell assumed the prerogatives of rank in the Finnish 
Paris delegation. Törngren, who had acted as head of the delegation on the 
strength of his appointment in December, 1918, t00k it as a loss of face. 
Piqued, he refused to collaborate with Enckell and instead undertook to 
look after the interests of his country as a separate enterprise, establishing 
a «bureau» of his own for the purpose. Enckell was joined in his "bureau"," 
in turn, by Hirn and Holsti — the latter presumably on account of their 
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official relationship in the main, for he failed to see eye to eye with the 
Foreign Minister on many a matter.  
Enckell, who in his capacity as Minister Secretary of State in St. Peters-
burg in r9r7 had acquired a good deal of diplomatic experience, enjoyed 
the confidence of Mannerheim. It was also to carry out certain special tasks 
assigned by Mannerheim that he had traveled to Paris. In particular, his 
mission was to hasten recognition of Finnish independence by the Western 
Powers and to ascertain whether support would be forthcoming in case 
Finland participated in intervention operations against St. Petersburg.32 
Holsti, for his part, felt that he had been aecorded no respect whatsoever, 
and he viewed with mistrust Ossian Donner, for example, who, as an 
eeonomic expert with an excellent knowledge of the British way of life,33  
had been chosen to take his place in London. During the dispute over 
•vacancies» in the Finnish foreign service, Holsti evidently was anxious 
to clinch his claim to the London post with the future in view.3' 
Gaining the ear of conference leaders in Paris proved difficult for the 
Finnish representatives. The very working procedure of the Peace Confer-
ence made it hard to contact top-level men personally, but the Finns were 
further handicapped by the »pro-German» stigma attached to their politics 
and their country's continued existence without the diplomatic recogni-
tion of the Western Allies.  
Enckell had to wait until late in April before, for instance, he was 
received by French Foreign Minister Pichon. And in his efforts to gain an 
audience with the United States Peace Commission, he managed to make 
contact only with Henry White and Samuel Morison, who were outside 
the »inner circle». Törngren seems to have been just about totally cut off 
from any contact with the diplomatic leaders of the West. 
The difficulties encountered failed to cool down tempers as the qualifica-
tions and abilities of others were challenged. The general feeling of un-
certainty grew among the members of the delegation, since the informa-
tion received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Helsinki on develop-
ments back home was extremely scanty. Thus, the Finnish delegates 
learned for the first time in April about the progress made in settling the 
issue of the Finnish Government through a member of the United States 
Peace Commission.35 
Taking advantage of the freedom of movement afforded by the division 
in their ranks, the members of the Finnish delegation busied themselves in 
a fumbling way, without any definite line of strategy. The best known of 
them, Enckell, Holsti and Törngren, went their separate ways around Paris:  
Holsti rubbed elbows with Americans and Englishmen, Törngren with the 
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French and Enckell with White Russians as well as the French.ss The 
Russian émigres represented a sphere of influence that aroused the interest 
of the Finns to a certain extent. Of the Finnish delegates it was evidently 
Enckell who, having been in contact with the Russians most and having 
the closest knowledge of the Russian question, drew support from the 
émigrés for his notion that the Bolshevik regime was a transitory phenom-
enon and that it would not be to Finland's advantage to refrain from 
participating in action organized to hasten its end. Holsti, for his part, paid 
heed, in formulating his conception of the situation in Russia, to the views 
of the American and British political leaders, whose attitude toward inter-
vention was marked by restraint. 
The Finnish delegation was split over the Russian question in a different 
way from its division over personalities and leadership. Hirn, for example, 
could not warm up to the idea of intervention, whereas Törngren lined 
up on Enckell's side in this matter. The disagreement over it and other 
political problems closely affecting the status of Finland as an independent 
country resulted in divergent reports, furthermore, to the Regent and the 
Foreign Ministry, leaving the Government in a state of perplexity. 
Finland had taken her first steps on the road to a new foreign policy 
around the time the World War ended and the machinery of the Peace 
Conference began to be installed in Paris. The majority of the Finns who 
became involved in the business of diplomacy considered themselves 
eminently qualified from the standpoint of experience to tackle the prob-
lems at hand. Since, in addition to everything else, communications with 
the Government back home were poor, these diplomatic representatives 
were guided in their operations by their own highly subjective ideas on 
how to deal with the problems confronting them. The disorganized condi-
tions and the lack of diplomatic traditions produced in the atmosphere 
charged with conflicting opinions a slow working rhythm, which yielded 
meager results. 
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Chapter IV 
Finland's Food Shortage and the Western Allies 
The exceptional conditions created by World War I had reduced Finnish 
foreign trade to a fraction of what it had been before. The situation made 
Finland materially dependent on her eastern neighbor. The Russian Revo-
lution, which reduced Russia to chaos internally, broke Finnish econo-
mic ties with the East, too. Russia's military deterioration, which pro-
ceeded parallel with the revolutionary activities in 1917, hastened the 
paralysis of trade between the two countries: Russia no longer purchased 
military supplies or industrial products from Finland, and Russian grain 
no longer reached the Finnish market. The slowdown in industrial and 
commercial activity resulted in an economic crisis, which was manifested 
in unemployment and in a scarcity of food and other necessities. 
During the early stage of the crisis fumbling efforts were made to estab-
lish contacts in the West, particularly the United States, the seemingly 
inexhaustible economic resources of which, it was hoped, could be tapped 
to combat hunger in Finland. Negotiations undertaken in the spring of 
1917 led to an agreement whereby the Finnish Government entered an 
order through the American firm of Grace Company for 5o,000 tons of 
wheat from the United States. Because of the exceptional situation the 
Americans insisted upon payment in advance despite the fact that the 
price of wheat could not be determined at the time the contract was signed. 
Accordingly, with the Bank of Finland acting as guarantor, the Finnish 
Government had sent a promissory note for an agreed sum to the National 
City Bank in New York to be handed over to the agent as soon as the 
wheat had been delivered to the export harbors. The matter of obtaining 
a transportation permit had, however, been left open on the part of both 
Russia and the warring Western Powers. 
Obstacles to a practical solution of the grain problem began to appear. 
The Inter-Allied Supply Committee stationed in St. Petersburg put on a 
cold front. It instructed the Finnish Government to procure a correspond-
ing amount of rye from Russia because difficulties seemed to have arisen 
in obtaining a license for the grain purchased in the United States. Accord-
ingly, the Finnish Government ordered even a larger consignment of 
grain from the Russians, making the payment in full in advance since 
assurances were given that this would expedite the deal.' Having turned 
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both East and West in the matter, the Finns consoled themselves with the 
thought that grain would be delivered from at least one or the other side. 
At the end of July 1917 new obstacles to the fulfillment of the deals 
cropped up.2 It began to appear as if the provisional Russian Government 
wanted to put an economic squeeze on the Finns to dissuade what it 
considered a pig-headed Finnish Parliament from going ahead with its 
scheme to establish complete home rule by enacting a special law. Toward 
the end of August the tension between Finland and Russia showed signs 
of relaxing when the Finnish Government decided to submit to an order 
from the provisional Russian Government to dissolve Parliament. But even 
then the chances of getting grain from Russia did not seem to improve. 
This brought the earlier plan to import wheat from the United States to 
the fore again. The Inter-Allied Supply Committee in St. Petersburg had 
finally come across with the required licence. By the end of October, thanks 
to the efforts of the American agent, a third of the 45,00o-ton wheat 
purchase had been delivered to the ports for loading and the remaining 
two-thirds were on their way.3 Meanwhile, Swedish cargo ships had been 
chartered to carry the grain. In addition, the Finnish authorities had agreed 
to go along with any measures the Allies might take to control the trans-
portation and distribution of the grain. 
The United States authorities continued to practice caution in handling 
the matter of the grain transportation license. They set in October as the 
primary condition for the granting of such a license that the provisional 
Russian Government approve the measures taken by Finland to procure 
grain from the United States.' A recommendation to this effect was sent 
on November 6 from St. Petersburg to Washington, or at a time when 
the provisional Government was on the point of collapse. When the 
cablegram was delivered three days later, Kerenski had already been 
overthrown. After that it was no longer deemed necessary to sound out 
the »Russian attitude» toward delivering American grain to the hungry 
Finns. 
In the summer and fall of 1917 the grain deal between the United States 
and Finland touched upon problems involving the course of hostilities in 
the World War and the interests of the major belligerent powers. One of 
these problems was how to avoid the danger of the grain's falling into 
German hands. Another was the growing problem of supplying the Allied 
forces fighting on the Western front; 
 as the number of American troops in 
action steadily increased, this matter commanded more and more attention, 
overshadowing Finland's need. After many difficulties had been surmount-
ed, it nevertheless came as a surprise when on November 12 the United 
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States food administrator, Herbert Hoover, announced that he had called a 
halt to preparations for shipping grain to Finland and ordered it to be sent 
to France instead. To justify this decision Hoover explained that the Allied 
supply situation had deteriorated to the extent that the available wheat 
stores could hold out only about twenty days.° He reported shortly after-
ward to Secretary of State Lansing that America was simply incapable of 
arranging the delivery of wheat or wheat products to anybody else except 
the Allies.7 
State Department officials and the directors of the Food Administration 
considered the Finnish appeal for grain from various angles. The State 
Department took into account the political factors bearing upon the matter: 
geographically Finland was situated at a crossroads of international politi-
cal interests where pro-German, pro-Entente and neutralist forces were 
apt to clash in a struggle for domination. The prime consideration of the 
food administrators was to settle supply problems in a way best calculated 
to serve the country's own war effort. The Finnish authorities had very 
little insight into Allied thinking;  and even if they did perhaps have some 
grasp of the difficulties with which the Western Powers were coping, they 
could not understand the prolonged delay in reaching a favorable decision. 
When toward the end of October r917 information began to reach Fin-
land concerning the appearance of obstacles to the fulfillment of the grain 
deal — there was talk of the confiscation of the wheat purchased by the 
Finns without its being known that the consignment was being diverted 
to feed Allied soldiers in the field — there was no lack of bitter indignation 
in the Finnish press. Finland was observed to have suffered a hard blow, 
Wilson's idealistic slogans were found to be empty in practice, and »Amer-
ican cynicism» became a catchword.° After the hopes of obtaining help 
from across the Atlantic slumped, a further worsening of the situation 
caused Finns to seek a solution elsewhere. It was at this juncture that the 
Finnish Government decided to appeal to Sweden and later on also to 
Germany.° 
In his first report to the State Department, the United States Consul, 
Thomas Haynes, who had started his tour of duty in Helsinki around this 
time, explained that pro-German propaganda was gaining the upper hand 
in Finland. He took the line that expressly from the standpoint of the 
development of public sentiment it would be expedient to do something 
about the grain deal.10 With an eye to a chance to weaken the German 
influence, Lansing ordered Hoover at the beginning of December to inves-
tigate the possibility of letting Finland have food supplies in some form." 
The offers made by Hoover shortly afterward to the Finnish Govern- 
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ment's representative Kaarlo Ignatius were aimed to alleviate the frustration 
felt in Finland over the cancellation of the wheat deliveries. Hoover 
offered to have 40,000 tons of oat products shipped to Finland either im-
mediately or by the end of January 1918. The other alternative, which 
appeared to be a more complicated and slower arrangement, involved 
procuring wheat from Australia — in which case Finland would have to 
fend for herself in chartering the tonnage to carry the grain. Explaining 
these alternatives to the Secretary of State, Hoover confessed to feeling 
the utmost reluctance in proceeding with the plan in spite of its political 
expediency. He said he failed to see any humanitarian excuse for it, since 
somebody else was being deprived of food to the same extent as another 
was being provided with it.12 
The exchange of views between Lansing and Hoover showed that they 
failed to see eye to eye in the matter of allocating grain to Finland. Com-
mon to both, in any case, was a desire to advance the Allied cause in the 
war. The focus of their attention, however, was on different sectors of 
the vast theater of military operations: on the one hand was the Western 
front and on the other the incipient Northern front. The State Department 
presumably was informed on Germany's aspirations to extend its influence 
to the Arctic sphere, and that is why Lansing sought to cool down the pro-
German sympathies of Finnish political leaders by arranging for food deliv-
eries to Finland. Since, furthermore, Finland had entered the phase of 
establishing her independence, the State Department was bent on settling 
the issue with the »least possible delay».13 The Food Administration for 
its part was anxious to concentrate its operations on the area of hostilities 
where the decisive battles could be expected to be fought. That was the 
main reason for Hoover's dissatisfaction. 
When the question came up of implementing the »substitute plan» for 
delivering grain to Finland, the Allied Powers demanded the institution of 
strict control to prevent the shipments from falling into the wrong hands. 
It was feared that the supplies shipped to Finland might be diverted by 
intermediaries to Germany or that they might be used to provision the 
Russian troops still based in Finland. Conferring on the matter, the Amer-
ican and British authorities considered the relative merits of routing the 
shipments via Gothenburg, Sweden, or Narvik, Norway, to Finland. The 
Narvik route seemed the more expedient one, for it was less exposed to 
the danger of the supplies' being sidetracked to Germany." 
Secretary of State Lansing, who had influenced the decision to help the 
Finns, was anxious to study the reliablity of the »guarantees» offered in 
detail." According to his directives, plans were laid to deliver the grain 
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included in the substitute program in small consignments — consisting at 
first of 8,000 tons —, to designate the United States Consul in Helsinki as 
the consignee, to have explicit instructions given regarding the continued 
control of the shipments en route from Narvik via Haaparanta (Haparanda),  
Sweden, to Finland, and finally to control the distribution measures taken 
at the destination. Such instructions were dispatched from Washington to 
Mr. Haynes in Helsinki on January 16, 1918."  The Finnish envoy Kaarlo 
Ignatius was on hand when the arrangements were worked out," but the 
Finnish Government was also required to agree specifically to the condi-
tions laid down. 
Political suspicion of German designs was manifested in many ways in 
both the United States and Great Britain while the problem of delivering 
grain to the Finns was being worked out. The British even expressed 
apprehension that the grain might be smuggled out of Finland to Germany. 
The Americans for their part, citing Lansing's directives, stressed that if 
despite the control measures taken during transportation and distribution 
anything uncalled for happened, the American Consul in Helsinki would 
have the acknowledged right to suspend the deliveries. It was desired to 
insure the feasibility of the precautionary measures in advance so that 
something could be done without further delay to relieve the food shortage 
in Finland.16 
The Western Powers' insistence on exercising rigid controls could be 
explained in part in the light of certain prior warning experiences. At an 
earlier stage in the war they had participated in supplying Bulgaria and 
Greece, only to discover that certain shipments had been diverted over to 
the side of the Central Powers. That is why the Allies wanted to make 
sure of Finland's stand toward two previously mentioned circumstances: 
one was their right, in line with the blockade of Germany, to supervise 
the distribution of the food supplies;  the other concerned Finland's obliga-
tion to refrain from re-exporting any of these supplies to Germany.1° 
The Civil War that broke out in Finland toward the end of January 1918 
signified a political event that the Western Allies did not overlook even 
in connection with the food deal. The question of distribution and its 
supervision was bound, it was realized, to grow increasingly difficult. The 
United States Embassy in Stockholm urged Washington to wait until 
«order» was restored in the country,20 but the State Department did not 
wish to cancel the plans already set into motion. On orders from Secretary 
Lansing the American food administrators continued at the beginning of 
February with preparations for the initial shipment of eight to ten thousand 
tons of grain to Finland. The consignment was supposed to be ready for 
transportation within two to three weeks. 
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The transportation of the food consignment to Finland depended ulti-
mately upon what the United States Ambassador in Stockholm had to say. 
It was in the light of his statement that the final decision would be made 
as to whether conditions in Finland would permit a controlled distribution 
of supplies.21 Additional directions concerning the supervision of deliveries 
to Finland came from London, which was the operational center for the 
blockade of Germany. The British Government wanted to extend the 
export ban to apply not only to the grain consignments but also in part 
to products of the Finnish woodworking industry, like pulp, being sold to 
Germany. In general it sought to arrange supervision in the same way as 
had been done in the case of neutral powers;  that is, it was out to secure 
the entry of British observers into Finland and to establish a Finnish trade 
agency in London. 
The British authorities were likewise anxious to expedite the delivery of 
the first grain consignments to Finland, and they were prepared to grant 
immediate permission for their transportation as far as Sweden. The 
transfer of the grain to the Finnish side would be permitted, however, 
only after fulfilment of the conditions laid down had been made certain.22 
During negotiations concerning the conditions of control in February 
beween both parties to the deal, signs of restraint began to appear in the 
attitude of the White, or legal, Finnish Government. The idea of admitting 
British observers into the country aroused negative reactions among many 
who had become accustomed to contemplating the development of future 
Finnish policy along lines of close collaboration with Germany.23 The 
demand that the export to Germany not only of food but also of certain 
products of the woodworking industry be banned appeared to violate the 
commercial freedom of action of the Finnish Government.2 M1 Submission 
to the export ban was apparently inhibited by the prospect of the White 
forces' obtaining munitions from Germany, which might then insist upon 
certain deliveries in exchange. Such a likelihood required preserving a free 
hand in trade. 
The discussions in Stockholm and London during February nevertheless 
appear to have resulted in the Finnish representatives' showing an inclina-
tion to accept a kind of control agreement.2a The draft agreement mentions 
the institution of Allied control measures as well as a ban on food exports 
to Germany;  on the other hand, no mention is made of any ban on the 
export of products of the woodworking industry.26 The hope of getting the 
first grain consignment from the United States speedily and of gaining 
certain other commercial advantages in the West27 evidently had the 
effect of creating a compliant frame of mind even in pro-German Finnish 
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circles. The legal Finnish Government at Vaasa, whose representatives 
abroad were obliged to go about their business without clearly defined in-
structions on account of the poor communications, was prepared for its 
part to resort to certain expedients to bolster its position in an uncertain 
situation. 
The march of military events, however, caused the representatives of 
the Western Allies and of the Finnish Government to move away from 
each other. The war effort was intensified in Washington, London and 
Paris, and the Allies aimed to close every possible gap in the blockade of 
Germany. The waxing strength of the Germans in Eastern Europe was 
observed with increasing concern by the Western Powers. When the offen-
sive on the Eastern front began toward the end of February, Finland too 
could be expected to be affected by the course of events. 
Advance intelligence regarding German intervention in the Finnish 
Civil War caused the sympathy — cool that it had been, to be sure — felt 
in Allied quarters over the supply situation in Finland to vanish. Hoover 
had repeatedly made known his opposition to Lansing's measures28 and the 
Department of War Commerce joined him in opposing the shipment of 
grain to Finland.29 As a consequence the preparatory steps taken in Feb-
ruary were halted.30 The negative attitude of the Entente Allies was 
strengthened by the reports received by them concerning the agreements 
concluded by the Finnish and German Governments. On March 8 the 
British Government notified the United States that no grain shipments to 
Finland would be sanctioned.31  
The Finnish bid for food had now been stopped dead. Contact both 
ways was maintained to some extent, it is true, mostly as before by repre-
sentatives of the different parties stationed in Stockholm. The »negoti-
ations», if the talks might be dignified by such a term, had shifted to a 
lower diplomatic level. The geopolitical environment, however, was a 
favorable one, for the Swedish capital provided a good observation post 
from which to follow the development of the emergency situation that had 
arisen in Finland. 
Evidently the Western Powers had for the time being abandoned their 
practical preparations to provide Finland with grain; they were now bent 
upon keeping a close check on the progress of events. The subject of food 
supplies could serve as a trial balloon. By sounding out the attitude toward 
it of Finnish representatives now and then, British and American diplomats 
could draw plausible inferences with respect to the status of relations 
between Finland and Germany and to the degree of hardening of political 
sentiment among the Finns toward the Western Allies.32 When events led 
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to German military intervention in the Finnish Civil War, Finland was no 
longer a neutral country in the eyes of Germany's enemies. Illustrative is 
the view expressed by the United States Minister to Stockholm, Ira Morris: 
»Allied Ministers are of the opinion that in view of control of Finnish 
commerce now obtained by Germany any arrangement in prima f a c i e 
undesirable as it would presumably be made only with German consent 
and is therefore presumably in German interest.» 
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the notion gained force in 
Great Britain and the United States that Germany had obtained a super-
visory hold on the political and economic situation in White Finland.3" 
It was surmised that, impelled by its pro-German leanings, the Finnish 
Government based in Vaasa would defy the Western Powers and, forfeiting 
its sovereign rights, make the territory under its rule available to German 
tr00ps to operate in.35 The World War had reached its decisive stage, and 
neither side had any scruples about resorting to any action likely to help 
defeat the enemy. The outbreak of the Civil War had enabled the Germans 
to obtain a hard grip on Finland and they apparently intended to exploit 
this advantage to create an opportunity of gaining access to the Arctic coast. 
The Western Powers for their part were forced to confine their activity 
to the use of economic weapons. The United States believed from experi-
ence that it could utilize its material resources to guide the policies of 
such nations as had kept out of the war. Thus it had scored successes in 
developing trade relations with certain neutral countries, like Spain, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and, most recently, Sweden, at the same 
time arousing popular sentiment favorable to the Allied cause. The Ameri-
can and British authorities were not inclined, on the other hand, to draw 
closer to Finland, a country in upheaval, which to an important extent 
was »under German occupation». In the prevailing circumstances they did 
not think any good purpose could be served by supplying the hungry 
Finns with grain.36 
Accordingly, the attitude of the Western Powers toward Finland could 
conceivably change only in two cases: r) if Finnish politics took a favor-
able turn from their standpoint during the course of the World War, or 
2) if Germany lost the war. As long as no convincing evidence turned up 
that either thing was happening, the chances appeared to be that the 
Americans and British would not change their stand toward Finland's bid 
for food supplies. The end of the Civil War in May 1918 did not alter the 
complexion of the situation: the German troops stayed in Finland and, 
looked at from the Allied camp, the country appeared to be politically and 
economically under German control.97 
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In Lansing's view it would be unwise for the Western Allies to lure 
Finland with promises of grain to break relations with Germany. Such a 
move, as he saw it, might tend to create the impression outwardly that 
Finland was valuable and important as a pawn in the hostilities against 
Germany. Instead, the idea should be fostered that Finland was working 
in collaboration with Germany. If, then, as it appeared, Finland intended 
to acquire territory for herself with the support of Germany from Russia, 
the Allies should take a negative position toward any such move and at 
the same time continue to refuse to let any grain consignments pass.33 
The Governments of the Scandinavian countries made attempts in the 
summer of 1918 to adjust the difficulties in the way of Finland's obtaining 
relief from the West. Seeing the Finnish scarcity of necessities grow worse 
than ever, Sweden took the initiative. And when the matter was taken up 
for discussion at the meeting of Scandinavian foreign ministers held in 
Copenhagen in the early summer, Denmark and Norway expressed willing-
ness to go along with Sweden. The upshot of the conference was that on 
August 8 the three Scandinavian Governments simultaneously delivered 
requests, each couched in approximately the same terms, to the British and 
United States Governments that grain be shipped to Finland. The amount 
asked for was not large, only 8,000 tons, but it was considered sufficient 
to relieve the situation until the next crop could be distributed for public 
consumption. Efforts were made to find a line of compromise in the 
question of control, which had previously aroused disagreement: it was 
proposed that a body chosen by the Scandinavian countries be formed to 
supervise the distribution of the grain;  being neutral it might stand a better 
chance of acceptance.3° 
Besides desiring to help the Finns in their distress, Sweden was politi-
cally motivated in taking action. The issue of Petsamo had placed a new 
strain on British-Finnish relations in late June and early July. So Sweden, 
which had made earlier efforts to ease the tension, was using this joint 
Scandinavian move as a means to persuade the Finnish authorities to 
practice greater restraint in collaborating with the Germans.40 
The responses received by the Scandinavian Governments from London 
and Washington revealed that the attitude of the United States and Great 
Britain remained negative. During the course of the summer it had been 
made known in various connections41: the »occupation» of Finland was a 
decisive obstacle to the delivery of grain.42 This stand demonstrated that 
the leading Western Powers actually were convinced that Germany was 
preparing an offensive operation in the direction of Murmansk and the 
Arctic coast with Finland serving as the base and that the Finns were in 
league with the Germans. 
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At the stage of the Armistice negotiations in October 1918, the general 
lines of development of events began to take shape rapidly. Insofar as 
Finland intended to take into account the political prospects of the changed 
circumstances, she would have to start revising her program of operations, 
which had been drawn up on a basis of a pro-German orientation. Cutting 
loose the German ties was all the more important as it was known that 
after the Armistice had taken effect the blockade of the Central Powers 
would continue to be maintained and possibly even intensified. At the 
end of hostilities the victorious powers felt their responsibility for the 
progress of events extend throughout nearly the whole of Europe, and it 
forced upon them problems requiring solution beyond their own territories. 
The food shortage in particular demanded urgent action. The political 
turnabout on the international scene spurred Finland to consider the expe-
diency of shifting her orientation: the sheer scarcity of the necessities of 
life offered her no alternatives. 
Victory in war thus did not free the Western Powers from further 
exertions. The overriding problem for them was how to make the shift to 
the conditions of peace without losing control of the situation and forfeit-
ing victory. According to the logic of »victory», the organization of peace 
involved a general guardianship by the victors over the vanquished. Only 
Russia was to be left outside the pale, although certain Western political 
circles itched to intervene in that country's internal affairs. The need of 
establishing a system of guardianship was justified not only by the chaotic 
conditions then prevailing but also by the threatening outbreak of ideolog-
ical war between the »old states» and Russia. In their efforts to create a 
new social order on the basis of Lenin's doctrines, the Bolsheviks adopted 
offensive ideological tactics and aimed their propaganda beyond the borders 
of their own country. 
To meet this aggressive challenge the Western Allies were compelled to 
set up their own ideological barricades: in addition to upholding their 
politico-social system, they were confronted with the task of organizing 
an effective international relief operation. It was at this juncture that the 
states that had kept out of the war and those that had been created during 
the final stage of hostilities drew the attention of the political centers of 
action in London, Paris and Washington. There were not only political 
but also humanitarian reasons for engaging in relief work. The victorious 
powers nevertheless treated the defeated Central Powers, especially Ger-
many, severely. As long as the terms of the Peace Treaty and its acceptance 
remained open on Germany's part, the behavior of the Allies was marked 
by a toughness aimed at »securing victory». The fear that the revolutionary 
5 
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movement which had gained momentum among the Central Powers might 
swing over to the far left seemed to be overshadowed by this aspiration. 
The relief program was brought into the framework of a kind of division 
of labor worked out after the signing of the Armistice by the Western 
Powers. The United States was awarded total responsibility for the manage-
ment of this program, while France took over the military supervision of 
continental Europe and Great Britain the enforcement of the blockade. 
The part played thereafter by Britain and France in the relief operatiOns 
was confined to decisions affecting the blockade and the transportation of 
supplies, while the actual administration of relief became the province of 
the United States, with its proprietory control of the food stores. 
The organization of the relief program was entrusted to Herbert Hoover, 
whose name had become famous during the war as the administrator of 
the economic aid given Belgium and to whom President Wilson had now 
granted broad powers of action. Hoover constructed a large-scale operation-
al network for the distribution of supplies. The local adminstrative 
agents in the different countries became known as »Hoover men», and they 
had at their disposal stores of foodstuffs situated in neutral territory at key 
points like Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Copenhagen. 
Hoover for his part did not relax his hold on the powers granted him 
to organize the relief operations but, exploiting the prestige and might of 
the United States, saw to it that his jurisdiction was not narrowed down 
by the other Allied Powers. He was, it is true, agreeable to maintaining 
relations with the other Allies on a negotiating level. But he disregarded 
every proposal and demand for, e.g., the formation of a joint collegial 
agency with discretionary authority in the matter of distributing supplies." 
Problems confronting Hoover included the organization of shipping facili-
ties and obtaining the co-operation of the authorities in charge of the 
blockade in arranging grain shipments to various countries. 
To Finland overcoming the supply shortage was a matter that, in ad-
dition to its practical urgency, under prevailing circumstances could contri-
bute significantly to strengthening the foundations of her sovereign existence. 
It presupposed, however, the surmounting of certain difficulties, for on 
account of her political orientation during the spring and summer of 1918 
Finland had become branded as an associate of the Central Powers. Thus, 
when Hoover for the first time after the Armistice took up the question of 
feeding the hungry in Europe, the political status of Finland was described 
as »unclear». Politically Finland was lumped together with certain parts 
of the Russian realm, like the Baltic countries and the Ukraine, as distin-
guished from the neutral Scandinavian states and the »little Allies», such 
as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Serbia.44 
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Before the Armistice negotiations opened Secretary of State Lansing had 
repeated his earlier view that Finland should be considered an occupied 
country, which the Germans were liable to use unopposed in military 
operations against the Western Allies.45 
 During the negotiations Allied 
representatives gave vent in numerous connections to their displeasure 
over Finland's political course up to that time. The British made it known 
that the Finnish Government had not been recognized, and the adverse 
attitude of the Americans was reflected in their continued unwillingness 
to let the Finns have grain. Sweden's renewed efforts to obtain a grain 
allocation for Finland by acting as intermediary in arrangements were 
given the cold shoulder by Washington.4° 
Signs of a change in the Allied policy toward Finland began to appear 
after the signing of the Armistice, when growing burdens of responsibility 
for the progress of events in Europe weighed down the shoulders of the 
political leaders of the victorious powers. 
The active interest shown by Sweden in combating the supply scarcity 
in Finland had not waned in the meantime. At this stage Sweden had 
proposed in conjunction with Denmark, in response to suggestions made 
from Finnish quarters, that each of the two countries deliver 5,000 tons of 
grain from its own stores to give Finland temporary relief from scarcity 
on condition that the Allies later make good this total allocation of 10,000 
tons.47 The United States announced its acceptance of this plan in princi-
ple, and the British authorities also expressed a willingness to go along with 
it. At the same time both the Americans and the British stressed their 
opposition to treating the case of Finland separately but rather as part of 
the total program to be organized for the relief of Europe in general. It was 
specifically pointed out on this occasion, moreover, that the administration 
of the program had been entrusted to Mr. Herbert Hoover.A8 
After arriving in Europe on November 26, Hoover proceeded to deal with 
the situation with characteristic vigor. London and Paris served as his two 
main centers of operation. The concentration of the relief program by the 
Western Powers caused Finland to resort to a corresponding centralization 
of authority in the matter. It was the Finnish envoy in London, Mr. Rudolf  
Holsti, who was charged with the task of procuring foodstuffs for his 
country. Shortly afterward it was deemed judicious to cancel the authority 
given Mr. Valkeapää, who had been sent to the United States on a grain-
procurement mission.4° 
In the general relief program drawn up by Hoover before his arrival in 
Europe, Finland had been marked down as needing »some assistance».50 Tt 
thus appeared that Finland was not regarded as a primary target of relief 
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operations. In proceeding to act in his new capacity Holsti first contacted 
Hoover's secretary Lewis, to whom he painted a lurid picture of the distress 
prevailing in his country. The only bread eaten in many parts of the 
country, he pointed out, was made of pine bark, and the mortality rate 
among infants and expectant mothers was the highest in its history." 
This sort of appeal met with a a strong response when Holsti gained the 
opportunity to repeat it directly to Hoover.52 
The discussions between Hoover and Holsti begun on December 7 
quickly led to important decisions affecting Finland. First Hoover agreed 
to have the United States later make up out of its own stores grain to the 
amount of r r,000 tons if Sweden and Denmark would, as they had pro-
posed earlier, proceed to make it available to the Finns immediately. In 
addition to the grain shipments from Scandinavia, which presumably suf-
ficed to cover the most urgent first month's need, Hoover said the United 
States was prepared to place at the disposal of the Finnish Government the 
following monthly quotas of foodstuffs: 10,000 tons of grain products, 
2,000 tons of pork, r,000 tons of fats and r,000 tons of sugar.53 
Considering that in Allied eyes Finland still belonged to the blockaded 
area, the measures taken by Hoover called for another decision of no small 
consequence in principle: the authority in charge of the blockade announc-
ed that the deliveries to Finland approved by the Allied supply authorities 
had been liberated.54 The contact achieved by Holsti with the highest 
American supply authorities, thanks to his energetic efforts, was impOrtant 
to Finland not only from the standpoint of alleviating the supply shortage 
but also politically. Finland had thus approached the Western Allies on her 
own, and this proved to be an opportune point of departure for the 
acquisition of fully acknowledged international status. 
The principles involved in making foodstuffs available to Finland had 
accordingly been decided, but there were still many practical problems to 
be solved. The bureaucratic machinery set up during the war to regulate 
the actions of the authorities in charge of the blockade and other measures 
functioned slowly as far as special problems such as the removal of the 
multiple obstacles to Finland's commercial aspirations were concerned. 
Making decisions concerning the distribution of food supplies was Hoover's 
prerogative. But the implementation of these decisions was hampered by 
many of the negative factors spawned by the war, including the red tape 
involved in financing supplies, the shortage of merchant tonnage and coal 
and the danger to shipping of mines. 
The solution to the problem of transportation was retarded specifically 
by the reluctance of the United States to permit its merchantmen to sail 
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into Baltic waters owing to the mine threat.u5 A further complication was 
the loss of Finnish tonnage through confiscation abroad — some of the 
Finnish ships had been seized in German ports around the time the Ar-
mistice was signed. The Finnish authorities had hoped to be able to depend 
on tonnage belonging to Allied Powers. But when this recourse appeared 
to be closed (being opened up only later), the possibilities were explored 
for the purchase of trading vessels from either England or the United 
States. Moreover, efforts were made to release native shipping engaged in 
other tasks for the transportation of foodstuffs. 
The situation seemed to ease up slightly in early January 1919, when 
Hoover announced5° that the supplies promised Finland would be delivered 
to Rotterdam, whence the purchasing country would have to take care of 
their transportation the rest of the way. Compared to the other alternatives 
in sight this solution afforded the advantage of reducing the transport 
distance to a fraction of what it would have been had the Finns been 
obliged to fetch the supplies from American ports in their own bottoms. 
In practice, however, another retarding factor entered the picture: the 
ships the Finns managed to muster for service were kept lying idle in 
Rotterdam harbor, waiting for their grain cargoes to be loaded. This was 
because certain consignments of foodstuffs had been shipped from the 
United States as far as Copenhagen for reshipment to Finland, while other 
consignments were carried the whole way.57 By a decision of the blockade 
authority on February 24,"A Finland was recognized as belonging in the 
same category as the neutrals like the Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands. The Inter-Allied Trade Committee that had set up headquar-
ters in Helsinki thereafter kept tabs on Finland's foreign trade relations." 
The foregoing cluster of multifarious problems of organization had the 
inevitable effect of delaying the achievement of practical results on the 
basis of previously endorsed principles. »The practical difficulties,» Holsti 
stated in a report to the Finnish Foreign Ministry dated February 17, 1919, 
-have been too great, indeed impossible, to overcome sooner. In Finland it 
can scarcely be appreciated that even in the conduct of all their own affairs 
the same sort of dilatoriness prevails among the Entente states as a uni-
versal phenomenom. The official machinery is completely worn out, and the 
more extensive and the more complex it has grown during the course of 
the war, the more numerous are the points at which a halt in operations 
threatens.»80 
The aforementioned circumstances contributed to the result that where-
as the grain shipments promised by Sweden and Denmark (i.e., the ones 
Hoover had agreed to make up later out of stores in the United States) 
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arrived in Finland before the year 1918 was quite over, the first consign-
ments of food intended to be delivered each month on a regular quota 
basis started to arrive in Finnish ports on February 20, 1919, and by the 
end of the same month five ships carrying cargoes of American supplies 
had reached this country. All told, the food supplies delivered to the Finn-
ish authorities by Hoover's organization in, for instance, the month of 
March amounted to 26,344  tons and in April to 27,256 tons.61 In the late 
winter of 1919 Hoover consented to increase the monthly quota of food-
stuffs previously fixed,82 in addition to which, according to the terms of a 
separate agreement with the United States, Denmark delivered to Finland 
an extra ro,000-ton consignment of grain (the Danes having been promised 
a corresponding amount from America at a later dater 63. Britain and Nor-
way likewise pitched in with small shipments of grain.64 
Special difficulties were confronted in working out the matter of pay-
ment for the supply deliveries. When it first cropped up at the beginning of 
December 1918, on the occasion of Hoover's central agency's agreeing in 
principle to accede to the Finnish appeal for food, great was the surprise of 
the Americans, according to Lewis L. Strauss, to learn from Holsti that 
Finland was prepared to pay immediately. The Finnish envoy made refer-
ence in this connection to the money deposited in the United States in 
the summer of 1917 as advance payment for grain purchased at the time 
but never delivered. 
The Finnish proposal had a novel twist in Hoover's experience. It caused 
astonishment because it came at a time when the general tendency in 
Europe was to appeal to American open-handedness as a means of sur-
mounting financial problems.6' It gave the impression that the Finns did 
not expect to need credit before the advance deposit had been spent. For 
his own part Hoover considered it a matter of course that Finland would 
be able to pay for her purchases with the currency deposited to her credit 
at the National City Bank in New York. 
At this juncture, however, the State Department intervened. At the turn 
of the year it proclaimed that inasmuch as the United States Government 
had not accorded recognition to the Finnish Government then in office, 
no orders could be issued for the utilization of the money deposited by 
Finland. To prevent the situation from developing into an impasse, Hoover 
thereupon agreed to accept payment in British currency, which Finland had 
deposited in London. But this did not solve things either, for the British 
Government would not permit the pounds to be taken out of the country. 
The solution was worked out at the beginning of February 1919 by an 
agreement that the money belonging to Finland in London would serve as 
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security given to the United States. As soon as the dollars frozen in 
the National City Bank were released for making payments, the checks in 
pound sterling would be returned to the Finnish authorities. Subsequently, 
Hoover persuaded the National City Bank to agree to transfer the Finnish 
funds, amounting to approximately 8.5 million dollars, to the American 
food supplier as soon as the Bank of Finland issued the order.66 
There was a delay, however, in the issuance of this order, as a conse-
quence of which the danger arose toward the end of March that the grain 
deliveries to Finland might be discontinued.67 Moreover, the pounds avail-
able to Finland in London gave out. Indeed, at one stage, the Finnish envoy,  
Ossian Donner, had to furnish a personal guarantee, in a way, when the 
Finnish account was considerably overdrawn as a result of continuous 
payments.88 The Bank of Finland probably hesitated to authorize a transfer 
of the funds deposited in New York for fear the American supply authori-
ties would be paid twice for deliveries — full payment in dollars and the 
corresponding amount in pounds sterling, represented by the security 
furnished in London. The question of compensation for the previously 
confiscated grain might, it was suspected, remain unsettled.09 
The efforts made to clear up the matter of payment had the effect of 
increasing Hoover's activity, in the political sector, as is recounted in anoth-
ei chapter, toward gaining recognition for the independence of Finland. 
While the supply problem was being hashed out, economic contacts be-
tween the United States and Finland spread with both sides seeking to 
develop trade relations under peaceful conditions. Russia's having become 
isolated on account of the chaotic situation prevailing in that country and 
Germany's having lost its capacity to make advances in the commercial 
sphere by the collapse of its military power, the victorious Western Allies 
were in an exceptionally favorable position to capture new markets for 
themselves. The United States, whose productive machinery had not been 
directly damaged by the war, as had by contrast, for example, that of 
France, was the first of the belligerents to regain its feet commercially. 
The steadily growing American industry began to seek new outlets for its 
products in Europe. 
The press had watchfully followed the progress of Finland's efforts to 
overcome the shortage of supplies. From the middle of December 1918, 
reports started to appear in the Finnish newspapers regarding grain ship-
ments likely to arrive shorty. Mostly in the form of news dispatches, these 
reports at first referred to the assistance promised by the Scandinavian 
countries and later to the food consignments planned for delivery on a 
monthly basis from the United States.70 The news correspondents seem to 
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have been ignorant of Mr. Herbert Hoover's position as administrative 
director of the international relief operations. Thus, one report explained 
that the decision to furnish Finland with foodstuffs had been made in the 
United States and that the responsible party actually was an outsider." 
Upon his return home from his mission abroad, just before Christmas, 
General Mannerheim made known in a communique addressed to the 
Finnish nation that there had been a favorable turn in the supply crisis. 
He stated that the benevolent promise of the Western Allies to make grain 
available to Finland would be fulfilled in the near future.72 The previously 
disseminated information concerning food imports was thereby authorita-
tively confirmed. Before that there had been no official announcement 
from the Government on the matter. The supply situation was now ex-
pected to grow brighter. Extra comfort was drawn from the knowledge that 
Finland was getting an »advance share».79 When around the time of the 
Regent's return the initial shipment of grain out of the 5,000-ton Swedish 
allocation was delivered, it was interpreted as »Mannerheim's Christmas 
present» to the Finnish people.74 
Herbert Hoover, who had made the decisions regarding assistance to 
Finland, really wielded powers tantamount to dictatorial control of the 
Allied relief program. This side of the matter seems to have escaped the 
comprehension of the Finnish public at first, but gradually, as the name 
Hoover became known, it began to take on legendary features. His organi-
zation — »Hoover's men» — became famous for its efficiency and speedy 
action. The name of the relief director even spawned a new functional 
eoncept: hooveroida, a Finnish verb meaning in general to work for the 
elimination of hunger.7u 
Evidently, Holsti with his dramatic descriptions of the distress in Finland 
had influenced the decisions taken to send relief. In his preliminary plans, 
as noted, Hoover had marked Finland down only as needing »some assis-
tance». But, as it turned out, the shipments to Finland were on a consid-
erable scale, in addition to which special measures were adopted to ex-
pedite the deliveries. 
On his mission to Western Europe, Mannerheim did not directly influ-
ence the decisions in Finland's favor in the sphere of relief. It was with 
the British and the French authorities that he conferred —• and not with 
any of the American public leaders active on the European scene. Around 
the same time as the decisions were being made in principle with regard 
to the Finnish appeal for assistance at Hoover's headquarters in London,  
Mannerheim was on his return journey to the British capital from Paris. 
His diplomatic activity therefore had no direet bearing on the resolution 
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of the supply problem, but he did make a contribution indirectly by break-
ing down political barriers. This is true specifically as far as England and 
France were concerned. The fruits reaped by Mannerheim included the 
readiness of the Allies to exempt the supply deliveries to Finland from the 
blockade. The warmth displayed by British Foreign Secretary Balfour to-
ward Mannerheim had its influence here, too. 
The political conditions laid down in connection with the relief oper-
ations were not apparently adhered to rigidly — with the exception of the 
demand that the German troops get out of Finland. In a memorandum 
written by Hoover in the middle of November 1918, the Finnish line of 
foreign policy was described as confused. Following that date, not only 
had the forces under von der Goltz withdrawn from Finnish territory, but 
the Finnish Government had changed, Mannerheim had carried out his 
special diplomatic mission to London and Paris, and, under the pressure of 
the Allied Governments, Germany itself had renounced the secret articles 
incorporated in the trade pact concluded with Finland March 7. 
Insofar as political factors affected the Allied position in connection 
with the settlement of the relief question, they were primarily of a general 
nature following the signing of the Armistice and as such simultaneously 
applicable to relations with several other countries as well: by overcoming 
famine, or at least speedily alleviating it, the Allies sought to avert chaos. 
The humanitarian program was designed in the last analysis to prevent 
the spread of Bolshevism over the Russian borders into the rest of Europe. 
Looked at from this vantage point, Finland might be considered to be 
either a buffer state or a bridge between East and West. As conditions 
became stabilized in the area of the new independent states, the assistance 
given might serve as a point of departure for the opening of commercial 
relations with the United States. 
After the American supply shipments began to arrive in Finland at a 
rapid rate at the end of February 1919, the solution of the emergency on 
such a large seale was bound to have its political repercussions. The 
benevolence shown Finland in the supply crisis was tantamount to material 
recognition of her newly won independence by the West. 
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Chapter V 
The Recognition of Finnish Independence and the Policy 
of the Western Powers 
When the matter of approaching the Western Powers was brought up 
in the Finnish Government during the Armistice negotiations, the atten-
tion of those who supported the move was drawn, as previously indicated, 
to General Mannerheim. There was much to recommend him for the 
mission: Mannerheim was a very distinguished looking gentleman with 
an authoritative mien, and his political views had been colored by Russia's 
membership in the Entente during his career as a military officer in the 
service of the Czar. It was in an army allied with the West that he had 
fought in the World War. But opinion was divided, to be sure, as to 
whether Mannerheim had lent his support to the White appeal for German 
aid in the spring of 1918 or whether he had simply been confronted with 
a fait accompli when word reached him that German troops had landed on 
Finnish soil. 
In any case, Mannerheim regarded the »comradeship-in-arms» with the 
Germans as a temporary arrangement, one that should not last longer than 
the Civil War; and he suspected the Germans of planning to exploit their 
intervention to gain political objectives in the Arctic area. The resignation 
in May of Mannerheim as commander-in-chief as a result of disagreement 
‘vi.th the pro-German Government apparently bolstered Allied confi-
dence in him. His withdrawal from the political scene exposed his Entente 
sympathies in a clearer light than had been the case in previous months. 
When the Government turned to Mannerheim, who had moved to 
Sweden, for help in its efforts to improve Finland's relations with the West-
ern Powers in order to facilitate gaining recognition of the country's in-
dependence, he did not att first lend it an entrely sympathetic ear. After 
all, as he felt justified in declaring, he was living in »exile». But, after over-
coming his misgivings, which obviously had an emotional basis, he agreed 
to accept the proffered assignment provided he could act as a private citizen 
rather than as an official envoy. This reservation may be interpreted as 
having been inspired partly by unwillingness to commit himself to colla-
boration with a Government that less than half a year earlier had approved 
his resignation from the post of commander-in-chief, and partly by the 
fact that he could not possibly be sure in advance of the results of the 
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proposed mission to London and Paris. Besides, in a private capacity, Man-
nerheim would have the opportunity, in the event negotiations got under 
way, to act with greater freedom than as an authorized agent of the 
Government, in which case he would have been obliged to follow instruc-
tions. He would have the freedom to act as he saw fit; 
 and this was clearly 
demonstrated when Mannerheim drafted his plan of action and formulated 
the methods he intended to use in the negotiations. 
 
Mannerheim wanted no part of the responsibility for the line of foreign 
policy pursued by Finland during and after the Civil War. In his view 
it would have been possible to bring about a more cordial understanding 
with the Western Powers, or even to create a propitious mood for negotia-
tions, if, disregarding their position, the negotiator proceeded to support pro-
German policy. The march of events had been swift, producing a situation 
less auspicious than ever for Finland. President Wilson's notes in response 
to Germany's bid for a truce began, as already mentioned, to extend their 
influence to the Finnish question, too. And they placed in a dubious light 
the political decisions of previous months and the continued presence of 
German troops in Finland. 
The series of notes delivered to Finland included one that further com-
plicated the task of dealing with the situation, which had taken on the 
aspect of a crisis. It was the French Government's notification (likewise 
referred to in the foregoing) that it would break off diplomatic relations 
with Finland on account of the election of a King. The situation was 
truly, as Prime Minister Paasikivi described it, one to »inspire anxiety».1 
The Government, which evidently considered a change in the composition 
of the Government necessary, nevertheless was inclined to temporize. 
Most of the Ministers, who were at their wits' end coneerning the course 
of foreign policy, wished to see a monarchic majority in the re-formed 
Government to insure the preservation of the dominant position held by 
the Conservatives. In transmitting the Senate's request to Mannerheim, 
Enckell had indicated that the proposed mission was designed to gain the 
recognition of the British Government and to restore relations between 
Finland and France.2 In connection with these problems, Mannerheim 
should try to ascertain the attitude of the Western Powers toward the 
election of the King. Mannerheim promised to keep these objectives in 
mind also to uphold the choice of Friedrich Karl as the Finnish sovereign.3  
At this point, Mannerheim's traditional monarchic leanings appear to have 
taken precedence over his pro-Entente sentiments. 
Obviously, Mannerheim had begun to have faith in his chances of 
success. It is hardly conceivable that a person of his character, who was 
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extremely resistant to persuasive pressure 4 would have been likely to ac-
cept any assignment that struck him as unpromising. With respect to Brit-
ish recognition, for example, Mannerheim was hopeful, whereas he was 
somewhat doubtful whether France, the politics of which he described as 
having been »very temperamental», would be particularly eager to have 
normal relations with Finland restored.' In addition, Mannerheim formu-
lated the settlement of the question not only of the Åland Islands but also 
of East Karelia along the lines of Finland's desire. 
Mannerheim's optimism stemmed from his belief that Finland could 
offer the Western Powers something in return for the resolution in her 
favor of all the issues mentioned. He had in mind a scheme of inter-
vention designed to capture St. Petersburg (Petrograd) from the Bolsheviks. 
The scheme was Mannerheim's own;  under the prevailing critical con-
ditions, the members of the Government, who were conscious of the inse-
curity of their position, could scarcely have entertained such notions of 
military activity.  
Mannerheim thus reverted to a previous military plan° of his, presented 
the summer before on certain occasions — now deviating from its earlier 
lines in that the intervention would be carried out, not by the great powers, 
but by Finland in league with the neutral Scandinavian countries.7 He 
believed that the implementation of this plan would afford the Western 
Powers such an opportunity to look after their interests in Russia as to 
effect a speedy change for the better in their political attitude toward Fin-
land — with the desired results. 
Mannerheim's departure was delayed, and he did not arrive in London 
until November 12 - that is, the day after the signing of the Armistice.8 
In view of the prevailing excitement, the political atmosphere was not 
propitious to his mission. Victory had lifted the Allied peoples to transports 
of joy, but the end of armed hostilities did not end the bitter hatred of the 
enemy, Germany, which had demonstrated its dangerous power;  and while 
such a feeling swayed the public temper, Finland could easily be branded, 
it is reasonable to suppose, as an ally of the enemy.° It had been hoped in 
Finland — and Mannerheim's mission reflected this hope — that the Finn-
ish question could be resolved before the general peace settlement because 
it was liable, as a »minor issue», to be buried under bigger issues at the 
conference table. 
In London, Mannerheim was briefed on the prevailing British mood and 
trends of thought by Holsti, who, as the Finnish envoy there, had gained 
an insight into the situation. Holsti pointed out that the election of a 
German king had stirred up sentiment against Finland and created the 
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impression that the political leadership of the country was obstinately 
sticking to its old line. The attention received by Mannerheim in London 
proved to be cool, and the matters he had to submit for consideration met 
with a half-unwilling response. It became clear in the discussions that the 
British Government was not prepared to take a separate stand toward the 
question of recognizing Finnish independence: the Western Allies intended 
to make a joint, negotiated decision. 
On the other hand, the British made much of the fact that Finland had 
accepted German assistance, made friendly overtures to the Central Powers 
and opened up her territory as a field of operations for their Arctic policy.10 
This was the way London looked at things, and Mannerheim's task was to 
break through the British mental barrier in order to make headway toward 
gaining recognition of Finland's independence.  
Mannerheim managed to contact certain of the British foreign policy 
makers, such as Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour and his assistant R. Cecil, 
but discussion with them was stiff and centered mostly on the position of 
Finland in 1918. From the standpoint of clearing up the situation, Cecil 
considered it completely improper that Friedrich Karl become King of Fin-
land." He let it be understood that Finland had sought recognition prema-
turely; 
 she would first have to give proof that her course of foreign policy 
had chånged. The view represented by Holsti12 had — upon the landing of 
the German troops on Finnish soil — led the British Foreign Office to 
suspect that the Government's pro-German leanings and monarchic senti-
ments were in conflict with the will of the majority of the Finnish public. 
Aecordingly, the British authorities deemed it fitting to set forth as the 
prerequisites of a resolution of the Finnish question the withdrawal of 
son der Goltz's troops from Finland and the settlement of the issue of the 
Form of Government by a Parliament voted into office at new elections. 
 
Mannerheim was unable to dissipate the oppressive atmosphere generat-
ed by the Finnish question. He tried to bring about a more conciliatory 
attitude by explaining that the traditional form of government established 
in Finland was a monarchical one,13 but as applied to the prevailing situ-
ation this explanation struck the British Government representatives as 
far-fetched. The general had previously failed to grasp sufficiently the fact 
that Entente observers" saw in the German intervention in the Finnish 
Civil War, the resolution of the constitutional dispute in favor of a 
monarchical system and the choice of a German prince as candidate for 
the Finnish throne a consistent sequence of events systematically directed 
by their enemy — one that validated the view held by the British regarding 
Finland as a kind of German protectorate. 
6 
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One of the first political conclusions drawn by Mannerheim in London 
was that the project to crown the prince king, which he had at first sup-
ported, would have to be abandoned. This conclusion he transmitted to the 
Government in a cablegram sent on November 17. It was in his opinion 
an obligation that would absolutely have to be fulfilled before any results 
could be expected in subsequent negotiations. The final reckoning of Man-
nerheim's mission in London was, in spite of everything, on the plus side, 
although, regarded in short perspective, it did not promise much. The 
British Government appeared to be irrevocably committed to its thesis that 
the question of recognizing Finnish independence, which was still an open 
one in British and American eyes, would have to be decided jointly by the 
Western Powers. In any case, it had been ascertained where the main 
trouble lay, from the Entente standpoint, in clearing up the Finnish situ-
ation. Mannerheim also took up for discussion the issue of the status of 
the Åland Islands, but the British dismissed it as premature -- and other-
wise, too, British opinion seemed to run counter to Finnish interests in that 
sector. Nor did the annexation of part of East Karelia by Finland meet 
with any favorable response in London. 
By the time of Mannerheim's arrival in Paris at the end of November, 
the progress of events set in motion by the World War had wrought a 
change in Finnish political conditions in the direction indicated by the 
Western Allies, though, to be sure, this change took place in a spirit of 
great caution. Half the members of Ingman's Government, which replaced 
the German-oriented Government headed by Paasikivi, were republicans 
friendly to the Entente. Yet, the Prime Minister (the terms Council of 
State, Minister, etc., came into use on November 27) was a well known 
»royalist», a circumstance hardly likely to inspire confidence in Allied 
circles. In Paris, Mannerheim's mission was hampered by the news reports 
published in the local press about the change in the Finnish Government. 
These dispatches placed special stress on the fact that the new Prime and 
Interior Ministers had but a short time before, in October, been members 
of the delegation that had called upon the Prince of Hesse to inform him 
of his election as King of Finland15 — not only that, but readers were 
reminded that the former had actually headed the delegation. Manner-
heim's embarrassment was reflected by his statement, issued at this time, 
that Ingman's Government did not represent his personal choice of mi-
nisters.1e 
Mannerheim's objective was the restoration of diplomatic relations be-
tween Finland and France, the breaking off of which some observers thought 
might lead to a retraction of the recognition of Finnish independence 
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granted at the beginning of January, 1918. The general claimed to have 
received a promise that relations would be restored from Foreign Minister 
Pichon. Clemenceau, however, had laid down stiff terms after conferring 
with Cabinet Secretary Berthelot of the Foreign Ministry: the restoration 
of relations was contingent upon the holding of parliamentary elections to 
determine the popular will, after which a new government should be 
formed on the basis of the results and issue a declaration pledging its 
pursuit of a line of foreign policy friendly to the Entente. The terms 
further called for the nomination of a head of State who enjoyed the con-
fidence of the Allies."  
Mannerheim relates that in Paris he was received with greater warmth 
than in London. There he felt more at home, thanks to earlier sojourns, 
and his familiarity with French culture and, ultimately, his fluent com-
mand of the French language were to his advantage. In the more relaxed 
environment, he tended on occasion to be fairly outspoken. With regard 
to the question of the Aland Islands, for example, he took an uncompro-
mising stand and minced no words. If, he observed, the Peace Conference 
decided to hand the islands over to Sweden, blood would flow, and if, he 
added, an attempt was made to subdue the Finns with a food blockade, 
the citizenry of Helsinki would sooner perish of hunger in the streets than 
acquiesce in the seizure of the archipelago by any foreign power." Such 
grandiloquence might smack of theatrical pathos and be out of keeping 
with the role of a diplomat. Nevertheless, Mannerheim considered it10 to 
be probably the only way, under the circumstances prevailing after the 
Armistice, to impress upon the victors the Finnish point of view.  
Mannerheim left Paris around the time . Thomas Masaryk, provisional 
President of newly independent Czechoslovakia, arrived in that city. The 
enthusiastic and festive welcome given Masaryk was a demonstration of 
the strong sympathy felt in the West for the political leaders of the nations 
that had leaned for support on the Allies in their struggle for independence. 
»The French and the Czechs have two strong bonds in common, the same 
ideals and the same interests,» declared a leading Parisian journal on this 
occasion.2° 
When President Woodrow Wilson arrived in the French capital some 
time after Masaryk, he was hailed as a great popular hero: not only was 
he head of a leading allied State but also personified high idealism, and his 
name represented the promise of a happier future for the nations of Europe. 
Caught in the froth and foam of this wild wave of emotion, the envoy 
from Finland, regardless of his identity, was bound to be obliged to shoul-
der the burden of »sins» of his compromised nation. It was a burden not 
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even Mannerheim, for all his traditional Entente leanings, could escape 
when he sought to advance the interests of his fatherland in the changed 
world political situation. 
Upon returning to London from Paris, Mannerheim was notified on 
December 13 that Svinhufvud, stigmatized for having pursued the »old 
line», had resigned as Regent of Finland and that he had been elected the 
day before to fill the vacant office. The news pleased Mannerheim, and 
since his election had been sponsored, in addition to everything else, by 
the very political quarters that had forced him into »exile», he appears to 
have savored the turnabout in something of a spirit of revenge."t Manner-
heim had now become his country's official envoy. 
As Regent of Finland, he had greater authority than before, outwardly 
seen, although this increase in authority tended to restrict his freedom of 
movement and expression to narrower confines than when he had been 
acting as a private individual in his contacts with Western Government 
representatives. But he was continually running up against a »wall». For-
eign Secretary Balfour, Under-Secretary Hardinge and Secretary for War 
Milner refused to consider any modification of the conditions for recogni-
tion of Finnish independence mutually agreed upon by France and England 
hut demanded their strict fulfillment as evidence of a change in Finland's 
political orientation. These conditions (referred to in the foregoing) im-
pressed Mannerheim as humiliating since they set limits to self-determi-
nation in matters that, he felt, should be left to the Finns to decide for 
themselves. 
Mannerheim's distinguished personality had succeeded in breaking the 
ice in British and French ruling circles to the extent of his obtaining au-
thoritative pronouncements on the Finnish question. Those responsible for 
the formulation of Finnish foreign policy now knew, as the result of his 
mission, what was expected of Finland among the great powers that had 
won the World War. This was a matter that had inspired great uncertainty 
and differences of opinion during the autumn of 1918. 
No immediate fruit was borne by Mannerheims' efforts to gain recog-
nition of Finland's independence, however, although this was the point of 
departure and the purpose of the plans relating to his journey to the West-
ern capitals. By producing the »conditions» laid down as the price of 
recognition, it did in any case stake out the road Finland would have to 
travel in the near future to obtain a solution to her most important poli-
tical problem. 
The view held by the Western Powers regarding the events and conflicts 
in Finland in the year 1918 gradually began to clear up. Holsti's contention 
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that the majority of the people in Finland did not support the pro-German 
line had been buoyed up by the position taken by Mannerheim in negoti-
ations with Western leaders. In Western eyes, the Finnish Whites had been 
lumped together, in accordance with notions formed during the Civil War, 
into a solid pro-German faction. Now this idea was evidently undergoing 
modification. 
The fruitlessness of his efforts to gain recognition of Finnish indepen-
dence in the Western camp was a disappointment to Mannerheim, who 
had cherished expectations of a better outcome of his mission. The state-
ment given out by Mannerheim before his return home that new elections 
would be held in Finland as soon as possible and that the government 
question would be resolved on the basis of the will of the electorate showed 
that he realized the fulfillment of the internal political conditions required 
by the change in foreign policy to be imperative.E2 
In the Western capitals, Mannerheim had, as he relates in his memoirs 
and as certain of his public statements indicate, repeatedly harped on his 
favorite theme — military action against Bolshevism, which he had main-
tained as the watchword of the White cause in Finland during the fighting 
in the spring of 1918. When he spoke around that time about the Finnish 
»War of Liberation» under his leadership, he stressed that he had not been 
fighting »against Russia but against Bolshevism».29 At the same time, he 
emphasized, for his own part, the desirability of establishing good relations 
with »la vraie Russie», or the old regime of Russia, which had fought as 
an ally of the Western Powers.24 
These explanations did not cut much ice with the British: the reserved 
attitude of Lloyd George's Government toward the Russian question was 
widely known. Insofar as alongside the resolution of the main issue of 
Finnish politics Mannerheim had hoped for some support for the personal 
schemes involving intervention that he had concocted upon setting forth 
on his journey, he must have perceived in broaching them a lack of re-
sponse.25 
From the standpoint of re-orienting Finland's foreign policy, Manner-
heim's mission to London and Paris, considered as a whole, proved of 
far-reaching significance. Now, as pointed out in the foregoing, the Finnish 
Government could begin to lay down its lines of action systematically on 
the basis created by the progress of events in the world at large. Hitherto 
certain measures whereby Finland had striven to clarify her political status 
had been made known. In addition to the ones previously mentioned, it 
had been announced that the annex to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk calling 
for joint Finnish and German operations against the Western Allies in the 
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Murmansk sector was not binding on Finland since she had not even taken 
part in making the treaty. It could further be announced that the German 
forces had withdrawn from the country and that Friedrich Karl -- the 
central figure of the episode of pro-German politics — had on December 
r4th renounced the Finnish throne. Upon returning home a week later, 
 
Mannerheim made reference in a proclamation he issued to the fact that 
the personal problems involved in the change of orientation in Finnish 
foreign policy remained unresolved and that it would be necessary to come 
to grips with them vigorously. »We can still — even if at the last mo-
ment —,» he declared, »reach our goal.» 
Mannerheim's trip abroad excited, as has already to some extent been 
indicated in the foregoing, political speculation. The historical tradition 
linked with his name symbolized the alliance between the Western Powers 
and Russia. In this respect it awakened confidence — in decisive measure, 
it may be said — in British and French governing circles. The circumstance, 
furthermore, that Mannerheim's name was linked with the »old regime» 
in Russia was a factor that led to its being coupled with the rising interven-
tionist activity of the »White generals». 
It was this that gave impetus to the news sensation that while passing 
through Stockholm he had sought to confer with Russian »Whites» on the 
restoration of the monarchy in Russia and that in London he had en-
deavored to gain approval for the idea of having the Finnish Army attack 
Petrograd.20 As already intimated, the latter assertion was not altogether 
contrary to the facts. Conjecture along these lines was soon forgotten for 
some time, but later on the matter cropped up again in connection with 
certain events. 
As far as the Aland Islands question was concerned, Mannerheim was 
regarded from the Swedish standpoint as a »dangerous man». Suspense 
mixed with fear was felt over the possibility that he might seek the support 
of the Western Allies for Finland's efforts to maintain possession of the 
arehipelago.27 There was unreserved sympathy for Mannerheim in Sweden, 
on the other hand, when it came to his endeavor to gain for Finnish 
independence the recognition of Western Governments, and it was hoped 
that he would succeed in this task.28 
In a separate class was the sharp criticism levelled at Mannerheim's 
role as Commander-in-Chief of the White forces in the Finnish Civil War 
from the direction of the labor movement in England and in France. Ideo-
logically colored, this view branded him a »counter-revolutionary», and he 
was further opposed in labor quarters as a champion of intervention in 
Russia.28 A similar attitude was also taken by certain liberals with radical 
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leanings. These segments of public opinion had no effective influence, 
however, upon the government policies in the two countries. 
The general's feelers in London and Paris sufficed to show that the 
problem of obtaining recognition in the West for Finnish independence 
was more complicated than had been anticipated in many quarters. A 
complete political metamorphosis was the price demanded of the Finnish 
Government. The resolution of the Finnish question was thus postponed 
by force of circumstance to a future date. It was then expected to ripen 
for decision in connection with the general settlement of European affairs 
at the Peace Conference. 
Insofar as the Finnish question came up for consideration after the con-
vocation of the Peace Conference, it was dealt with only in passing in 
connection with some other matter, usually one concerning Russia. This is 
what happened at the negotiations held on January 22, 1919, where the 
Western Powers tried to find common ground to stand on in coping with 
Bolshevism. One thing that became evident was that France alone, whose 
Prime Minister, Clemenceau was known to be an uncompromising foe 
of the Soviet Government, was rigidly opposed to Bolshevism. The French 
delegation would have been ready to draw a clear-cut conclusion from its 
point of view and invite representatives of the Russian Whites to parti-
cipate in the negotiations on the Russian question at the Peace Conference. 
President Wilson and Premier Lloyd George tended to favor a compromise 
solution and accordingly were not inclined to bypass the Bolsheviks in 
the task of arranging affairs in Russia. Accepting the line advocated by 
the American and British leaders, the Peace Conference's Council of Ten 
drew up an appeal urging the governments and political coalitions operat-
ing in European Russia (meaning the territory extending to the r914 
boundaries of the empire) and in Siberia to cease hostilities and send 
representatives to the island of Prinkipo in the Sea of Marmora for a 
meeting under the auspices of the Allies toward restoring peace to Russia. 
Nothing came of the scheme to decide the future of Russia at Prinkipo, 
but the scheme itself incorporated a view of Finland that in principle 
proved of no little significance. Among the countries previously under 
Russian rule that had been invited to take part in the negotiations, two 
were set apart from the rest: Poland and Finland. This was generally inter-
preted to mean that the Western Powers did not regard either country as 
any longer belonging to the Russian sphere of political control. 
The projected line-up of participants for the Prinkipo conference was 
thus some kind of token — though, to be sure, a vague one — of the fact 
that Finland was considered to have broken loose from Russian rule, even 
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if no decision confirming this view had been made at the Peace Confer-
ence. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that in connection with the Prinkipo 
project Finland was equated with a country like Poland, which the West-
ern Powers had recognized as an independent state. An event like this was 
a step forward from the standpoint of the Finnish question although no 
mention had been made of recognizing the country's independence. 
As arrangements continued at Paris for the Peace Conference and work-
ing procedures had to be drawn up in detail, the Council of Ten decided 
on January 27 that the Finnish question would be dealt with in connection 
with the settlement of affairs in Russia.30 It appeared as if, according to the 
plans that had been outlined, which set up the problems of the Poles and 
the Czechs alongside those concerning Germany and Austria-Hungary for 
solution, Finland would find herself in a similar position in the general 
program of the conference. Nevertheless, Finland would rank after the 
states mentioned in the political scale. Poland and Czechoslovakia were 
acknowledged sovereign entities. Moreover, the general order of the items 
on the agenda of the Peace Conference, which gave precedence to matters 
pertaining to Germany and its allies, meant a considerable time advantage 
for them, provided no changes — based largely on Wilson's recommenda-
tions — were made later in the schedule. 
Of all the Western Powers, France was the one that had, perhaps, taken 
the most severely critical stand toward the election of the king held in 
Finland in the autumn of 1918, having, as mentioned earlier, broken its 
diplomatic relations with the Finnish Government on that account. The 
French attitude began to soften after the turn of the year, apparently in 
anticipation that Finland would, in the interest of gaining recognition 
of her independence, live up to the conditions imposed on her by the 
Western Allies. The removal from positions of influence of pro-German 
individuals was still demanded, however, in certain connections, and these 
demands were transmitted from Paris to the Finnish authorities. The 
formation of the Ingman Government was looked upon only as a half-way 
measure. Prime Minister Ingman and Interior Minister Tulenheimo were 
among those who, as »king makers», were considered unfit to serve as 
members of a government entrusted with the task of steering a new 
political course. Even Foreign Minister Enckell was branded an undesirable 
in certain quarters, where he was thought to have had close contacts in 
Germanys' 
The suspicion smoldering in France that the leading politicians or Fin-
land continued to be under German influence caused some diplomatic 
incidents. For instance, Adolf Törngren, who had been sent to Paris as 
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political observer for the Finnish Government, was obliged to wait in 
London for several weeks at the beginning of 1919, as mentioned previously, 
before he could obtain the visa required for entry into France. 
On the whole, the interest of French political circles in Finland was 
rising. An important reason for this was that Paris had been swept by the 
interventionist tide of feeling and hopes had been raised that intervention 
would lead to a solution of the Russian question favorable to the Whites. 
Finland was looked upon as a suitable base of operations for such a war 
of intervention, particularly as far as the conquest of Petrograd was con-
cerned. When France in this connection supported the stabilization of 
Finland's independent status, the matter did not strike her as being any 
political objective worth striving after for its own sake but only as an 
incidental goal likely to further the interventionists' ends — or, then, 
Finland was viewed as a barrier to the spread of Bolshevism. 
In the leading political quarters of Paris, Finland was thus generally 
placed against the background of the Russian question for scrutiny. Atten-
tion was then drawn to Mannerheim, who, as a former Czarist officer 
and friend of the Entente, was seen to be destined for a special mission 
in the »pacification of Russia». This interest in Finland, aroused by inter-
ventionist sentiment, involved the danger — as far as the task of gaining 
general recognition for Finnish independence was coneerned — that France 
would begin to back down to a passive position at some stage in the game. 
From the point of view of the Clemenceau Government, the White Rus-
sians represented elements who had remained loyal to the old Entente 
cause,32 and the hope was nourished that, after gaining power in their 
own country, they would constitute a balancing factor in Europe against 
any future resurgence of Germany.33 
An indirect consequence of this was that the victorious Allies had no 
desire to overlook White Russian interests in international politics, although, 
on the other hand, they did not deem it feasible to endorse in full the 
appeal issued at the beginning of March by the White Russians that the 
status and territorial claims of the minority nationalities belonging to 
»the Russia of the year 1914» — with the exception of Poland — he left 
off the agenda of the Peace Conference.94 It was specifically the endeavors 
of French Government circles to form close ties with the Russian Whites 
that threatened to lead to conflict with the Finnish bid to reinforce the 
independent position of this country. 
While in Paris, Mannerheim had made it clear, as pointed out in the 
foregoing, that Ingman and his ministers were not a Government of his 
choice. On the other hand, he did not favor abrupt changes;  rather was 
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he inclined to act slowly in yielding to the demands for the removal of 
office-holders branded as pro-German by the Western Allies, for such 
measures would cause the Government to lose face. If, he argued, all the 
politicians that had previously held positions of influence were forced to 
step down, the Government would lose the support of the Conservatives 
and then stand on a very narrow bourgeois base. And this, he warned, 
could encourage revolutionary elements to take action.35 Mannerheim 
relied upon the ability of the Conservatives to maintain public security 
and order in Finland. 
In a communication sent to the French Government in the middle of 
January, Mannerheim further explained that changes in the compOsition 
of the Finnish Government would be taken advantage of by highly in-
fluential forces hostile to him.36 Which he was referring to in this connec-
tion, »revolutionary» or republican bourgeois circles, is hard to say. Both 
of these groups, particularly the Social Democrats, were considered by him 
unprepared to pull the nation through the difficulties of the »transitional 
period». In asking the French Government to hasten the measures required 
to give recognition to Finnish independence, he evidently was also thinking 
of his own position, which was likely to be strengthened by the resolution 
of the question. 
During the month of January the French took action to the extent of 
turning to the British Government with the idea of doing something about 
Finland's plea for recognition.37 From the standpoint of the country as a 
whole, a favorable decision at this early stage would have been a significant 
event: it would have given Finland an acknowledged status at the very 
beginning of the Peace Conference, and this would have given her a voice 
in matters relating to her territorial claims. If it had come to pass — i.e., 
if Finland would not have had to await the holding of parliamentary elec-
tions as a prerequisite of recognition —, Mannerheim could have taken 
personal credit: it would have shown that his personality had been deemed 
a sufficient guarantee that the demands of the Western Powers would be 
met. 
The action taken by the French authorities to deal with the question 
of Finnish independence was apparently prompted by the very thought38  
that the hand in Finnish politics of Mannerheim, who was known to be 
interested in intervention, might be strengthened if the American and 
British Governments could be persuaded to moderate the conditions im-
posed on Finland. The efforts made by the French proved, however, to be 
ineffective. The other Western Powers would not budge. 
The political mood of the transitional period is illustrated by the fact 
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that during the change from a German orientation to one favoring the 
Western Allies neither press opinion nor official diplomacy in Finland 
had yet reached a state of equilibrium. There was nervous excitement over 
the delay in gaining recognition after expectations had been raised to a 
pitch of confidence, and rightist circles, in particular, severely criticized 
the Allies for their stiff attitude toward Finland. Prevailing bourgeois sen-
timent was kept in constant agitation by the Russian peril and the revolu-
tionary threat. Rumors were spread about joint preparations undertaken 
by the Bolsheviks and fugitive Finnish Reds to start a revolution in this 
country. 
In circles favoring intervention in Russia, on the other hand, Manner-
heim was represented as believing he could defeat the Bolsheviks. He was 
further alleged to have asserted that he considered the capture of Petro-
grad essential to the security of Finland.3B In addition to these rumors, 
word spread around the country that the White Russians had become 
more active after ex-Foreign Minister Sazonov had arrived in Paris at the 
end of January to direct their operations. In Finland special note was taken 
both in Parliament and in the press that40 in various connections Russian 
Whites were expressing their opposition to Finnish independence. 
The atmosphere of vague apprehensions and impatient waiting prevail-
ing in Finland evidently hampered the fulfillment of the conditions that 
the Western Powers had set as the price of recognition. 
The state of high tension generated by the uncertainty over the issue 
was revealed by the publication of a sensational, if misleading, report — 
and the chain reaction it set off is not without its comical side. 
On January 26 there appeared in the newspapers of the Finnish capital 
a news report41 that the Government had learned from »quite reliable 
sources» that France had taken the initiative in effecting recognition of 
Finnish independence and that — it was added — -an affirmative response 
probably had already been received from the British Government». The 
latter, rather vague expression inspired headlines in certain newspapers 
that made it appear as if a fait accompli were in question.4E The informa-
tion had been communicated to the Regent and to the Foreign Minister 
by the acting French Consul in Helsinki, M. J. Poirot, who in his enthu-
siasm at the same time drew up for the Government a complete proposal 
for an announcement on the matter to be made to the Finnish public. He 
further explained the matter himself to the press in an interview'1s in 
which he laid special stress on the part played by the French Government 
in arranging things. 
The intelligence that the British Government had agreed to recognize 
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Finnish independence naturally inspired rejoicing in the national capital. 
The newspapers published solemn editorials44 which, drawing upon the 
glad tidings, proclaimed that after months of uncertainty the sovereignty 
of the country had been established on a sound basis. Heartfelt expressions 
of gratitude were heaped upon the French nation and Consul Poirot. The 
leading Swedish-language daily also published an article eulogizing Sir 
Esme Howard, onetime British Minister to Stockholm, who had joined 
his Government's delegation to the Peace Conference and who was 
supposed to have influenced the decision in favor of Finland.45 
Public spirits were kept buoyed up by a report, emanating from a 
Swiss source, which was made known some days later. Deviating from 
Poirot's communication, it stated that a proposal to have Finnish in-
dependence recognized had been made at the Peace Conference itself and 
been accepted.40 Press comment did not consider the news tapped from 
the Swiss source to have altered the fundamental significance of the event. 
Illustrative of the steadfast position taken by the highest Finnish authori-
ties, the Regent awarded the Foreign Minister the Liberty Cross, a decora-
tion that had passed him by during the pro-German period, to celebrate 
the occasion.97 
When no official notification was forthcoming from the British Govern-
ment, which had been credited with the decision to recognize independent 
Finland, one of the newspapers published in Helsinki began to demand 
a verification of the authenticity of the news report.48 It was established as 
a consequence, to be sure, that French diplomacy was bent upon further-
ing the cause of Finnish independence, but it was also discovered that the 
French proposal in Finland's favor made to the British Government had 
metamorphosed upon being reported to Helsinki into a resolution of the 
question. At this point, the French Consul felt constrained to offer an 
explanation. In communicating his intelligence, Poirot let it be understood, 
he had been motivated »solely by a desire to remove the anxiety concern-
ing the intentions of the Entente powers». As much as a week after his 
communication had been made public, Poirot was giving assurances that 
the British had responded affirmatively to the French proposal and that 
a similar response could be expected from the rest of the Allies.40 
When the anticipated official communiques of the American and British 
Governments failed to materialize, the high spirits of the Finns began to 
sag and doubts about the true state of affairs to gnaw at people's minds. 
One of the Helsinki dailies then dashed cold water upon die-hard enthu-
siasts by reporting that no decision had been yet made concerning re-
cognition of Finnish independence.50 
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Disappointment followed in the wake of the exposure of the canard. It 
perhaps tended to clear up the political atmosphere in Finland and to 
develop caution in the drawing of conclusions among those in positions 
of responsibility. The episode nevertheless did not pass without some real 
benefit to the Finns: the French Government announced that it had decided 
to restore diplomatic relations with Finland as they had been before the 
breach came on October 15, 1918.51  
In following the course of French policy toward the Finnish question, 
one is struck by its abrupt twists and turns;  in other words, to borrow 
again Mannerheim's previously quoted expression, the French behavior 
in reaching decisions was »temperamental». The behavior of the British, 
on the other hand, was stiffly restrained — they insisted upon Finland's 
strictly meeting the conditions imposed upon her and were unwilling to 
modify the attitude they had taken earlier. The British view was that Fin-
land would have to change her politics and that this would take time,52 
and for this reason the British obviously disapproved of the French 
readiness to modify the conditions jointly imposed on the Finns. The cool 
detachment of British diplomacy had been previously displayed when, in 
October 1918, contrary to the precipitate action of the French, London 
refrained from resorting to drastic measures;  and Great Britain remained 
alone among the Western Allies to maintain contact — through the Finnish 
Charge d'affaires, Holsti -- with the Finns. As a result, in the changed 
world political situation later on, at least one channel remained open for 
possible exchanges of views between the British and Finnish Governments. 
In dealing with the Finnish question, London did not, accordingly, seem 
to have any special reason to make haste. Following the Armistice the 
British position had become easier. British naval units were cruising around 
Baltic waters and Allied troops tarried in the Murmansk area, which meant 
that the strategic interests of Great Britain were being well looked after. 
Germany, the enemy, had withdrawn on account of the fatal turn in its 
fortunes of war from the northeastern theater of operations, which had 
included the Aland Islands and the Gulf of Finland. Simultaneously, the 
Arctic coast had been neutralized, now that the possibility of its developing 
into a danger zone through joint Finnish and German action no longer 
existed. 
Roles had changed on the stage of power politics, and Finland was 
obliged to face the consequences of having leaned for support on the losing 
side. The Finns needed time to adjust to the changed circumstances, 
and the view of the British authorities was that too short a time had 
elapsed up to the beginning of the 1919 for relations between the two 
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Governments to be established on a basis of mutual confidence. That is 
why they chose simply to follow the progress of events in Finland and 
let the political leaders of the country wait. 
Of the Western »Big Three», France had proved to be the weak link in 
the chain of collaboration. At the end of 1918 it had, it is true, approved 
the decision in principle according to which Finland would be required 
to fulfill certain conditions in order to gain recognition of her indepen-
dence. But in practice it was ready to make »adjustments», which caused 
the Americans and the British embarrassment. To the French, as noted 
in the foregoing, Mannerheim's appointment to the Regency sufficed as 
guarantee of the desired change in the Finnish political line, and, contrary 
to the Americans and the British, the French began to feel that Ingman's 
Government could qualify for acceptance of the act of recognition. 
The United States looked upon Finnish independence as a de facto 
reality. The Prinkipo Plan initiated by President Wilson treated Finland 
as a state that had seceded from Russia. Characteristic of the American 
attitude toward Finland was the fact that it involved a desire to separate 
the different parts of a broad set of problems. Thus, the problems of 
political recognition and relief deliveries were handled separately.'3 The 
decision made at the beginning of December 1918 to deliver food supplies 
to Finland did not signify any point of departure for acting upon the 
Finnish request for recognition. The Finnish authorities considered the 
treatment of the latter problem slow, and this annoyed American diplo-
mats. Illustrative of the American frame of mind was the response given 
by Mr. Henry White, a member of the United States delegation to the 
Peace Conference, to Holsti upon his inquiring what Finland could do to 
speed up action on the issue of diplomatic recognition. «... Nothing,» 
White said, »just wait.»54 
From the beginning of February the distinctive feature of the Allied 
stand toward the Finnish question was one of waiting —• waiting for the 
outcome of the parliamentary elections in March, the holding of which 
would signify the fulfillment of the most important of the conditions 
imposed on Finland. By this time, French enthusiasm in the matter of 
armed intervention in Russia was also showing signs of waning. Foreign 
Minister Pichon, who had endeavored to secure Mannerheim's position, 
deemed it necessary to retreat and fall in line with the views of the Ameri-
can and British representatives. By the beginning of March he, too, was 
interested in the Finnish elections and the new government to be formed 
on the basis of the results. 
Considered in the light of diplomtic activity, the Finnish situation was 
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nearly dead as the parliamentary elections approached. Whenever any of 
the Western representatives were approached, queries were met with coldly 
laconic responses to the effect that »the matter is under advisement».55 
Getting anything done to facilitate action on the question of diplomatic 
recognition at the Peace Conference had proved difficult: alongside the 
major problems of the peace settlement, the Finnish question looked 
»small» and of »secondary importance».J8 Practical diplomatic activity had 
— - bypassing all wishful thinking — made this fact plain, as unpleasant 
as it was from the Finnish point of view but easy enough for any observer 
of a different nationality to see.57 
The Finnish parliamentary elections of March r and 3, 1919,  were held 
in an atmosphere of high political tension. At stake, after all, was the 
resolution of vitally important political issues. The results of the elections 
would, it was felt, lead to a settlement of the prolonged controversy over 
the constitutional form of the government, among other things, as well 
as determining the general line of social reform and laying a foundation 
on which to build foreign policy. 
What happened was that the bourgeois parties together won a substantial 
majority of the seats in Parliament, but with their 8o seats the Social 
Democrats emerged as the strongest single party. The republican factions 
-- the Agrarian Union with 42 and the Progressive (Liberal) Party with 26 
seats --. established themselves as the largest of the bourgeois groups. Of 
the monarchist factions, the National Coalition (Conservatives) ended up 
with 28 and the Swedish People's Party with 22 seats — though three 
members of the latter party favored the establishment of a republic. In 
addition, two seats went to the Christian Workers' Party. 
The political right had suffered defeat, for the republican factions, count-
ing the Social Democrats, had captured a three-quarters majority in Parlia-
ment. Political responsibility had shifted to different hands.56 The results of 
the election had cleared the air. They disproved the notion that the Finn-
ish people were monarchists at heart. And this fact the republicans did 
not fail to stress.59 
The Agrarians and Liberals hoped to have the biggest voice in the 
enactment of laws, after lending a due ear to the views of the Social 
Democrats. Taken as a whole, the results of the election reinforced the 
line of neutrality. It was felt that the country had wrested itself free of 
pro-German influence once and for all and that a decisive step had been 
taken toward the fulfillment of the »conditions» laid down by the Western 
Powers.80 
As Regent, Mannerheim took a hand in the re-organization after the 
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elections of the administration of the country on the highest level. As a 
monarchist by conviction, he could hardly have found the task a congenial 
one. Because the Conservatives and the Swedish People's Party had adopted 
him as their guiding political star, his prestige had been cast into the 
electoral scales and even been damaged by the defeat suffered by the 
parties lined up behind him. 
Also contributing to the weakening of Mannerheim's position was the 
circumstance that the Social Democrats, who had been barred from the 
rump Parliament, had gained the biggest representation of any single party 
in the new Parliament. The Regent's attitude toward them was one of stern 
repudiation — that supporters of the Social Democratic Party had been 
allowed to vote in the first place he had condemned as a »grave risk».01  
Considering the importance attached by the Western Powers to the holding 
of free elections in Finland, however, it is hardly conceivable that the 
Government would have dared to impose any restictions on their participa-
tion in the elections. 
On the occasion of the parade held on May 16, 1918,  to celebrate the 
end of the Civil War, Mannerheim had emphasized, as a precept for future 
observance, the principle of »firm government», which would not be sensi-
tive to the pressure of partisan interests or liable to the acceptance of com-
promises. He was now confronted with the problem of applying this prin-
ciple in practice under completely changed conditions. Mannerheim's 
objective, the formation of a bourgeois coalition government" was no 
longer possible of realization — the election results could not be ignored. 
His first personal contact with Finnish democratic parliamentary politics 
obviously proved disappointing. 
In constructing the post-election government, Mannerheim strove to 
keep the rightist parties from being cast out into the cold. They consisted 
of »Mannerheim's men», whom he could count upon to bring stability to 
the exercise of governmental authority. On occasion Mannerheim cham-
pioned the formation of a bourgeois coalition government so zealously that 
he threatened to quit as Regent unless his demands were accepted.03 When, 
to bOlster his arguments, he referred to the »opinion of the Western 
Powers», he was probably not thinking solely of gaining recognition of 
Finnish independence but evidently also -- and France figured particularly 
in this matter — of the attitude toward intervention.64 In the light of this 
question a centrist government looked troublesome to  Mannerheim, one 
hard to manipulate; inclusion of the rightist groups had its advantages in 
his view. 
The radical elements among the centrists were out to gain objectives of 
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their own. What they wanted was a government composed wholly of 
ministers who stood for the republic, and they believed that the three- 
quarters majority in the new Parliament entitled them to make such a 
demand. So far had they advanced along this line that the Agrarian and 
Liberal groups in Parliament had nominated a candidate to head such a 
government, Mikael Soininen. But implementation of this scheme, which 
would have facilitated obtaining the support of the Social Democrats, 
was evidently regarded in circles close to the Regent as marking too abrupt 
a change under prevailing conditions. 
Negotiations led to the formation of a government in which the majority 
of the portfolios were held by republicans but a few were reserved for men 
who enjoyed the confidence of Mannerheim. Notable among the latter were 
Prime Minister Kaarlo Castrén and Defense Minister Rudolf Walden. At the 
uncompromising insistence of the republicans, the Regent's candidate Carl 
Enckell had to step aside to let Rudolf Holsti take over the office of Foreign 
Minister. In the main, the Castren Government, which also included 
certain members of the Swedish People's Party or men in close sympathy 
with it, had a centrist complexion. Left outside the pale were the National 
Coalition05 and the Social Democrats. 
During the negotiations preceding the distribution of portfolios, the 
observation was made that protraction of the government crisis could have 
an unfavorable effect upon the position of the country in international 
affairs.°6 
The parliamentary elections in March and the appointment of the Cast-
rén Government on April 17 were forward steps in the development of 
internal Finnish politics that facilitated the shift in orientation westward 
and simultaneously brought diplomatic recognition closer. The last of the 
»conditions» laid down at the end of 1918  by the victorious Allies --
establishing a democratic foundation for the government67 -- had thus 
been fulfilled. 
The attitude of the American and British Governments toward these 
»conditions» had been consistent the whole time, and toward the end 
France, too, was standing firm beside them.08 At the end of March, after 
the election results had become known but before the new government 
had been formed, Enckell and Donner made brave efforts in London to 
bring about an immediate settlement of the issue of diplomatic recogni-
tion toward bolstering the Regent's position.0° The British policy makers 
refused to take action, ignoring the favorable recommendations of certain 
of their subordinates in the diplomatic service. 
While relations between Finland and the Western Allies remained un• 
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settled because the question of diplomatic recognition was still an open 
one, the British Consul in Helsinki, like his French colleague, kept in touch 
unofficially around the turn of the months of March and April with the 
Finnish authorities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The United 
States Consul, by contrast, kept his distance, to Mannerheim's chagrin.70 
Consul Haynes had decided to hold back as long as a new Finnish govern-
ment failed to materialize,71 and his line of conduct was supported by 
Secretary of State Lansing.72 The attitude of the State Department pro-
voked criticism outside Finnish circles, too. There were those Americans 
who felt the United States, by its own actions, was forfeiting commercial 
markets to the British.73  
The necessity of looking after economic interests placed the two great 
English-speaking powers in a competitive relationship. Of all the countries 
in the West, the British had maintained the liveliest trade before the war 
with Finland, which had been a valuable source of agriculture g00ds and 
products of the woodworking industries. And England made haste to revive 
its old trade with the Finns. The United States, for its part, had tremendous 
economic resources at its command;  and the Finns had felt their pull at 
the time the deliveries of food supplies had been made by the American 
Relief administration. On the top level at the Peace Conference, where 
the future status of Finland was being weighed, however, political con-
siderations continued to hold sway. 
After the parliamentary elections had been held and the Liberal-colored 
government formed, satisfying Allied demands, the only factor remaining 
to delay recognition of Finnish independence was the decision made on 
January 27 concerning the order of business at the Peace Conference, 
which bound the Finnish question up in the same package with Russia. 
From the standpoint of Finnish diplomatic activity, it was important to 
try to extricate by some means the question of the country's diplomatic 
recognition from the planned agenda, according to which the peace 
treaties with Germany and the other Central Powers would have had to be 
dealt with completely before other matters, such as those relating to Russia, 
could be considered.74 
During the latter part of April, around the time the Castrén Government 
took office in Finland, the main attention of the Allied leaders at the 
Peace Conference was centered upon putting the finishing touches to the 
German peace treaty as well as upon solving certain territorial problems, 
including Italian claims in the Balkan sphere. The border revisions de-
manded by the Italians had provoked such sharp differences of opinion 
that powerful exertions were required to iron them out sufficiently to 
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keep the conference going. The clash of views amounted to a crisis that 
threatened to make it more difficult than ever to get to the conference table 
matters not marked on the schedule. 
At this stage of the conference, the Russian question was at a dead end 
as far as the Western Powers were concerned. The scheme for holding a 
meeting on the island of Prinkipo had petered out because the proposed 
participants — the groups and governments exercising authority in Russia 
— could not be brought together for talks. President Wilson's next attempt 
to »pacify» conditions in Russia, which involved sending the American 
diplomat C. Bullitt to Moscow late in February to sound out the possi-
bilities of settling the Russian question through negotiations with the 
Bolshevik rulers, had likewise yielded no results. Wilson's originally tolerant 
attitude toward the Bolsheviks, whom he looked upon as representing in 
their own peculiar way the strivings of the Russian people to achieve 
internal reform, had begun to change to one of restraint and even oppo-
sition. Lloyd George, another advocate of the Prinkipo Conference, had 
experienced the resistance put up by the majority -- consisting of Con-
servatives — in his own Government, a situation that gave Winston 
Churchill, a zealous champion of the idea of intervention, courage to move 
into more vigorous action. 
The proponents of intervention stressed the argument that the Soviet 
Government was engaging in propaganda that preached world revolution, 
and it was pointed out that the failure of the Western Powers' Russian 
policy only served to fan the flames of this propaganda the rnore.7' The 
founding of the Communist International, or Comintern, in Moscow and 
the establishment of Béla Kun's »Red dictatorship» in Hungary forged new 
links in the chain of revolutionary events. 
Contact between the Western Powe nd the Bolsheviks had been nearly 
completely broken after the th; nQtI, 	 attempt to do something for 
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The functional break in the relations of the Western Powers with Russia 
appeared, on the one hand, in the loss of contact with Moscow and, on 
the other hand, in their failure to develop — France excepted — firm con-
tact with the Russian Whites, who also claimed a voice in deciding the 
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fate of Russia. It became possible to make observations on a change in 
the situation only after the middle of May, when reports began to reach 
the West about offensive operations started by White troops against the 
Red forces, first under Admiral Kolchak in Siberia and later under General 
Denikin in southern Russia. 
The decision of January 27 made by the Western Allies to put off action 
on Finland's request for diplomatic recognition until the question of Rus-
sia was dealt with was losing its binding force. It was hardly reasonable 
to expect that a governing body in control of all Russia would appear 
before long, one with the authority to take a »definitive stand» on the 
status of Finland. That the Finnish question, contrary to the agenda of 
the Peace Conference, might be extricated from the broad scope of the 
Russian problem, the primary objective would have to be to persuade 
Wilson to modify his attitude in principle toward the order of business of 
the Conference. The task facing Finnish diplomacy was to find out how 
to reach the ear of the American President, who had withdrawn in Paris 
into splendid isolation and kept in touch only with the top representatives 
of the major powers in the central organs of the Conference. 
Having been advised in London" how to open the knot formed by the 
political strings attached to the Finnish question, Holsti decided to appeal 
to Herbert Hoover for help in influencing Wilson. In connection with 
administering the Finnish relief program, Hoover had become acquainted 
with the development of the situation in Finland, one of his informants 
having been none other than Holsti himself during the previous five 
months. It gave him an opportunity to follow the progress of events on 
the Finnish political scene, such as the holding of the parliamentary 
elections and the setting up of the new government in fulfillment of the 
»conditions» laid down by the Allies. 
Nor was the issue of Finland's diplomatic recognition terra incognita 
to Hoover: he knew the various phases it had undergone, and he had even 
made a move a short time before to settle it.78 Lack of recognition was 
hampering Finland's economic dealings abroad, and this, too, Hoover had 
witnessed first hand. For example, American banks were continually re- 
fusing to honor bills of exchange from Finland covering the growing food 
deliveries and other commercial transactions between the two countries. 
After Holsti had explained the nature of the obstacle to recognition of 
Finnish independence, Hoover actively demonstrated his capacity to seize 
upon the solution of problems not within his special field of operations. 
The sequence of events leading to the resolution of the issue of Fin-
land's diplomatic recognition was as follows: On April 26 Hoover drew 
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up a memorandum to be dispatched to Wilson toward ending further 
procrastination in the matter. Detailed grounds were given for action, 
so at this juncture Hoover emerged as the prime mover in a matter of 
paramount importance to Finland. In appealing70 to Wilson, he emphasized 
that Finland had met the demands of the Western Powers and that there-
fore her request for diplomatic recognition deserved a favorable response. 
Moreover, as a general matter of principle, he observed that in their 
political development the Finns had lived through every phase the world 
could ask to achieve their status as an independent nation. And, referring 
to the political inheritance of the West, he stated further that the Finnish 
people had bravely striven to establish in their own country a -liberal 
democracy».80 Finally, Hoover expressed the opinion that, considering 
everything, Finland would undoubtedly have gained recognition of her 
independence had not a tremendous number of other questions simul-
taneously confronted the Peace Conference. 
Wilson took up the Finnish question at a meeting of the «Big Four- 
on April 28. The "Fourth», Orlando, did not attend on account of the 
cold reception given the territorial demands of Italy; 
 so he did not partici-
pate in dealing with the matter. Hoover's message provided the basis for 
discussion, and the direction it took was staked out by President Wilson's 
proposal that the independence of Finland be recognized. The brief com-
ments made by Lloyd George and Clemenceau boiled down to the observa-
tion that the matter had been brought up at precisely a time when neither 
was prepared' to tackle it. Lloyd George presented reasons why the Finnish 
question could not be settled at an earlier stage. He remarked that Finnish 
politics had opposed Western interests and had in general vacillated since 
the outbreak of the Russian revolution. Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau 
wanted to consult their men in charge of foreign affairs, and thus the 
matter was referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers for treatment." 
When the recognition of Finland's independence had been under con-
sideration as a theoretical problem ever since the latter part of March on 
the top foreign policy-making levels in the British and United States 
Governments, the following alternatives had received attention: should 
de facto recognition be given first and de jure recognition only later? or, 
if the de jure step were to be taken directly, should it be granted con-
ditionally or unconditionally? 
The British authorities had no intention of dictating any actual con-
ditions but only expressed the hope that certain wrinkles in the situation 
which interfered with the resolution of the main issue might be ironed out. 
Among matters that might be rectified, as mentioned by Lord Curzon in the 
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middle of March to the Finnish envoy in London, Ossian Donner, were 
the expulsion from Finland of a couple of German agents and the grant-
ing of an amnesty to the Finnish legionaries who had served in the British 
forces in the Murmansk sector.82 
Curzon brought up both matters somewhat later again in discussions 
with Foreign Minister Enckell, who was visiting London at the time. The 
first measure stirred up no resistance on the part of the Finnish authorities, 
whereas the second did. With regard to pardoning the legionaries, Manner-
heim had refused to go along with the proposal, as a diplomatic communi-
cation sent to London at the beginning of April disclosed.83 The British 
Foreign Office then proposed an alternative solution: it called for the 
appointment of a mixed committee of British officers and representatives 
of the Finnish Legion, which would proceed to negotiate with the Finnish 
authorities toward settling their differences.84 This proposal, which did 
not involve any decision regarding the fate of the legionaries, was accepted 
by the Regent. The recognition of Finland's independence was, in accord-
ance with the stand taken by the British Foreign Office, to be de jure in 
form. 
When the mode of recognition of Finnish independence had been 
weighed at the State Department in Washington during the month of 
March, the granting of de facto recognition had at first been considered.85 
The reason for this was that the United States policy-makers wanted to 
reserve for the Peace Conference a voice in the Finnish question in its 
entirety for the time being, that is, until the eventual granting of de jure 
recognition. The aim of this strategy was to keep open for the Peace Con-
ference the possibility of influencing the solution of the problem of Fin-
land's territorial boundaries. 
The Western Powers apparently drew a parallel between the Finns' 
boundary policy and the measures undertaken by the Poles and the Italians 
to acquire additional territory at their neighbors' expense. The latter two 
nations had taken matters into their own hands — without awaiting the 
decisions of the Peace Conference — to satisfy their demands for border 
revisions by force of arms and thereby confront the great powers with a 
f a i t a c comp 1  i. On the part of Finland, the reservation regarding the 
granting of recognition was probably made with an eye on both the A land 
Islands and East Karelia, particularly the latter. 
In the United States delegation to the Peace Conference, special attention 
had been focussed on East Karelia,A6 the annexation to Finland by force of 
arms of which appeared to be the aim of new attempts later in April. In 
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contrast to the other states that had gained their independence as a result 
of the World War, the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland had possessed 
national boundaries of her own. Acknowledgment of the Peace Confer-
ence's power of decision in the matter of these boundaries posed a problem 
because it was liable to throw the controversy over the Åland Islands into 
the lap of the Western Powers and thereby cause Finland to lose part of 
her national territory. 
Among Finnish diplomats it was Holsti, enjoying as he did the closest 
contacts with representatives of the English-speaking powers, that expected 
his Government to submit to the desire of the United States to have the 
question of. Finland's boundaries decided by the Peace Conference.s' This 
»wishful thought» of Holsti's stemmed from his endeavor to remove the 
obstructions in the way of a rapid solution of the issue of diplomatic 
recognition.  
Holsti appears to have nourished the idea that unless the Finns showed 
compliance in the matter of their national boundaries, the recognition of 
their independence would only be a de f a c t o one.88 It would mean 
that the main issue, recognition without any reservations, would be left 
at the half-way point and might nevertheless leave the boundary problems 
open for rehashing at a later date. Even if submission to the judgment of 
the Peace Conference involved the risk of Finland's losing territory — the 
Åland Islands, perhaps, in particular — Holsti felt sure compensltion 
would be offered from some other direction, most likely that of East Ka-
relia. The possible acquisition of territory in the east appears to have 
interested him more than the retention of the Åland Islands.89 
Like Holsti, Adolf Törngren also thought that the territorial problems 
could be separated from the issue of diplomatic recognition for subsequent 
solution.90 The treatment of the Finnish question would thus follow the 
Polish pattern: first would come recognition of the State's sovereignty, and 
then would come the determination of its boundaries. This procedure 
would not, as mentioned, remove the danger of territorial losses, either.  
Mannerheim vigorously opposed granting the Peace Conference authority 
to decide upon Finland's boundaries because of the risk of her being 
deprived of the Åland Islands, which had till then been part and parcel 
of the Finnish domain. Matters had a different complexion with respect to 
new areas, which had previously been situated beyond the Finnish border. 
The Regent's stand, in line with which directives were dispatched to 
Holsti,°1 was in conformity with the one taken by the Government when 
Sweden sought to get the Peace Conference to settle its border dispute 
with Finland. In the past, too, Mannerheim's stand toward the issue of 
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the Aland Islands had proved uncompromising. The governing authorities 
of Finland had thus refused to submit voluntarily to the judgment of the 
Peace Conference concerning the country's boundaries. 
When the question of recognizing Finland's independence came up on 
May 3 before the Council of Foreign Ministers,B2 there did not appear to 
be any obstacles in the way of a favorable decision. Nevertheless, discus-
sion was raised on the basis of the »general line» that had been adopted as 
to the form the decision should be given and as to whether any provisos 
should be attached to it. In this connection, most of the arguments were 
reiterated that had been presented by the Americans and the British when 
the principles involved in according Finland diplomatic recognition had 
been dealt with around the turn of the months of March and April ; but 
certain new points of view were also brought to the fore. 
No difficulty was encountered in arriving at an agreement according to 
which each of the participating great powers would accord its recognition 
to Finland separately rather than through any joint proclamation. The 
action of France and several other countries in acknowledging the inde-
pendent status of Finland in January 1918 had established a mode of 
procedure that was considered fitting to adhere to in this connection as 
well. 
It did not escape the notice of the Council of Foreign Ministers that the 
question of granting Finland diplomatic recognition had older political 
roots than in the cases of Poland and Czechoslovakia, whose claims to 
recognition were first submitted at as late a stage as the signing of the 
Armistice. The agreement whereby Finland's independence would be recog-
nized separately by the contracting powers was actually produced by the 
Peace Conference. But the formal declaration of the action taken was to 
be made as if each government had reached its decision on its own. The 
fact that the various great powers intended to issue separate announce-
ments could not, however, conceal the truth, which was that the total 
series of actions proceeded from a common agreement. 
The question raised in the Council of Foreign Ministers as to whether 
certain provisos should be attached to the act of recognition provoked an 
exchange of views regarding the principles involved, on the one hand, and 
regarding the nature of such provisos, on the other hand. 
In this connection, British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hardinge 
proposed — in line with the earlier American recommendation — that 
the act of recognition include the proviso that the Finnish Government 
agree to let the Peace Conference settle the matter of Finland's boundaries. 
On the other hand, he felt that the British delegation's earlier demand for 
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the granting of an amnesty to the Finnish members of the Murmansk 
Legion could not, on account of the nature of the question, be incorporated 
in the document dealing with the recognition of Finland's independence. 
The matter would have to be arranged some other way, as, for example, 
by using Western diplomatic channels in Helsinki to bring the wishes of 
the British Government to the attention of the Finnish Government. 
The discussion revealed that, although the initiative in the matter had 
been taken by the United States delegation, the Americans themselves 
were unsure as to what form of recognition should be granted Finland. 
Thus Lansing of first spoke about de f a c t o recognition and subsequently 
considered on a parallel basis the alternatives of de j u r e and de f act a. 
Hoover took a straighter line. In his letter of April 26 to Wilson, cited in 
the foregoing, he had remarked that it was hard to understand why it was 
necessary to resort to »half-way measures» in dealing with the Finnish 
question. A memorandum drawn up on May u by the secretariat of the 
United States peace delegation juxtaposed the alternatives. De j u r e would 
presuppose a promise by the Finns to submit to a solution of their border 
problem at a later date."3  
Lansing had turned to Wilson to inquire whether the recognition of 
Finland's independence should be defined as applying only to her officially 
established national territory." Before the Council of Foreign Ministers 
convened, Wilson had responded that the granting of diplomatic recogni-
tion would not bind the United States to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
the annexation by Finland of any territory that had belonged to Russia. 
To the national territory she had hitherto held, he had maintained, Fin-
land had an undisputed right.95 Evidently, it was due to this statement of 
Wilson's stand in the matter that Lansing no longer supported Hardinge 
in his demand that the Finnish border problem be brought before the Peace 
Conference for settlement. 
A special contribution to the discussion on the Finnish question in the 
Council of Foreign Ministers was made by Ambassador Makino of Japan, 
who proposed the introduction of an entirely new »proviso». It was his 
idea that in return for diplomatic recognition Finland should grant General 
Yudenich the right to use Finnish territory for operations against Petrograd. 
Since Makino had no instructions relative to the matter from his Govern-
ment, he declared that he was only expressing his personal opinion. His 
statement represented such a shift in the Council from the special question 
at hand to the central arena of power politics that the spokesmen for the 
other major powers were prompted to set forth their views. 
French Foreign Minister Pichon, who was indifferent to the issue 
rOb 
	 Juhani Paasivirta 
of recognizing Finnish independence, enthusiastically seized upon Makino's 
suggestion — seeing how it accorded with the attitude of his own Govern-
ment — and was prepared to furnish the French diplomatic envoy in Hel-
sinki with instructions to act in the matter. Both Lansing and Hardinge, 
on the other hand, sharply opposed the idea of coupling any scheme of 
intervention in Russia to the business of recognizing Finnish independence. 
Lansing emphasized that the recognition of a country's independence 
was based upon considerations of justice. Accordingly, any provisos design-
ed to serve political ends — as in the case of Makino's proposal — would 
be out of order. Hardinge, in his criticism of Makino's proposal, pointed 
out that the British Government opposed Finland's involvement in l:ude-
nich's campaign, which he believed to confront the country with a grave 
danger. 
The question of attaching provisos to the recognition of Finnish inde-
pendence thus ended up in a negative decision. On the other hand, it 
was unanimously agreed that, when recognition was accorded, the Govern-
ments of the Western Allies would exhort the Finnish Government to 
aceept whatever the decision of the Peace Conference might be regarding 
the boundaries of Finland as well as to grant the members of the Mur-
mansk Legion an amnesty in a »liberal spirit». 
The intention of the Western Allies — excepting Italy, which did not 
take part in the handling of the Finnish question — was that, after a 
mutual understanding had been reached on the matter of recognition, the 
American and British Governments would separately but at the same time 
notify the highest Finnish authorities. The aim of bringing about a syn-
chronization of this diplomatic move by the two Governments was not 
realized, however, in practice. 
The British communication was cabled on May 6 by Under-Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs Curzon to Consul Bell. And on the same day Prime 
Minister Kaarlo Castren passed the glad tidings on to Parliament, affirming 
that the event was a significant one from the standpoint of the country's 
capability of action in international affairs.96 
Secretary of State Lansing did not inform the United States Consul in 
Helsinki directly, as Curzon did the British Consul, but on the evening of 
May 5 sent his communication regarding the decision to recognize Finnish 
independence to the State Department in Washington.07 This procedure 
caused confusion and complications.88 After Lansing's message had been 
delivered to the proper desk at the State Department, he received a response 
that took for granted that the United States peace delegation had already 
sent a notification to Helsinki concerning the matter of diplomatic recog- 
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nition.99 It was only after he had received this response to his own cable-
gram that Lansing informed Consul Haynes in Helsinki about the decision 
that had been made.'°° 
In the meantime, Haynes had gone about sending inquiries to Paris and 
Washington as to the reason for the delay.101 The result of all this was 
that it was not until May 9 that the Finnish Parliament was notified on 
the favorable action taken by the United States in the matter of according 
Finland recognition — that is, three days after the British notification had 
been received. It was therefore deemed advisable to make the announce-
ment that the American and British representatives had reached a simul-
taneous decision in the matter in Paris on May 3.102 Then, on May 12, the 
French envoy in Helsinki informed the Finnish authorities about his Gov-
ernment's having ratified its earlier recognition of Finland's independence, 
and the Japanese Ambassador to Paris sent his Government's favorable 
response to Finland's request for recognition the next day. 
Recognition by Italy was put off. As mentioned in the foregoing, its 
delegation had been absent from the Peace Conference during this period 
on account of the reverses it had suffered in trying to acquire additional 
territory on the eastern side of the Adriatic;  so the decisions made at the 
conference did not affect the Italians directly. Postponement of Italy's 
action was not, however, entirely due to its periodic isolation but to other 
considerations of some significance to that country. Like the French, the 
Italian political line was strictly anti-Bolshevik. Viewed from this stand-
point, according Finland recognition was not a measure that fit in very 
well with the Italian authorities' desire to maintain close relations with 
the Russian Whites, who were known to oppose Finnish independence. 
Endorsement of the decision relating to Finland, based as it was on the 
principle of self-determination, was in conflict, moreover, with Italy's own 
territorial demands, insofar as they could be challenged by the right of 
the inhabitants of the eastern Adriatic coast to self-determination.'" 
The Italian Government's eventual favorable action, communicated to 
the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a note dated June 27, should 
probably be viewed — after Belgium had accorded Finland its recognition 
on the loth of the same month — more than anything else as a demon-
stration of Italy's desire to identify itself with prevailing opinion among 
the Western Allies. The Italian delegates had by this time returned to the 
Peace Conference to work side by side with the representatives of the other 
victorious powers. 
The recognition accorded Finnish independence aroused no significant 
editorial reactions in leading newspapers in the West. It was reported in 
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brief news dispatches, and the event was soon thrust into the background 
by more momentous political developments. One such topical event of 
major interest was the arrival at Versailles of the delegates of defeated 
Germany on May 7 to receive the terms of peace. For historical drama, 
this event was almost without parallel, and it drew the concentrated atten-
tion of both the belligerent powers and the neutrals. The weighing of the 
conditions of peace having begun once more in earnest, the Russian 
question commanded special interest, what with the color given it by the 
military operations of the Russian Whites and the new wave of activity on 
the diplomatic front. 
The recognition of her independence obtained from the American and 
British Governments signified for Finland the attainment of a political 
goal that cost half a year's diplomatic exertion. However tirelessly the 
regular representatives of Finland in Paris and London, reinforced at the 
end of March by the Finnish Foreign Minister, strove to expedite matters, 
the »conditions» laid down by the Western Allies remained inflexible. On 
his mission in November and December 1918 to the two great Western 
capitals, Mannerheim had had to cope with these conditions as well as 
with the distrust the victorious powers felt toward Finland. 
In numerous connections since the beginning of 1919, Western diplomats 
had demanded the fulfillment of the conditions laid down by their Gov-
ernments when the Finns had expressed concern over the delay in gain-
ing recognition of their country's independence. For Mannerheim it had 
been obviously distasteful to concur in bringing about the reform in Finn-
ish domestic politics called for by these conditions — mainly the holding 
of parliamentary elections and the reorganization of the Government — 
especially in view of the fact that, in addition to everything else, he ran 
the risk of losing support through the required changes. No matter how 
much personal good will he had earned in French circles, he had been 
obliged to steer a course adhering to the »joint decision» of the Western 
Powers. The Finnish diplomat who laid heaviest stress upon the necessity 
of submitting to the Western demands was perhaps Holsti, but his role 
as informant for the Finnish government expressly in this matter had 
evidently aroused mistrust and disgust in the minds of many government 
officials who had been responsible for foreign affairs during the period of 
pro-German orientation. Although the conditions had been accepted un-
willingly, the resolution of the issue, when it at last became known, had 
been greeted with satisfaction. The independence of Finland had been 
recognized without reservations, and this made it possible for even Man-
nerheim to look upon it as a signal achievement of his tenure as Regent. 
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Having been accorded diplomatic recognition by the victorious Allied 
powers, Finland had become an operative agent in international affairs. 
Finland's lack of recognition by the American and British Governments 
had given aid and comfort to inimical forces, particularly the Russian 
Whites, who had no sympathy for the idea of establishing any part of the 
former Czarist empire as a sovereign State.104 Relations with the Western 
Allies were viewed by the Finns as becoming normalized, and the result 
was a feeling of increased security.10" The prospect of the future was some-
what darkened by the border question, regarding which diplomatic represen-
tatives of the Western Powers had delivered an »exhortation», although 
the intimation of a boundary revision could not — as the Finnish note of 
thanks to the British Government emphasized — concern the »ancient 
historical boundaries» of Finland.106 
Government circles in Sweden affirmed that Finland's position as an 
independent State had become stabilized by virtue of the diplomatic 
recognition accorded her. As favorable as the Swedish attitude was, it 
nevertheless was tempered by the knowledge that the dispute over the 
Aland Islands remained to be settled. Her attainment of recognized inter-
national status opened up for Finland opportunities to arrange commercial 
relations on the basis of bilateral agreements.107 In this connection, the 
Finns were primarily interested in Great Britain, which in the past had 
been the biggest buyer of Finnish exports, and the United States, which 
through its deliveries of relief supplies had inspired in Finnish commercial 
quarters a hankering after permanent American markets. 
After this Finland's political problems pointed in the direction of the 
East. In the opinion of many, the question of the country's eastern border 
was still an open one. The development of the situation in Russia and 
the attitude taken toward it by political circles in Finland were awaited 
with a certain excitement: Would Finland collaborate in the intervention 
or stick to the sidelines? In the last analysis, the issue of intervention 
involved — though not unconditionally and definitively — Finland's 
relations with the West, according to the mode of thought concerning 
Russia that became prevalent in the Western countries. 
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Chapter VI 
The »Murmansk Legion» and Public Opinion in Finland 
One of the things the Western Allies, the British in particular, had urged 
the Finnish Government to agree upon in return for diplomatic recognition 
was the settlement of the fate of the Finnish legionaries that had served 
in the Allied Murmansk Force »in a liberal and magnanimous spirit». 
The fact that many of the legionaries had fought in the Finnish Civil War 
on the Red side and thus were guilty of having taken part in a rebellion 
against the legally established Government made it a problem that incensed 
political tempers, even though its importance diplomatically as a means 
of smoothing relations between Finland and the victorious powers was 
understood. 
The creation of the Murmansk Legion can be traced back mainly to the 
closing stage of the Finnish Civil War: the flight across the frontier into 
northern Russia of Finnish Red troops who had no desire to make common 
cause with the Bolsheviks. With the Russian empire in a state of disintegra-
tion and internal chaos,' this group of fugitives, in seeking living space, 
threw in its lot with a stronger force. It was an act of self-preservation. 
Preparing to oppose any German thrust up toward the Arctic Ocean, the 
British Expeditionary Force took the Finnish Reds and other fugitives from 
the other side of the border under its wing by organizing them into special 
fighting units. This was one of the ways in which the British command in 
the far northern sector sought to further its own military plans. It also, for 
example, maintained contact with the local revolutionary, so-called Re-
gional Council of Murmansk, which was likewise prepared to support 
measures against German and Finnish Government troops. The Western 
Powers, for their part, promised to refrain from meddling in Russian 
internal affairs.' 
The British need for reinforcements offered the Finnish Reds a chance 
of salvation. Their helpless situation was a boon to the Expeditionary Force, 
making it easy to recruit them for service. It was in June of 1918 that a 
mutual agreement was made, which led to the founding of the Finnish 
Murmansk Legion. The legion had its own officers, who took their orders 
from the Allied military headquarters in this sector. The legionaries received 
their arms and other supplies from the British, and they were also paid 
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wages. Their area of operations was East Karelia and the territory around 
Murmansk, and they were not supposed to be used in any other fighting 
except against Germans and Finnish Government forces.3 From the British 
point of view, they were to this extent regarded as politically reliable.' 
Homesickness and uncertainty about the future, however, were factors 
apt to affect their morale and lead to difficulties in handling them. 
The political liaison officer for the -Finn Legion» was Oskari Tokoi, 
who, after wandering about in search of a suitable place to establish a 
colony for the emigrant Finns, had ended up in northern Russia, ancestral 
home of one branch of the Finnish racial family. The step taken by the 
Red Finns led by Tokoi5 was not to the liking of the revolutionary-minded 
fugitives from Finland who chose to support the Soviet regime. Although 
its spokesmen emphasized that the legion was not engaged in fighting 
against the Soviet Government, the »Muscovite» exiles condemned the 
legionaries as heretics deserving the death penalty for their »treachery». 
When it became known in Finland that Red Finns had formed a military 
force in Murmansk and that this had been done in collaboration with the 
British, the result — as indicated in the foregoing — was to stir up public 
feeling and complicate relations between Finland and the Western Powers. 
Bourgeois newspapers denounced the legionaries as Bolsheviks, who were 
bent on taking political revenge on their native country and who were 
assumed to be preparing for an opportunity to return to Finland by force 
of arms. 
In various connections, Finnish newspapers depicted the British and the 
Red troops in action shoulder to shoulder. It was rumored that they had 
operated together in repulsing the advance of the Finnish expeditionary 
force that in May had tried to capture the Arctic province of Petsamo.  
Various allegations were made that during the final stage of the Civil War 
the Reds had negotiated with the British toward continuing the fight as a 
joint effort.° All these matters, together with the reports that in East Kare-
lia British troops were obstructing the advanee of Finnish detachments of 
volunteers on the other side of frontier, contributed — in addition to the 
strong pro-German sentiment — to direct the development of political 
opinion against the British and the Western Allies in general.7 
Since the issue of the Finn Legion had provoked discussion along the 
lines indicated in Finland, the British Foreign Office saw fit to make 
certain observations concerning the matter. They were contained in notes 
presented to the Finnish Government on August 9 and October 13, 1918, 
and also published.° The first note asserted that the British authorities had 
supported neither side in the Finnish Civil War and, accordingly, had not 
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worked in collaboration with the Red Guards. The second stated that the 
use of Finnish Reds in the British Expeditionary Force in the Murmansk 
sector did not mean that the British Government endorsed their political 
views. Neither would it countenance their making any attack across the 
border to violate the state of law and order recently restored in Finland 
and thereby plunge the country once more into the throes of civil strife. 
When this statement was brought to the attention of the Finnish Govern-
ment, the victory of the Allied cause and the end of the World War were 
in sight and a new phase was about to begin in the fortunes of the Mur-
mansk Legion. 
When the military operations of the Germans ceased, and since the Finn-
ish legionaries could not be put into combat against the Bolsheviks, the 
legion no longer had any function provided for by the agreement concluded 
the previous summer. The course of events had reached a point where the 
dissolution of this extraordinary military unit was in order. 
The immediate disbanding of the legion could not come into question, 
for, in view of their wartime services, the British Government did not wish 
to abandon the legionaries to an uncertain fate. The attempt of one de-
tachment of legionaries to force their way into Finland across the border 
at Kuusamo in January 1919 caused British diplomacy some embarrassment 
in relations with this country° — not least of all because these Red Finns 
wore British uniforms.10 To forestall the spread of rebellious feeling among 
the members of the legion, the British military authorities were obliged 
to undertake »pacification measures». The excitement quieted down con-
siderably after assurances were given that the legionaries would be kept 
on the payroll of the Western Allies by being transferred to the labor 
service." According to an agreement made in April 1919, the British prom-
ised to place their prestige at stake in order to arrange an opportunity for 
the legionaries to return home. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the 
British Government had expressed the hope at the end of March to the 
Finnish Government that it would help settle the case of the Finnish 
Murmansk Legion by granting an amnesty to these former Red Guards — 
with the exception of the ones who had specially »compromised» them-
selves — and thereby removing the obstructions to their repatriation. The 
British Government emphasized that duty required its l00king after the 
fate of men like these, who had served in its military forces. The proposal 
was made at a juncture when Finland was expecting a decision to be 
reached by the Western Allies on her request for diplomatic recognition;  
and this circumstance naturally caused the Finnish authorities to give the 
matter attention so that it would not develop into a new source of friction 
in relations determining the country's international status. 
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Neither the Regent nor the Government was disposed, however, to agree 
to the granting of the proposed amnesty. The British government took up 
the matter again and again; and it suggested negotiations to clarify the 
question. Later on, the Charge d'affaires of the United States, the United 
Kingdom and France made a joint appearance to urge a settlement of the 
issue.12 Contact was made in Tallinn during the month of June, with 
representatives of the Finnish Government, the British staff in command 
of the Murmansk army and the Finn Legion; but, since the negotiations 
produced no result,11 consideration of the question was resumed in Hel-
sinki. 
According to the agreement eventually drawn up,14 the signing of which 
took place on July 19, 1919, Finland entered into no commitments that 
might have signified a deviation from existing law. The proposal of a spe-
cial amnesty having been rejected, an extraordinary repatriation procedure 
was worked out. The examination of the legionaries was to be conducted 
as provided for by Finnish law, with the British authorities taking care 
of their transportation for this purpose to Helsinki, where they would con-
tinue to be the responsibility and in the custody of the latter. A Finnish 
court would try each case and pass judgment in accordance with the laws 
then in force. 
A special clause stated that the agreement did not concern such legion-
aries as could be deemed to have been instigators or otherwise have played 
an especially influential part in the rebellion of 1918. Among the names on 
the list of such persons presented by the Finnish authorities was Oskari 
Tokoi. 
The signing of the repatriation agreement removed the last of the diplo-
matic obstacles in the way of establishing relations between Finland and 
the Western Powers on a normal basis. 
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Chapter VII 
The Åland Question and the Peace Conference 
The development of political sentiment among the inhabitants of the 
 
Åland Islands following the summer of 1917 was marked by a predominant 
trend favoring union with Sweden.1 A popular petition drawn up along 
these lines in December had given the activity of the Åland Islanders the 
character of a mass movement. The »grand petition», which carried as 
many signatures as the number of ballots cast in the parliamentary elections 
held in the fall of 1917, was aimed to serve as an overt point of departure 
toward the realization of the separatist ideal. Much was made of the 
principle of self-determination, on which Finland had based her own 
claims to political sovereignty. 
This trend of opinion was further advanced by the events of the spring 
of 1918: thanks to the intervention of the Swedish authorities at the end 
of February, the Russian troops garrisoned on the islands — together with 
the military units representing both sides in the Finnish Civil War — were 
made to withdraw. The easing of the local situation increased the Ålanders'  
security and inspired in them a sense of gratitude to Sweden. 
More important than the islanders' Swedish sympathies in determining 
political decisions was the dominating position of Germany in the sphere of 
the Baltic Sea. Around the time Germany had decided to take a hand in 
the Finnish Civil War, Sweden had for her part decided to send troops to 
the Åland Islands. When the Germans landed in Finland at the beginning 
of March, the Swedish Government felt that difficulties lay ahead in the 
implementation of its political aims. Germany's position as the guiding 
force behind the progress of events compelled Sweden to compromise. 
Hoping that the step would not endanger the country's neutrality, Sweden 
in May 1918 gave Germany a pledge that she would not, by appealing to 
the 1856 Treaty of Paris, demand the co-operation of the Western Powers 
in arranging matters relating to the Åland Islands. Indirectly this commit-
ment was tantamount to acknowledging German hegemony.2 Thus, the 
question of the Åland Islands had to be settled among the states border-
ing on the Baltic Sea, that is, Germany, Russia, Sweden and Finland. 
The decision to have the fortifications on the Åland Islands destroyed 
came after this, and it was carried out jointly by Germany, Sweden and 
Finland; the Soviet Government had forfeited its voice in the matter by 
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submitting to the terms of the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The »enforced» 
collaboration between Finland and Sweden engineered by Germany did not 
help to improve future relations between them. Rather did they remain 
cool. And with the withdrawal from the islands of the Swedish troops by 
the end of May, Sweden's policy toward the Åland Islands displayed a 
weakening from the state of assertiveness observed during the previous six 
months, which, again, caused the Alander's own strivings to achieve union 
with Sweden to lose strength. 
The idea of a »compensation deal» whereby the Swedes hoped to gain 
possession of the Aland Islands as a reward for their services in realizing 
the annexation of East Karelia by Finland cropped up in Sweden at the 
beginning of July as a product of frustration generated by the emotional 
climate of the dying phase of the World War. The overall situation being 
persistently confused and the outcome being clouded by different possibili-
ties, the Swedes seized upon this scheme because the other means tried had 
yielded no results. The Swedish Government of Liberals and Social Demo-
crats headed by Nils Edén, which was cautious in its general approach to 
foreign policy, did not apparently wish — in view of the aforedescribed 
background — to take a position opposing the search for such a solution. 
As much courage and optimism as the scheme demanded of those who 
had initiated it, since it called for contacting both Britain and Germany at 
the same time, its implementation nevertheless depended upon the mere 
application of the procedures of diplomatic arbitration. 
Thus had Swedish foreign policy ended up by Foreign Minister Job. 
Hellner's acknowledging as his own the scheme for the solution of the 
Aland question promoted by zealots, though, it is true, now moderated 
with respect to the methods applied. The hoped-for solution to the problem 
of the ownership of the islands was not to be found, however, by the 
pursuit of this line. 
The unfavorable turn in the fortunes of war for the Central Powers had 
its effect also on the fate of the Åland Islands. Finland's having run into 
difficulties on account of her pro-German policy, Sweden felt her own 
chances for action opening wider insofar as she considered herself able, 
under the changed circumstances, to take up the pursuit once more of 
her objectives in the Åland Islands. 
Around October and November, when the foundations on which Fin-
land's pro-German policy had been built were collapsing and she had yet 
to establish relations with the Western Powers, the makers of Sweden's 
foreign policy thought it opportune to define their stand toward the Aland 
question on the basis of the changed international situation. The point of 
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departure of the line followed by Sweden was to strengthen the position 
of Finland as an independent state by offering her good offices. 
The Swedes, just across the Gulf of Bothnia, hoped that in the future 
Finland would not lean on any big power coalition for support but instead 
would join the neutral Scandinavian bloc and thereby add lung power to 
the voice of this Nordic »ideological alliance» in international affairs. It 
was hoped that, by developing close ties with the other Scandinavian 
countries, Finland's relations with the Western Powers would improve and 
that the British and United States Governments would recognize Finnish 
independence — preferably before the Peace Conference convened. Nec-
essary preconditions for a change in the attitude of the Western Powers 
were believed to be, above all, the evacuation of Finland by the German 
troops and, then, postponement of the settlement of the issue of the 
Finnish King until after the peace treaty was concluded.' 
This favorable attitude toward the matter of stabilizing Finnish inde-
pendence encouraged the Swedes at the same time to seek the realization 
of their unfulfilled hopes with regard to the Åland Islands. Swedish 
wishful thinking evidently stemmed from a belief that in a new situation, 
which in the Baltic sphere would leave open to Finland only the possibility 
of leaning on Sweden for support, the Finns, aware of the weak position 
of their country, might be prepared' to submit to the Swedish territorial 
demands as a »favor» in exchange for Sweden's good offices in the field of 
diplomacy. 
The altered conditions did produce certain expressions of opinion in 
Finland that ran parallel to the line of thought prevailing in Sweden. 
Especially among those who had zealously championed the pro-German 
policy there were many who in the crisis were inclined to reconsider their 
earlier attitudes in the light of the events of October and November. 
As the defeat of Germany began to loom on the horizon, the fear of 
Bolshevism overcame certain of the Activists and their collaborators, in-
cluding Regent Svinhufvud, whose experiences during the period when the 
Red Guards reigned in southern Finland increased their sense of ap-
prehension, while their pessimistic view of the future made them 
grope after every chance of getting foreign support. It was hard for 
them to adjust to the idea of turning to the Western Allies, a strange bloc 
of powers, the approach to which they had seemingly made impossible by 
the political line they had pursued. Sweden remained for them — in 
contrast to those who had sought to achieve a balance in relations with 
the major powers — the only state whose support could be obtained 
without difficulty. 
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Svinhufvud's stand toward the matter betrayed a certain compulsiveness. 
In order to bring about better relations with Sweden, Svinhufvud was 
willing to make a concession: he hinted at Finland's readiness to go along 
with the referendum demanded by the Swedes as the solution to the Åland 
question — which, considering the sentiment prevailing among the over-
whelming majority of the islanders, would have been tantamount to surren-
dering the islands peaceably to Sweden. On November 2 the Regent sub-
mitted to C. G. Westman, the Swedish envoy to Helsinki, a proposal 
designed to improve relations between the two countries,' one incorporat-
ing the aforementioned concession. This idea, which even in earlier years 
had not been excluded from the program of the pro-German Activists, 
apparently gave encouragement to the political leaders of Sweden as they 
undertook to push their demand for a referendum among the Åland Island-
ers. 
Noteworthy among the voices raised by representatives of the line 
hitherto pursued by the Finnish Government with the object of promoting 
better relations between Finland and Sweden was that of Minister Heikki 
Renvall. At the beginning of October he observed that in general the 
attitude of Finland toward the question of giving up the Åland Islands 
was a negative one, but he nevertheless left room for speculation that a 
bargain might be struck if it included territorial compensation for Finland 
from East Karelia.' 
Hinted at by Minister Renvall, the »compensation settlement», which 
had claimed the attention of the Swedish policy makers in the summer of 
1918,  reawakened interest and was mentioned in Joh. Hellner's circular 
letter of October 14 among instructions of topical importance. It was 
realized that acting accordingly involved difficulties in the arena of big 
power politics, as experience had shown, but the matter continued to be 
-in the wind». A condition of success was that at the Peace Conference 
Sweden manage to get her voice heard and that the victorious Allies feel 
some interest in territorial adjustments along the lines proposed in the 
Aland Islands and East Karelia. 
Sweden's most immediate goal was to bring about an internationally 
recognized referendum among the islanders. Prior to anything else, the 
Swedes thought they should seek an agreement in principle with Finland 
on this matter even before the Peace Conference met. Action on this basis, 
it was believed in Sweden, might prevent foreign interference and conse-
quent disagreements. Sweden saw the danger of the Western Allies' taking 
a position favoring Finland's claims to the Åland Islands in advance.' 
Accordingly, Mannerheim's mission to London and Paris aroused mixed 
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feelings in Sweden. On the one hand, it was hoped that the General's 
efforts would lead to a stabilization of Finland's independence. On the 
other hand, when it became known that the question of the Åland Islands 
had figured in his discussions with Allied political leaders,' Swedish ob-
servers became mistrustful' knowing that he opposed the annexation of 
the islands by Sweden. And these misgivings were also given public ex-
pression.lo 
It was on December 11 that Sweden confronted the Finnish Government 
with an official communication proposing that a referendum be held in 
the Åland Islands. 
When the world political situation took its momentous turn during the 
months of October and November, 1918, the Åland Islanders seized upon 
the idea of approaching the Western Allies in the matter of their future 
status. The procedure in itself was nothing new. Previously the islanders 
had appealed to powerful agencies abroad: at the beginning of February 
it had been the King of Sweden, in March the German Kaiser;  now had 
come the turn of the belligerents on the winning side in the World War. 
The action in itself reflected the conception that had become rooted in 
the political thinking of the Ålanders during the period the prohibition 
on fortifying the islands was in force after its imposition in 1856, namely, 
that the big powers played the decisive role in international affairs and 
that their range of interests embraced even »minor questions» like that 
of the Åland Islands. 
The initiative taken by the Ålanders appeared to serve the interests of 
Sweden also from the standpoint of its being a means of nullifying the 
agreement between Sweden and Germany according to which arrangements 
affecting the islands should be made jointly by the countries bordering on 
the Baltic Sea.11  
The islanders' leaders practiced caution in planning the steps to be 
taken, however, evidently on account of their earlier failure. Thus, when 
the matter came up of petitioning the support of the Western Powers for 
the holding of a referendum among the inhabitants of the islands, it was 
deemed advisable to turn to Regent Svinhufvud simultaneously with the 
same petition. Thereby, it was believed, the petition would not appear to 
be an act of disloyalty to the Finnish Government.12 
According to the plan of action of the Åland movement, the prominent 
local leader Julius Sundblom was to contact the Regent of Finland before 
the executive committee of the local representative assembly, or Ålands 
landsting, which had been formed the previous June, approached the 
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British, French and United States Governments. Of the triumvirate in 
control of politics in the islands — the other two being Carl Björkman 
and Johannes Eriksson — it was Julius Sundblom who from this point on 
began to appear most conspicuously in the picture. The shift of his position 
from one of loyalty of Finland to separatism had occurred slowly and, to 
some extent, even with difficulty."S As an MP representing his Åland 
constituents, Sundblom had gained parliamentary experience in the Finnish 
capital. And after the Civil War, which he had been obliged to wait out 
in Helsinki, he laid emphasis for the benefit of his fellow islanders on 
the necessity of pursuing a line of compromise.14 In the summer of 1918 
he declined the post of chairman of the Ålands landsting, thereby show-
ing consistency in his adherence to this line. 
It was not until the defeat of the Central Powers in the World War 
appeared inevitable that Sundblom began to blossom out as a separatist. 
During October and November he was in Stockholm, where he tried to 
maintain contact with the leading Swedish political circles;15 but neither 
did he wish to shut the door on negotiations with the authorities in Hel-
sinki, as pointed out in connection with the petition for a referendum. He 
continued to be a member of the Finnish Parliament, and he did not dare 
to burn his bridges back from the past, especially since he steadily doubted 
the chances of the separatist movement to succeed. 
The appointment of the deputation to be sent to Paris at the turn of 
the years 1918 and 1919 placed Sundblom at the crossroads. The leadership 
of the separatist movement demanded his participation10 and, being aware 
of the prevailing sentiment in the islands, he decided to accept membership 
in the delegation.17 Thereafter he played the role of separatist — as a 
crusading protagonist of the Aland movement and as a political agitator 
among the participating islanders' ranks. 
When word reached the islands that Prime Minister Paasikivi, who had 
been visited by the deputation, had taken a negative stand toward the 
Ålanders' petition for a referendum to settle their future status, finishing 
touches were applied to the petition. It was dated November 9 and two 
days later it was delivered to the Western Powers through their embassies 
in Stockholm.18 
The petition made reference to the principle of self-determination as 
interpreted by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points in January 1918, 
and the hope was expressed that the Åland question would be settled 
along this ideological line in connection with the peace negotiations. Such 
a solution would conform to the aspirations of the islanders, which could 
be manifested through a referendum. Delivered at the time of the signing 
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of the Armistice, the Alanders' petition was the initial step in appealing 
to the Western Powers. The next step was the sending of the Alanders' 
delegation to Paris, where its mission was to contact leading political per-
sonalities attending the Peace Conference. The decision to send the delega-
tion had evidently been inspired by political quarters in Sweden. The 
execution of the diplomatic task involved appeared, however, to be very 
difficult. Operating in the French capital confronted the delegation with 
demands of a different order from those required in dealing with the 
Swedish authorities. After all, it meant moving about in completely strange 
surroundings, and a further obstacle to effective action was the delegates' 
unfamiliarity with the languages of the major powers. To prevent a 
premature collapse of the effort, Sweden helped out by providing the 
Alanders with the services of interpreters and trying to arrange contacts. 
The Peace Conference had a crowded agenda and, under circumstances 
where problems concerning the future of Germany and Russia harassed 
the participants, the question of the Aland Islands could scarcely arouse 
much interest. On the contrary, the patience of the representatives of the 
big powers was often put to quite a test by deputations from small states 
or separate areas knocking at their doors.'s By the end of February the 
Alanders had managed to gain brief audiences with the French, British 
and Italian Foreign Ministers.20 A French diplomat below the top level 
might express some cordial sentiments about the separatist aims of the 
Aland Islanders, but an exposition of the general international situation 
given on the same occasion was calculated to demonstrate the »secondary» 
importance of their cause from the point of view of the world conference. 
The characteristic noncommital attitude of the leading Allied politicians 
was revealed to the deputation when it called upon the British peace 
delegate Esme Howard. According to a report sent to the Swedish Foreign 
Ministry,21 Howard »carefully and with the utmost amiability avoided 
giving any promises or raising any hopes.» Outwardly this call was an 
exceptional one in that, in conversing with the former British envoy to 
Stockholm, the Alanders were able to present their case directly in their 
own mother tongue. Otherwise, in all their calls they were obliged to resort 
to the services of an interpreter. 
In the face of the setbacks they had experienced, the idealism of the 
Aland Islanders, which had been particularly in evidence during the initial 
stage of their mission to Paris, began to falter. Power-political factors 
appeared to run rough-shod over idealistic considerations, and this obser-
vation awakened in the minds of the deputies capable of independent 
judgment, among them Sundblom, a presentiment of the final outcome of 
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their mission. The calls of the deputation, which interpreted the feelings and 
opinions of the inhabitants of a cluster of small, remote islands, on diplo-
mats representing the great world powers of the West — in connection 
with which formalities were overlooked and faith was optimistically placed 
in a »just cause» — produced in the atmosphere charged with power poli-
tics after-effects not unmixed with elements of irony.22 
The Alanders' mission to Paris yielded a historical picture of the times. 
It was one manifestation of the state of ideological ferment prevailing at 
the end of the World War; 
 and what it did was to give multifarious ex-
pression to the conceptions of democracy and the right of nations to self-
determination. The mission itself ended up as a mere gesture, an attempt 
to place information where it counted, and it colored the columns of the 
Finnish press for a long time. 
In the consequent rather polemical discussion of the issue in the news-
papers, Julius Sundblom began to emerge as the central figure of the 
separatist movement, personifying the aspirations of the Alanders to unite 
their island province to Sweden. In the press of mainland Finland he 
became the target of much violent abuse: in certain quarters his arrest 
was even advocated. Relations between Sweden and Finland revealed signs 
of growing coolness as a result of the foregoing developments. 
In delivering the aforementioned note of December r 1 to the Finnish 
Government, Sweden had aimed at a settlement of the issue of the Åland 
Islands before the Peace Conference convened on the basis of negotiations 
with Finland, the point of departure for them being a referendum held in 
the islands. 
The task of the Swedish diplomats stationed in the Allied capitals was 
to ascertain how the victorious powers viewed the matter. Apparently the 
idea was to seek prestigious support in the West for Sweden's Åland policy 
as a means of pressuring the Finnish Government but also to determine 
Sweden's chances of success if she were obliged to take an alternative course 
of action — in the event of Finnish resistance, to bring the matter before 
the Peace Conference for settlement. In handing the December note to 
Foreign Minister Enckell, the Swedish Minister to Helsinki, C. G. West-
man, gave notice that the next step contemplated by his Government was 
along this alternative course.23  
At the turn of the years 1918 and 1919, the Swedish authorities showed 
a desire to hasten the solution of the Åland problem according to the 
possibilities opened up by the December note. Evidently, political quarters 
in Sweden at that time entertained the belief that Finland felt her position 
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as an independent state insecure24 and would grope for salvation by orient-
ing herself in the direction of Scandinavia. Swedish calculations further 
took in the aforementioned fact that certain Finnish political leaders had 
betrayed signs of a willingness to compromise, which was interpreted as 
an inclination to avoid taking any rigid stand on issues. 
The mood of crisis generated in Finnish government circles by the 
collapse of Germany did not, however, lead into any blind alley. Gradually 
the view began to gain strength that time was working in Finland's favor 
as far as the Åland question was concerned. Accordingly, it was considered 
to be in the interest of the country to delay answering the Swedish note. 
Recognition of Finnish independence by the Western Powers would, it 
was believed, bolster Finland's sovereign position in defending her title to 
the Åland Islands. 
Public opinion served as an effective sounding board for the Finnish 
Government's own views. The various bourgeois factions — though their 
zeal did not in all cases spring from the same source — supported the 
Government's determination to preserve the inviolability of the country's 
historical boundaries. Among the Finnish-speaking population this »defen-
sive measure» inspired expressions of sentiment imbued with a fierce 
patriotic spirit. Sweden was generally condemned for her desire to annex 
the Åland Islands;  it was even suggested that in the light of this develop-
ment it appeared difficult to establish close ties with the Swedes. 
The attitude of the Swedish-speaking minority living on the mainland 
with regard to the Åland question was similar — and quite as uncompro-
mising — although the views of this group were to some extent differently 
based.25 Violation of Finland's territorial integrity had the effect of violating 
a valuable historical tradition. Repugnance to the idea of a territorial split 
was all the stronger since it would cut through the ranks of the Swedish-
speaking minority, reducing its numbers and weakening its chances of 
gaining a more influential voice in national affairs. 
Common to the thinking of both language groups was the view that 
applying the principle of self-determination to the Åland Islanders, »a 
splinter nationality», was not justified. Insofar as the idea of exchanging 
the Åland Islands for certain parts of East Karelia still claimed adherents, 
they were to be found among the one-time pro-German Finnish-speaking 
Activists. 
On the other hand, the Social Democratic party did not at first take any 
consistent stand in opposition to Sweden's bid to annex the Åland Islands. 
On many occasions the activity engaged in by Sweden was branded as the 
»right of the stronger» to assert its will. Concurrently, however,26 there 
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were voices raised in the Social Democratic camp that expressed »under-
standing» of the islanders' cause. This line was chiefly inspired by the 
desire, fostered by the party's democratic features, to contribute to the 
settling of international disputes and to stress the value of the right of 
self-determination among peoples and of the system of referring issues to 
popular vote in the general adjustment of postwar conditions in Europe.27 
The »delaying tactics» adopted by the Finnish Government in the issue 
of the Åland Islands were manifested as unwillingness 'to undertake negotia-
tions with Sweden any more than with the victorious Western Allies. 
Continuance of the prevailing situation struck it as being most advanta-
geous. Evidently, the leading political quarters in Finland were confident 
that the passivity of the opposite side would cool down Sweden's eagerness 
to pursue her ambition of annexing the Åland Islands. On the other hand, 
the notion was not alien to Finnish thinking, either, that the activeness 
of the islanders could be tempered by asserting the authority of the Finnish 
Government and making it plain that this authority could not be challeng-
ed without punitive consequences. 
As far as satisfying the provincial movement with certain reform 
measures was concerned, it was felt that the granting of local autonomy 
would accomplish this, in time taking the wind out of the separatists' 
sails. 
Even though Finland was »accused» of pro-German leanings, she had 
nevertheless kept out of the great war. And this fact was expected to 
affect the attitude of the Allies favorably. At a time when there was much 
talk about the right of small nations to self-determination and they were 
being awarded territory over and beyond the actual claims of nationality, 
the Finns felt that it would be contradictory if Sweden were to compel 
Finland with the support of the victorious Allies to surrender her title to 
the Åland Islands. 
Such were the thoughts in the minds of Finnish politicians. Realizing 
the faintness of their voice in international affairs, the Finnish authorities 
could not discount the fact that the Åland Islands posed a problem not 
for Finland and Sweden alone to decide between them. For, according to 
historical tradition, it was up to an international forum to offer the 
solution. 
At the beginning of 1919 it did not appear as if the Western Powers 
felt any compulsion to decide what to do about the Åland Islands; it had 
no place among the major postwar problems. No guidelines in principle 
seem to have been laid down officially to indicate the way to a solution, 
and the whole matter had probably never even been examined in detail 
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by the Western policy makers. On the contrary, there were circumstances 
suggesting that the matter had been shelved, one such circumstance being 
the faet that the Russian question was still »open». 
Differences could be detected in the attitude of the victors toward Fin-
land and Sweden. The United States, for one, remained passive and avoided 
touching the matter before its possible appearance on the agenda of the 
Peace Conference. Sweden, too, did not appear to stand any chance of 
receiving support from that quarter. 
France, whose politieal barometer moved with greater sensitivity, was 
more likely to raise Swedish hopes on this score, as was Italy.28 This 
hopefulness, which was at times characteristic of Swedish diplomats, 
tended to be buoyed up by the thought that fear of a resurgence of German 
power was rooted deep in the souls of French politicians. This line of 
reasoning ran: in Swedish possession the Åland Islands would contribute 
more to the security of the Western Allies than as Finnish territory, which 
had been the scene of German intervention during the civil strife of the 
spring of 1918. 
England pursued a pragmatic course of foreign policy, applying the 
lessons of the past and trying to reconcile antitheses. From this standpoint, 
the Åland Islands were liable to provoke less Russian displeasure in 
Finnish than in Swedish possession. The British attitude was marked by 
a certain legitimistic point of view as well: Finland had seceded from 
Russia and the Åland Islands were part of the territory in secession. In 
conformity to this line of thought, it was also fitting to confirm the islands' 
former demilitarized status, which England had taken part in creating 
in 1856. 
Worthy of separate attention are certain ideas for a compromise solution 
that were in the air as the year r919 opened. British interest in the matter 
was shown by Howard's proposal in early January that an effort be made 
to prevent harsh discord between Finland and Sweden by dividing the 
Åland Islands. His suggestion was that the boundary be so drawn that the 
eastern groups of islands — Kumlinge, Sottunga and Degerby — would 
remain under Finnish rule.20 It was 1-Ioward who dreamed up this com-
promise himself; 
 and it was not based upon any decision reached by the 
British Foreign Office, any more than were other similar recommendations 
made by British diplomats.30 Likewise aimed at settling the dispute amica-
bly was the scheme hatched by the Italian Foreign Ministry according to 
which the islands would be organized into a condominium jointly govern-
ed by Sweden and Finland." 
Neither proposal promised enough to satisfy the demands that had 
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crystallized out of Sweden's Åland policy. Distasteful to Sweden, too, was 
the hint that she might buy the islands for a stated sum of money or — 
in a mitigated form — give compensation for them by assuming the 
Finnish State debt. This, after all, would have been out of keeping with 
the grounds on which the Swedes purported to base their claims. It was 
the right of peoples to self-determination that was intended to justify the 
holding of a referendum to settle the dispute over the islands. 
As the foregoing mediatory recommendations were bandied about, the 
Swedish policy makers tried to avoid over-optimism, to act with caution 
and to adopt a flexible point of view. They did not want to reject the idea 
of a compromise offhand, nor did they want to betray any sign of shifting 
from their original stand in the matter, either. Thus, in January 1919 the 
Swedish Ambassador to Helsinki received instructions not to reject the 
idea of dividing the islands without more ado if it emanated from a 
Finnish quarter.42 On the other hand, the proposal to create a condominium 
failed to arouse interest — if for no other reason than the difficulty 
of organizing such a project in practice. The experience of joint action 
during the spring months of 1918 and subsequently during the phase of 
demolishing the fortifications indicated 'that it only tended to produce 
friction.33 
When the Finns fell back on the argument that a solution of the Åland 
question by means of a referendum might prove a deceptive measure — 
that is, the result might only reflect a passing stage of popular sentiment 
—, the Swedes sought to contrive a form of voting that would effectively 
nullify this argument. Accordingly, Hjalmar Branting, the Swedish Social 
Democratic leader, suggested that two separate referenda be held, the 
second three years, for instance, after the first one, with the League of 
Nations supervising the administration during the control period.3M1 The 
second vote should, according to this plan, convince even outside observers 
as to the wishes of the Åland Islanders. 
Since the various vague proposals thrown into the air as »trial balloons» 
promised no concrete solution, the Åland question appeared from the 
Swedish standpoint to have reached an impasse. It aroused in Stockholm 
political circles a desire to break the deadlock by means of personal con-
tact. Eyes turned at this juncture to Mannerheim, who was invited to pay 
an official visit to Stockholm around the middle of February. He was 
recognized as an independent personality, whose position as Regent added 
to his prestige. And it was realized that any stand he took in the matter 
might create a realistic basis for its future treatment. On his mission to 
the Western capitals, Mannerheim had on occasion spoken his mind quite 
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straightforwardly, so it was thought that in interpreting the will of the 
Finnish State in a more modest milieu he would undoubtedly pursue a 
clearly marked course. 
This supposition was not wrong. Finland's official stand in the matter 
of the Åland Islands was characterized by the uncompromising outlook 
that generally was reflected by Mannerheim's statements of policy. Finland, 
it became known, was prepared to make strategic concessions with respect 
to the islands, but none territorially. Mannerheim explained his rigid 
position on the ground that his countrymen opposed all territorial cessions 
and that it was futile to expect the Finnish Parliament to accept any plan 
based on a division of the islands. 
On the other hand, Mannerheim said that Finland was prepared to agree 
to Sweden's sharing in the defense of the islands.3" With joint defense in 
view, he considered it appropriate to allow Sweden to undertake control 
measures in certain parts of the Åland Islands. 
The idea of joint Finnish-Swedish defense confined to a neutral Åland 
subjected to sovereign Finnish rule had been broached by the Finnish 
Foreign Ministry to Sweden as early as January, 1919, before the negotia-
tions with Mannerheim took place. Those two experts in international 
law, Rafael Erich and K. G. Idman, appeared on this occasion as interpret-
ers of the scheme.36 Simultaneously, the Finnish Government indicated a 
willingness to concede the islands home rule. Proof of these good intentions 
came later in the form of a bill submitted to Parliament. Beyond this Fin-
land was not prepared to go as one of the parties to the dispute. 
When Swedish government circles saw that Finland was uncompromis-
ingly committed to her Åland policy, they had no other course open to 
them — if they wanted to be consistent — than to make another appeal 
in a new form for the holding of a referendum in the islands or, if too 
much disagreement prevailed on the matter, to submit their case ultimately 
to the Peace Conference. 
Finland rejected the proposed referendum also in the form in which it 
was last presented. The continued exchange of views related to the ques-
tion of an appeal to the Peace Conference. Swedish spokesmen did not lay 
any special stress on the form the appeal should take;  the main thing for 
them was that the issue of the Åland Islands be dealt with by the Western 
Powers. They wanted to bring together for a settlement under the direction 
of the major powers both the matter of demilitarization, which had the 
character of prior international participation and on which there was no 
disagreement between Sweden and Finland, and the question of the terri-
torial ownership of the islands, which was »new» and doubtfully within 
the jurisdiction of the Peace Conference. 
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Finland, for her part, held back with regard to such a measure. Appealing 
to an international forum appeared to signify acknowledgment of restricted 
sovereignty, and it carried the risk of a reduction in the extent of the 
country's historical boundaries. The Finns had no desire to transfer to the 
Peace Conference the authority to decide the Åland question as a package 
settlement, for they viewed the matter of possession as involving their 
sovereign rights. In the event the Aland question was brought up before 
the Peace Conference for decision against the will of Finland, it was hoped 
that she could be represented there as a plenipotentiary member, together 
with Sweden, and not be relegated to the role of defendant as in a court 
trial. 
In Sweden it was considered plausible that the Åland issue would be 
linked up with the questions of the possession of East Karelia and of Fin-
land's access to the Arctic Ocean." 
The outcome of the negotiations was Sweden's realization that she 
would not be rewarded by any favorable response from Finland to her note 
of December. It further became clear that the Finns had no inclination to 
appeal to the Peace Conference for a settlement of the Aland question. 
Sweden's bid to reach an agreement with Finland on the matter at the 
negotiating table had failed. According to plan, therefore, Sweden decided 
to appeal to the Peace Conference.ss 
That spring, then, the Swedes proceeded to take measures to have the 
Aland question included in the agenda of the Peace Conference. In the 
proposal submitted on April 22 to the president of the Conference, Sweden 
requested that the matter be dealt with in connection with the decision on 
Finland's future boundaries. As the starting point for a settlement, she 
proposed the holding of a referendum in the islands, at the same time 
acknowledging that the Conference had a free hand in exercising its power 
of decision. »In accordance with the principles of the Peace Conference,» 
however, the assumption was expressed that Sweden would be given the 
opportunity to participate in the discussion on the matter. The Swedish 
Government was not untroubled by the fear that as s00n as Finland was 
accorded diplomatic recognition she would hasten to have the question of 
her boundaries settled. If she succeeded in this, Sweden would be confront-
ed with a f a i t a c comp 1  i, after which it would be difficult for her to 
carry out her designs on the Aland Islands.39 
The Åland question had been touched upon in passing on February 27 
by the Council of Ten at the Peace Conference. The exchange of views on 
this occasion had been concerned with certain of the conditions requisite 
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to dealing with the matter; 
 among other things, the question was raised 
whether the Conference had the right to offer a settlement of the issue. 
Who were the legitimate parties concerned was not altogether clear. Thus, 
the British considered Finland, as owner of the islands, to be a party 
concerned, whereas the Italian delegate had referred to the power-political 
side of the matter and argued that the Åland question should be decided in 
connection with the settlement of the Russian question.40 The grounds 
for dealing with the Åland question were thus wholly obscure. It is note-
worthy that, for instance, Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, ex-
pressed doubts whether the Peace Conference had any business whatsoever 
to intervene in the matter.41 The uncertainty of the situation was bound 
to shake the confidence of the Swedish Government in the possibilities 
of its gaining its objective. 
The prevailing atmosphere in international politics, which did not seem 
to favor Sweden's annexation of the Åland Islands, demanded growing 
political activity on the part of the Swedes, who were also obliged to keep 
a sharp eye on shifting currents of opinion at the Peace Conference in 
order to utilize them to their advantage. In view of the possibility that the 
question of according recognition to Finnish independence might be dis-
cussed in Paris, the Swedish Minister there was given instructions to bend 
his efforts toward bringing about a decision in favor of holding a refer-
endum in the Åland Islands in connection with the general settlement 
of Finland's boundaries.42 
The coupling of the Åland question to these decisions was, the Swedish 
authorities, too, realized, a delicate matter. Thus, in the plan of action 
drawn up by the Swedish Foreign Ministry it was emphasized that no 
demand should be made to have the hopes of the islanders taken into 
account in connection with the recognition of Finland's independence. if, 
however, any proposal were made to have the said problems dealt with and 
settled together, Sweden should undertake to support the move. A certain 
disposition to accept a compromise was indicated by Sweden's unwilling-
ness to reject Howard's scheme of partition offhand, although the difficul-
ties involved in its implementation should be stressed. Insofar as East 
Karelia and Petsamo were taken up by the Peace Conference as territorial 
problems, it was felt that Sweden should in some suitable way back up 
Finland's claims. 
If, however, in spite of Sweden's endeavors, the Åland Islands remained 
in the possession of Finland, their neutralization should be internationally 
guaranteed, as earlier. They should not be converted into a territory jointly 
guaranteed by Finland and Sweden. In the event of hostilities between 
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Germany and Russia, the combined resources of Finland and Sweden were 
considered insufficient to protect the inviolability of the islands.43  
Because Finland, for reasons already explained, was unwilling to acknow-
ledge the jurisdiction of the Peace Conference over the Åland question, 
she did not get into [touch with the so-called Baltic Commission, which, 
formed in April as a body of experts, was supposed to do the preparatory 
work in clarifying the question. In addition to the principles at stake, a 
certain factor of power politics had emerged to reinforce Finland's resolu-
tion not to recognize the authority of the Peace Conference to deal with 
the matter. 
After the middle of May it began to look as if the Western Allies would 
seek contact with the so-called White Russians and take into account their 
views on the organization of conditions in Russia. Around this period 
there were schemes afoot for Allied intervention in Russia, and there were 
certain influential groups in the West that wanted to reach an under-
standing with General Kolchak. With regard to the recognition of Fin-
land's independence, the White Russians opposed it, as will be recounted 
later, and this gave reason to think that they would also insist upon re-
storing Russia's historical »dominion» over the Åland Islands. 
The Peace Conference lacked the will to grapple with the problem of 
the islands. Notwithstanding Swedish exertions bent on hastening adoption 
of the proposal submitted by Sweden at the end of April as an item on 
the conference agenda, the Baltic Commission kept postponing its examina-
tion of the question. Vital matters involved in the settlement of postwar 
affairs continued to press for attention with the result that it was a 
thankless task to whip up interest in any side issue. On top of everything 
else, the British in especial had expressed doubts as to whether the Con-
ference had any right to interfere in a dispute between two neutral states. 
It was on July 2 that the Åland question was taken up for examination 
by the Baltic Commission on the basis of the notes exchanged by Finland 
and Sweden, the Swedish appeal to the Peace Conference and the memo-
randum submitted by the White Russians. This memorandum sternly 
opposed the annexation of the islands by Sweden in accordance with the 
principle of national self-determination, the importance, instead, of mili-
tary considerations' being primarily stressed. The military considerations, 
as viewed from the Russian and Finnish standpoints, were represented as 
running parallel. 
No matter how negatively the White Russians reacted to the business 
of according Finnish independence recognition, they played the role of 
championing the »common vital interests of Russia and Finland» when 
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it came to the issue of the Åland Islands — and this indirectly meant a 
weakening of Sweden's case. The islands were considered to be part of 
the defense system of the Gulf of Finland: whoever controlled them could 
maintain military surveillance over the area extending to the line between 
Tallinn and Porkkala. »The status of the Åland Islands must so be defined,» 
the memorandum stated, »as to preclude their use by any power hostile 
to Russia and Finland. The same interests require that the state obliged 
to defend the Gulf of Finland under conditions of war shall not forfeit 
the advantages which possession of the group of islands affords strategic-
ally.»44 
The White Russians' memorandum did not expressly say whether the 
Åland Islands should belong to Russia or to Finland (within the framework 
of the special political status the White Russians were prepared to accord 
the country). But the arguments presented indirectly suggested that Russia 
should take over the military control of the islands. 
In this connection the representatives of the Western Powers on the 
commission defined more clearly than before the attitude of their Govern-
ments toward the treatment of the Åland question and the lines of its 
future settlement. The British spokesman advocated a solution which would 
prevent any major power from utilizing the Åland Islands toward gaining 
mastery of the Baltic Sea. The restoration of the islands' demilitarized status 
in accordance with the arrangement made in 1856 was likewise considered 
important. Howard went on to suggest that the islands be established on 
an autonomous basis »sous le protectorat collectif de la Finlande et de la 
Suede». Accordingly, these two small powers would support each other 
in defending the islands against any military aggression by a large power. 
The British Government would have liked to postpone any further action 
on the whole question, explaining that no effective arrangements could be 
made as long as Russia was not participating. Its aim was to pass the 
whole matter on to the League of Nations for solution, whereupon the 
task of the Baltic Commission would be limited to preparing a recommen-
dation. Thus the British apparently thought an international guarantee of 
maximum scope could be arrived at with respect to the future status of the 
Åland Islands.45 
The representatives of France, Italy and Japan placed an importance on 
not overlooking the strategic interests of Russia in arranging the status 
of the Åland Islands. France demanded that access of German military 
forces to the area of the islands be effectively obstructed, and this, it con-
tended, could be best achieved with the help of (White) Russia. The French 
delegate, M. Albert Kammerer, emphasized in a statement made before the 
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commission that Russia should in this matter be given priority over Sweden. 
By contrast, the British authorities were against awarding Russia a naval 
base in the islands. The British considered it important to secure close 
relations with the Scandinavian countries in the future. 
Despite the differences of opinion mentioned, the Baltic Commission was 
unanimous in its view that no proposal in the matter should be submitted 
to the Peace Conference but that — as the British Government recom-
mended — the whole question be passed on to the League of Nations for 
eventual settlement. A memorandum to this effect was approved by the 
commission on July 4.413 
Since Finland had not surrendered the settlement of the Åland dispute 
to the Peace Conference, the Finnish delegates in Paris were left in a 
position of »wait and see». Efforts were nevertheless made to keep abreast 
of developments on an unofficial level by contacting members of the 
commission, notably its Chairman, Esme Howard, from whom Enckell had 
received information during the latter half of June47 concerning the views 
held by the commission. At the time the Commission's report was being 
worked out, Enckell and Törngren summoned Ossian Donner from London 
to their assistance. His task was to exploit his personal ties with Howard 
to try to get the points of view represented by Finland recognized. On July 
6 Donner did succeed in gaining an unofficial audience with Howard and 
setting forth Finland's case before him. 
The report of the Baltic Commission had, however, been approved two 
days earlier, so there was no further possibility of influencing its contents 
but only the communications concerning the decision already made that 
were supposed to be delivered to the Swedish Government and the Aland 
Islanders. (Not having joined in the demand to have the matter taken up, 
Finland was not in line either to receive an official reply.) From the stand-
point of Finland, Howard had an important message to present Donner: 
the question of organizing a referendum in the Åland Islands would no 
longer be dealt with by the Commission.98 Howard had previously told the 
Swedish Minister to Paris, J. Ehrensvärd, that he agreed with those who 
did not consider the inhabitants of the Åland Islands a nation apart but as 
part of the Swedish-speaking population of Finland.40 Donner probably 
was influential, to some degree, in having any mention of the referendum 
omitted from the communications. 
The statement adopted by the Baltic Commission on July 4 was not made 
public;  instead, the wording of the communication to be delivered to 
Sweden and the Åland Islanders was approved three days later. It observed, 
on the one hand, that no final settlement of the question could be arrived 
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at without the approval of Russian representatives, while, on the other 
hand, doubts were expressed whether the Peace Conference was at all 
within its sphere of authority in dealing with the matter. It was hoped 
that the negotiations between Finland and Sweden would settle the dispute 
or, if such were not the case, that the matter might later be decided by the 
League of Nations." 
The communication as a whole reflected the slight interest that the 
major powers represented at the Peace Conference felt toward the Åland 
issue. Its deferment was justified, to be sure, on the ground of Russia's 
absence, but an important — if not the decisive — factor was a desire to 
avoid taking a stand in the matter. This is indicated further by the fact 
that, contrary to general practice at the Peace Conference, the Commission's 
report remained secret. 
Evaluating the significance of the communication, which was also un-
officially passed on to Enckell, and considering the other alternatives, such 
as the proposed referendum, it may be said that, from the standpoint of 
Finland, the worst danger at this stage of developments had been averted. 
It had been the hope of the Finnish diplomats that the Peace Conference 
would bury the Åland question as far as it was concerned and that the 
question would not be revived again until the League of Nations had 
begun to operate.' If this occurred, it was assumed, Finland would at any 
rate have gained a useful breathing spell. 
In Finland, where the public actively followed the progress of events, 
chief attention was concentrated on the possibility that the White Russians 
might actually interfere and give the Åland question a new, unfavorable 
twist. An effort would have to be made, it was felt, to eliminate the point 
about -Russia's rights» from any report on the matter that might be re-
ferred to the supreme council of the Peace Conference. 
At one stage, sentiment favored a joint protest by Finland and Sweden. 
But this idea was abandoned when a risk of confounding the issue was 
seen: it was feared that such a move might create the impression that 
both parties were ready to acknowledge the ultimate jurisdiction of the 
Peace Conference. Thus, on July 24, Howard expressed his astonishment 
to Donner over the planned protest. To him, such a joint protest with 
Sweden was impossible to comprehend. It would mean a protest against 
a solution the Baltic Commission construed as favorable to Finland, and 
the rejection of this solution could lead to a situation where Sweden would 
have the Åland Islands in her grasp. 
Recognition of the Russian points of view at some date in the future 
could not, in Howard's opinion, involve the right of possession but most 
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likely only insistence upon enforeement of the demilitarization ruling, 
which both Finland and Sweden were prepared to go along with.a2 .As 
interpreted by Howard, the Baltic Commission's statement was designed to 
shelve the issue of the Aland Islands, resulting in a status quo that, as a 
permanent situation, would certainly favor Finland. 
The idea of a protest was left unpursued by the Finns. As a kind of 
substitute, the Finnish newspapers published vigorous denunciations of any 
possible Russian move to meddle in matters affecting the settlement of 
the Aland question. Swedish activity, which was rewarded by Branting's 
and Ehrensvärd's gaining an audience in July with no less a dignitary than 
Clemenceau, must have played a part in causing the »supreme council» on 
August 4 to instruct the Baltic Commission to reconsider its earlier report. 
The result was a new report, issued on August 25, which emphasized that 
since the settlement of the Aland question could not be put off indefinitely 
it might as a last resort be done without Russia's being heard in the 
matter." 
The barometer of international politics had oscillated: as a political 
force the White Russian cause was showing signs of weakening. Looked 
at from the standpoint of Finnish interests, it meant another step forward. 
The status quo continued to be maintained. Illustrative of the situation 
militarily, Finnish troops were stationed on the Aland Islands at the same 
time as British naval units were cruising in Baltic waters. The impression 
that the Aland question was quietly being buried grew stronger.54 On 
December 13, 1919, the Finnish emissary Carl Enckell was solemnly notified 
by the secretary of the »supreme council» that the Peaee Conference 
would no longer concern itself with this question. 
The issue of the Aland Islands had been wiped off the political calendar 
-- for the time being. At first, insofar as it involved territorial title, it 
had amounted to 2 dispute merely between Finland and Sweden. Public 
opinion in Finland strenuously opposed any move to separate the islands 
from the national domain. In this connection, the unyielding stand of the 
Swedish-speaking minority living on the Finnish mainland in resistance to 
the attempts to give a small fraction of this linguistic minority the right 
to decide what country it wanted to belong to proved to be an important 
factor in creating a unified body of popular opinion. When the issue was 
forced upon the attention of the Peace Conference, it proved to be the 
British Government, in the main, that repulsed the action aimed at taking 
the Åland Islands away from Finland. 
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54 Prime Minister Clemenceau's speech in the French Chamber of Deputies 
on Sept. 25, in which he rhetorically dwelt upon the safeguarding of Swedish 
interests in the Aland dispute, revived discussion on the matter, chiefly in 
Sweden and Finland, where irritable comments were made with reference to it 
(Enckell, Politiska minnen II, pp. 44, 45)• The British authorities simultaneously 
assured Finnish diplomats that their Government would oppose any attempt 
to rehash the matter (Ossian Donner, Min tid, pp. 181, 182). 
Chapter VIII 
The East Karelian Question and the Attitude of the Western Allies 
The annexation of East Karelia had awakened widespread interest in 
Finland in the spring of 1918, and the nonleftist groups as a whole were 
in favor of it. Annexation was believed to be justified on various ethnic, 
linguistic, military and economic grounds, and the Government laid plans 
for its realization with the support of Germany. The intensification of the 
conflict between Germany and the Western Allies also in the far northern 
sector, after the landing of German troops on Finnish soil, had led in April 
to a »solemn warning» from Britain to Finland against meddling in the 
progress of events in East Karelia. Subsequently, at the turn of the months 
of June and July, a new crisis threatened as a result of the aforedescribed 
sharply worded note from the Finnish to the British Government concern-
ing Petsamo. A complicating problem that faced the Finnish groups actively 
seeking to settle the East Karelian question was the attitude of the native 
population, which was not united behind any program for its political 
future. 
At the stage of the armistice negotiations, Finland's East Karelian policy 
was ripe for revision. The notion that the Finnish domain might be 
expanded with the aid of Germany had proved illusory. Signs of change 
in political thinking began to appear, as already noted, when Germany's 
passivity toward the Finnish territorial claims during the Finno-Soviet 
negotiations in Berlin in August became known. 
Disappointment over the terms of the supplementary Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk gave the impetus for profound changes of opinion. Germany was 
seen to have acted against the objectives of the Finnish Government in 
order to achieve collaboration with Russia in line with its own high 
political interests. By autumn 1918 more hopes had been blighted. The 
Finnish volunteers fighting across the border had suffered setbacks, and 
in late September and early October they had retreated back over to the 
Finnish side. 
In the attempts to settle the East Karelian question, no abandonment of 
objectives had taken place in response to the foregoing developments. But 
the ideas concerning ways and means to attain them began to undergo 
revision, at least as far as finding support in the arena of high politics was 
concerned. This was indicated by the fact that, when the East Karelian 
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question had blossomed out during the spring and summer of 1918 as 
an issue involving power interests on an international scale, positions 
began to be sought, particularly after the Petsamo crisis, that eschewed 
dependence on either of the embattled sides in the war and rejected military 
operations as a course of action.' The possibility of Finland's being drawn 
into the World War was taken into account at this stage as a danger, 
although zealous pro-German circles saw »England» as the foreordained 
culprit behind this hazardous development.' 
The disappointments experienced and the perils that loomed ahead 
nourished the line of thinking that the settlement of the East Karelian 
question, too, might be facilitated by Finland's shifting over to a neutral 
course.' As the convocation of the Peace Conference in the proximate 
future began to appear inevitable, the view gained ground that insofar as 
it was hoped to reach a solution in the East Karelian question, the means 
would have to be diplomatic rather than military.' Those Finns who had 
built their hopes upon German support were pessimistic: they did not trust 
in the intentions of the British authorities.' The withdrawal of the volun-
teers from East Karelia was felt as a severe blow, which doomed the 
chances of securing anything by military means for the time being. Un-
centainty over what to do led to periodical passivity. 
The British response of August 9, 1918, to the Finnish note on the 
Petsamo crisis had expressed a wish to see that in the final settlement 
following the war Finland would gain access to the Arctic Ocean. At the 
earliest this could occur in connection with the Peace Conference. The 
belief was openly voiced that »as long as Finland was under the influence 
of Germany», implementation of such a project would enable the Germans 
to establish submarine bases in Petsamo and operate freely in Arctic 
waters.e 
The British showed no inclination, on the other hand, to favor the 
annexation of East Karelia by Finland. Their view was that if the border 
were drawn from Lake Ladoga to Lake Onega and from there on up north 
to the White Sea it would lead to future trouble between Finland and 
Russia; 
 nor did they relish a settlement that would deprive the Russians 
of the Murmansk railroad and their ice-free Arctic port.7 
The center of gravity in the East Karelian question was seen to be 
shifting to Paris, and, as the deadline for the opening of the Peace Con-
ference approached, political spokesmen in Finland began to stress the 
need to make an appeal based on the right of nations to self-determination 
in deciding the status of the province across the Finnish border to the East. 
In the new situation on the world political stage, Finland's aspirations 
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followed a double track: for one thing, a political format representative 
of the East Karelian people as a whole and convincingly designed to pro-
mote the idea of union with Finland should be sought, and, for another, 
means should be contrived to bring about the desired decision by the 
Peace Conference. Observations and experience up to that time had 
revealed the lack of cohesion in the political strivings of the Karelians. 
in addition to those who desired union with Finland, there were those 
who advocated bidding for an autonomous status within the Russian 
domain as well as others whose imaginations were fired by a dream of 
an independent East Karelian republic, which was kept alive by an in-
stinctive fear that Finland might seek to exploit the natural resources of 
the province at the expense of the local inhabitants for her own selfish 
benefit.° 
Starting in November, 1918, appeals were once more addressed to the 
Regent and the Government of Finland, in addition to which deputies 
r.rriving from East Karelia called on consular representatives of the Western 
Powers stationed in Helsinki as well as diplomatic officials in Stockholm. 
The opinions expressed and the persons delivering the messages generally 
represented some particular commune or group of communes situated in 
a particular area; and the points of view had been formulated either 
directly by the inhabitants of the area concerned or by delegates from a 
group of communes at a special meeting. The building up of Finnish policy 
on the hope that the Peace Conference would endorse a union between 
Finland and East Karelia had the effect that the Government authorities 
endeavored to hold back the Karelians from staging an armed revolt against 
Soviet rule at this juncture.° 
No general movement with consistent aims based upon the principle 
of national self-determination developed, howerer, in East Karelia. The 
lack of any homogeneous body of opinion and the isolation of the various 
communities contributed to this, together with the military situation. The 
province was the scene of troop movements involving a variety of nation-
alities, ranging from the British to the Russian Bolsheviks, which further 
hampered contact and collaboration between groups representing the same 
political outlook. 
The Finnish delegation sent to Paris had assumed the task of publicizing 
the East Karelian cause, too, one of the members, Lauri Hannikainen,  
being a specialist on the subject. As long as the central objective of Finnish 
policy was to gain general recognition of the country's independence, not 
much attention could be devoted to such a special matter by the dele-
gation; and after the long sought-after diplomatic recognition had finally 
10 
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been gained at the beginning of May, 1919, the issue of the Åland Islands 
forged to the surface. Finland's stand in the East Karelian question was 
explained in memoranda handed to the United States, British and French 
peace delegations, among others, the conditions prevailing in the province 
being described along national, historical and geographical lines. All these 
documents ended up on a note of hope that the East Karelian population 
might be able to express its political future freely. 
By the spring of 1919 the East Karelian question was attracting fairly 
wide attention and had even aroused some interest at the Peace Conference. 
This was brought on by the march of an expeditionary force of Finnish 
volunteers into Aunus, as the southern half of East Karelia is known to 
the Finns, in April. The operation was of private inspiration though it 
enjoyed the Government's moral and material support.10 The force was 
forbidden, however, to form as a military organization until the partici-
pants had crossed the frontier. Evidently, the Finnish authorities were 
afraid of a high political crisis with the Western Allies, especially the 
British. 
The Aunus venture excited controversy on the home front. The climax 
came when the Social Democrats confronted the Government with a 
parliamentary interpellation, which pointed out the risk of conflict between 
Russia and Finland generated by such activity and warned against the 
dangers of »adventurous politics». More serious from the standpoint of 
the political position of the Government was the suspicion the military 
expedition aroused at the Peace Conference. It was likened to the efforts 
of certain new states in central Europe to gain their territorial objectives 
through military occupation without waiting for the great powers to 
decide matters. Moreover, the peace delegates representing the Western 
Allies in Paris felt that the military action taken by the Finns was ob-
structing the work being done to solve the Russian question.12 
The conference leaders suspected Finland of seeking to conquer Aunus  
or of otherwise confronting them with a fait accompli in territorial disputes. 
At the beginning of May, 1919, the French Government had discussed 
the idea of presenting Finland with a stern protest." Attention was further 
drawn to the circumstance that both the civilian and military leaders 
of the expeditionary force had mostly supported pro-German policies. 
This excited the suspicion that Germany was secretly party to a plot to 
create friction between the Western Allies and the White Russians." 
The official stand of the Finnish Government toward the military expedi-
tion to southern East Karelia was presented in Prime Minister Castren's 
response on April 29 to the Social Democratic interpellation. It was stated 
The Victors in World War I and Finland 	 147 
that the Government did not wish to set up obstructions to the activity 
of volunteers endeavoring to drive the Bolshevik forces out of Karelia and 
that, furthermore, it was deemed necessary to assist the local inhabitants 
in procuring food supplies. But, i t was emphasized, the Government was 
not bent on conquering the territory. A similar statement was issued on 
May 9 by acting Foreign Minister Leo Ehrnrooth when he notified the 
French and British Governments that Finland would submit to whatever 
decisions the Peace Conference might make with regard to the eastern 
boundary of the country.15 These notes pledged Finland not to seek territory 
by conquest across her eastern frontier. 
Evidently, the Finnish Government hoped and endeavored to influence 
the course of events in southern East Karelia to the end that the Bolshevik 
military forces would be driven out and the native, Finnish-speaking in-
habitants might thereafter be able to give expression to their true desires 
regarding their political future. The assumption was that after the situa-
tion had changed such a manifestation of popular will on the basis of the 
principle of self-determination would result in a demand for union with 
Finland. Insofar as developments took this course, it was thought that 
political opinion would run parallel at a later date in Viena, the northern 
half of East Karelia,1° which, then occupied by British troops, had thitherto 
favored the idea of establishing an independent East Karelian state.' 
The advance of the British troops southward from Murmansk — in May, 
1919, 
  they had captured the Karelian town of Karhumäki — caused the 
Finnish authorities to focus their attention on the task of avoiding a clash 
with them and, at best, of getting them to enter into collaboration with the 
force of Finnish volunteers that was marching toward Lake Onega. The 
Finns' objective was the capture of Petroskoi (Pctrozavodsk), the main 
urban center in East Karelia. The Foreign Office in Helsinki sent a repre-
sentative to Aunus for the purpose of contacting General Maynard, the 
commander of the British expeditionary force.18 The contact was made on 
June 13. 
The British, however, both rejected the Finnish proposal of joint opera-
tions to capture Petroskoi and refused the request to have the commanding 
officers of the British troops in East Karelia. What the Finns were aiming 
to do was to eradicate the Russian military and political influence from 
the whole area — in concerted action, if possible, with the British. 
Instead, in conformity with the prevailing view held at the Peace Con-
ference, the British command demanded a written pledge that after the 
end of operations the Finnish troops would withdraw from East Karelia 
and 	 surrender the territory they had captured to the White Russian .s.19 
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No mutual understanding could he reached through these preliminary 
exchanges. Then the contact was broken when, after advancing close to  
Petroskoi, the Finns were forced to start their retreat in the face of an 
attack launched by the reinforced Bolsheviks 20 
After the latter half of May, the negotiations between General Kolchak 
and the Western Powers concerning mutual co-operation indirectly weaken-
ed the interest of the latter in everything designed to diminish the Russian 
domain (as measured in relation to the boundaries of 1914) beyond re-
cognition of the independence of Poland and Finland. Therefore, also Fin-
land's efforts to get the East Karelian question brought before the Peace 
Conference were in conflict with the trend of developments in the arena 
of high politics. 
In Finland there emerged two lines of thought when at this stage it was 
endeavored to implement a settlement of the issue over East Karelia. One 
line was represented by Holsti, who -- like the pro-Germans before the 
Armistice in 1918 — tried to construct his solution on the basis of support 
from the major powers, in his case placing his hopes specifically on Great 
Britain among the victorious Allies. Holsti went so far in his planning 
that toward the end of April he was prepared, as previously pointed out, 
to let the Peace Conference work out Finland's future boundaries. There 
was a risk that it might mean loss of the Åland Islands;  but in that event,  
Holsti was convinced, Finland would be awarded possession of East Karelia 
as compensation. Politically this line of thought was fallacious insofar as 
Britain, the power among the Allies most actively interested in the affairs 
of northeastern Europe, stood firmly on the ground that East Karelia was 
of vital importance to Russia. Accordingly, the British certainly had no 
desire to contribute to any move to unite East Karelia with Finland. 
The representatives of the other line saw a different solution to the East 
Karelian question: Finland's joining the intervention. In the event the 
Bolsheviks were defeated in the offensive against Petrograd, Finland might, 
it was calculated, expect East Karelia to be handed over to her as a reward 
for her military assistance. This line of thinking had certain points of con-
tact with the views of, for instance, Mannerheim and Enckell. The 
circumstance, however, that the White Russian leaders opposed recogni-
tion of Finnish independence within the framework of the country's 
historical boundaries even at this stage, when the participation of the 
Finns in the intervention scheme was being contemplated, indicates that 
the White Russians would be still less enamored of the prospect of a 
Greater Finland. 
As already noted, the East Karelian question entered the discussions at 
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the Peace Conference only on rare occasions. On July 15, 1919, Enckell 
was given the opportunity to elucidate the Finnish claims with respect to  
Petsamo and East Karelia for the benefit of the Baltic Commission, the 
concerns of which ranged also as far as these remote areas. Under the 
prevailing conditions, which favored the interests of the White Russians, 
the Commission took the stand that matters relating to Russia could not 
be decided until there existed a government capable of representing Russia 
in the formulation of such decisions.21  
On July 25 a note from the Finnish Government was delivered to the 
Peace Conference. Pointing to acts of violence by the Bolsheviks in East 
Karelia, the note asked that the conference sanction Finland's sending 
regular troops into the areas of Aunus and Petroskoi.22 The inspiration for 
this proposal had come from military circles,23 but the Government author-
ities had agreed to sponsor it only on condition that implementation of 
the scheme would be subject to the approval of the Western Powers. The 
Finnish Government began to explore anew the possibility of collaboration 
with the British expeditionary force operating in East Karelia. The idea 
was that the temporary occupation of the area between the Finnish border, 
on one side, and the Syväri (Svir) river, Lake Onega and the White Sea, on 
the other side, should be pointly carried out, except that the Murmansk 
railroad would be left wholly in the control of General Maynard's troops.24 
By this time the operations of the army of Finnish volunteers in southern 
East Karelia, which had at first been suecessful, had ended in defeat, and 
a substantial proportion of the total force had already retreated across the 
frontier back into Finland. 
The Baltic Commission refused to lend its support to the Finnish Govern-
ment's request. The cold attitude toward any move to separate East Kare-
lia from Russia was displayed further by the Commission's decision — made 
on the oecasion of the same meeting at which the Finnish Government's 
request was turned down — not to give an audience to the deputation 
from East Karelia that had arrived in Paris to plead the case of the native 
Finnish-speaking inhabitants of the province.25 
The East Karelian question later, at the end of September, reappeared 
once more on the agenda of the Peace Conference. This time the »supreme 
council» took up for consideration an inquiry from the Baltic Commission 
as to whether, in spite of Russia's not being represented by any delegate, 
it could make a statement on the points of view presented by Finland 
with regard to changes in her eastern border. The council decided to assign 
to the Commission the task of preparing a report on the matter.20 The 
particular significanee of this episode was that it reflected the turn that 
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had taken place meanwhile in the general situation. As the position of the 
White Russians weakened, the absenee of a duly aceredited Russian spokes-
man was no longer considered an obstacle to dealing with questions relat-
ing to Finland's boundaries against Russia. The council's decision did not, 
however, herald any move to submit the revision of Finland's eastern 
border to the Peace Conference for. approval. Rather did it presage the 
silent burial of the whole East Karelian question, which took place at the 
same time as the Allied troops were withdrawn from the province. 
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Chapter IX 
The Issue of Intervention, Finland's Position and the Allied Stand 
After the Western Allies had recognized the independence of Finland, 
the country's foreign policy became concentrated — in addition to the 
unresolved territorial issues — upon the matter of intervention in Russia. 
Finnish public opinion was divided: some Finns favored military action, 
some remained passive, and some opposed getting the country mixed up 
in any risky venture of this kind. The course of events, especially by the 
latter half of 1919, had the effect of swelling the ranks of the third faction. 
As an international political issue, intervention in the affairs of Russia 
concerned Finland on two scores: how the White Russians fighting against 
the Bolsheviks stood with respect to Finnish independence, and how, 
besides the White Russians, the Western Allies hoped Finland would 
respond to intervention strategy as it affected the northwestern Russian 
frontier. The attitude of the Allies was an important factor influencing 
the division of opinion in Finland. 
The breakthrough achieved by the October Revolution had placed Petro-
grad and Moscow, with their surroundings, under the control of the Bol-
sheviks. It resulted in a situation that began to take on the appearance 
of a Civil War, although the split in the Russian ranks was not yet clear-
cut and the »fronts» that had formed were in a state of flux. On the one 
side were the Bolsheviks and on the other scattered bourgeois groups and 
the supporters of moderate labor factions, who had been prevented from 
governing the country by the October Revolution. 
The adversaries of the Bolsheviks considered the position of the Council 
of People's Commissars, headed by Lenin, to be precarious: they could not 
believe that it was possible to convert the Russian social order, with its 
peasant majority, into a Soviet system or to place the land under public 
ownership. 
During the initial stage of interventionist activity, the Bolsheviks had 
notable conquests to their credit. Not only did they control Russia's vital 
nerve centers, Moscow and Petrograd, with their industrial facilities and 
traffic networks, but also the region extending south from Archangel and 
the East Karelian town of Kemi as well as the largely Finnish-inhabited 
province of Ingria, bounding the eastern stretches of the Gulf of Finland. 
Possession of Moscow gave the Bolsheviks an important psychological 
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advantage:' intervention by foreign powers allied with the Czarist regime 
to overthrow the Soviet Government enabled them to fortify their revolu-
tionary propaganda with patriotic agitation. In short, the Bolsheviks could 
appeal to the patriotic feelings of the Russian people in rallying the masses 
to the national defense. 
In comparing the ideological arsenals of the Whites and the Reds, the 
observation must be made that the former had nothing new to offer as a 
substitute for the socio-political system that the World War had proved 
to have outlived its time. The Czarist order had spent itself, and the 
liberal movement of early 1917, which was swept along by the stream of 
events, lacked the resourcefulness necessary for survival. By contrast, Bol-
shevism was still an unused and untested ideal, which seemed to he able 
to rally the people to its colors in the crisis.' Both sides, White and Red, 
made their appeal in the struggle to the ',soul of the Russian people». 
Toward the end of 1918 fugitives began to stream away from the areas 
held by the Bolsheviks toward the peripheral portions of the Russian 
sphere as well as abroad, to Germany and the new states that had emerged 
along the European boundaries of Russia as well as, later, France. At this 
stage, Paris became the center of White Russian political activity. It was 
in the Franch capital that the Con f erence politique russe, which had been 
established in January, 1919, as the central agency of this activity, began 
to draw up the lines of strategy for intervention. Contact was accordingly 
maintained both with the Allied governments, on the one hand, and the 
White generals preparing for military operations in peripheral parts of 
Russia, on the other. 
As the lines of battle began to emerge, the White Russians controlled 
distant parts of the vast Russian domain, and it was difficult for their 
military and political organs of leadership to maintain contact between the 
separate fighting units. After the German and Austrian forces had with-
drawn from southern Russia, followed by the army of the Ukrainian 
independence movement, the Bolsheviks occupied, among other centers, 
Harkov and Poltava. 
At the end of 1918 the Whites had formed combat units under the 
command of General A. Denikin, who sought to advance from the Kuban 
and the Crimea in the direction of the Don and Tsaritsyn. The Whites 
were assisted from Baku and Odessa, where Allied troops were stationed 
and could supply them with weapons and place military advisers at their dis-
posal. In Siberia the Whites were in contact with Czech legionaries released 
from imprisonment and their plans called for joining forces with Denikin's 
army. They also intended, on the other hand, to seek contact with the 
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Whites fighting in the region of Archangel in order to tighten the ring of 
encirclement around the Bolsheviks. 
The government of Admiral A. Kolchak, which hab its headquartert at 
Omsk, tried to act as the controlling agency of all the White forces as 
well as the proper authority in charge of relations with the Western 
Powers. The Russian »government»-in-exile in Paris, however, wanted to 
remain independent of its rulings as well as of those of the other White 
governmental agencies at the front in scattered parts of Russia. 
In their efforts to seal off the Bolsheviks, the White Russians sought to 
obtain reinforcements from the Western Powers. Psychologically, at the 
final stage of World War I, the bid was made at a bad time: the French, 
British and American armies were, it is true, flushed with victory — but 
they were also weary of war. Even those forces whose operations in peri-
pheral parts of Russia had been easier than those on the major fighting 
fronts had no desire to start a »new war». The authorities in the Western 
capitals were forced to take into account the war weariness prevailing 
among both soldiers and civilians. Moreover, opinion in the nations of 
the West was divided with regard to how to deal with the Russian question, 
i.e., the merits of intervening in the raging civil strife. Finding a common 
-official» line of action therefore appeared to involve formidable difficul-
ties. 
Of the »Big Three» of the Peace Conference, France was unquestionably 
the power that displayed the most active interest in the matter of interven-
tion. The French ruling circles openly sympathized with the White Rus-
sians, who were looked upon as, for one thing, representatives of the Rus-
sian alliance with France, which dated back to the 1890's, and, for another 
thing, as dedicated foes of the Bolshevik revolution. Lenin and his people's 
commissars had renounced the alliance, which had inspired a sense of 
security in the souls of Frenchmen intimidated by the military threat of 
Germany. 
Furthermore, the Soviet Government had refused to honor the earlier 
Russian bond issues floated in the French money market, with resultant 
heavy losses to the many bond holders, mostly belonging to the middle 
class. The French desire to support the intervention was, of course, in-
fluenced by the announcement included in Admiral Koltshak's proclama-
tion of November 18, 1918, that the debts incurred abroad by Czarist 
Russia would be paid back. Characteristic of France's anti-Bolshevik stanee 
was an opposition to any partition of the Russian domain. Only a strong 
and undivided RuSSia, the French felt, could be a worthy ally and one 
capable of squaring its accounts." 
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The most noteworthy French plan of intervention was the one proposed 
by Marshal Foch on January 12, 1919. According to it, the Western Powers 
would together form an army of intervention, which, using mainly Poland 
and to some extent other states that had been formed along the western 
Russian border as bases of operation, should join forces with the Whites, 
then pitted against the Reds in civil strife. This proposal was opposed, 
however, by President Wilson and Prime Minister Lloyd George, who 
around the same time were bent upon persuading the antagonists to enter 
negotiations, according to the aforementioned Principo plan, designed to 
effect a conciliation. Nor was Prime Minister Clemenceau favorable to the 
idea of dispatching French troops to the Russian front. 
In a country that had experienced battles on the gigantic scale of the 
Marne and Verdun, it would have been hard to induce anybody to leave 
the conditions of peace for more war. The reverses suffered by the French 
forces of occupation using Odessa as their base and the attempted mutiny 
in the French Black Sea fleet were factors pitted against any plan of armed 
intervention. The few French citizens who had resided in southern Russia 
since the final stage of the World War were soon evacuated, and France's 
Russian policy began to concentrate in April, 1919, on supporting the 
White Russians with munitions and money. Correspondingly, a willingness 
was shown to assist all those who took part in the intervention on the 
side of the Whites. 
With quite special zeal France sought allies to collaborate in pursuing 
the policy of intervention among the new states bordering on Russia, 
including Finland. Simultaneously, France began to feel a deep interest in 
stabilizing the independent status of these countries, notably Poland, 
because it wanted to form out of them a zone that, according to the so-
called cordon sanitaire program, which was Clemenceau's particular 
pet, would protect the capitalistic world from the onslaughts of Bolshevik 
propaganda. General Weygand's words to the effect that the victors had 
nothing to fear had by then lost their meaning. Even the leading conserva-
tives of France had begun to have trepidations about the possibility of a 
spread of the proletarian revolution in its extreme Russian form to Western 
Europe. 
Britain's attitude toward the settlement of the Russian question in the 
situation following the defeat of Germany was reflected in the memoran-
dum delivered on November 29, 1918, by Foreign. Secretary, Lord Balfour 
to the War Cabinet. His argument was that after four years of war the 
people in the West were unwilling to intervene in the Russian civil war 
and force upon the Russians a particular system of government. In practice, 
156 	 Juhani Paasivirta 
however, this did not mean that the British were not concerned about 
developments in Russia. After all, at the time the memorandum was drawn 
up, British military activity continued in the Murmansk area, Siberia and 
the region of Baku, in addition to which arms were being delivered to 
Denikin and the Baltic peoples. All this activity was tantamount to at 
least temporary intervention, designed to assist the White Russians. To 
justify it, reference was frequently made to the course of action taken by 
other powers of the West." This sort of Russian policy was also probably 
influenced by the problem posed by Germany. It was desired to prevent 
the defeated Germans from courting the Bolsheviks as an ally in the event, 
specifically, that the latter should win the civil war. 
Alongside the official policy, there was a multiplicity of views on Russia 
among the British. The idea of intervention was primarily upheld by the 
Conservatives, who viewed the radical revolutionary movement as a threat 
to the Western social order and its eivilization. Not all of them favored 
armed intervention, however;  some did not want to go beyond an econo-
mic blockade. Since the active interventionists were to be found mainly 
among the younger politicians of the Conservative party, its leadership, 
including Lord Balfour, maintained a stance of »wait and see», which 
actually amounted to a critical attitude toward intervention. 
The Liberals on the whole were unwilling to support military action 
against the Bolsheviks. In their opinion the Russians should be given the 
right to choose their own system of government. An exception was the 
faction headed by Winston Churchill, which was ready to launch military 
operations to help the White cause. Field Marshal Henry Wilson was 
among the influential figures behind this faction. 
The Liberals felt the Bolshevik dictatorship and its violent methods to 
be repulsive, but this did not prevent them from seeing in the October 
Revolution a certain striving for reform. Prime Minister Lloyd George, 
leader of the Liberal party, to which Churchill belonged in those days, 
had as his aim the creation of peaceful relations with the Soviet Govern-
ment. His freedom of movement was restricted, however, by his being 
head of a coalition government in which the Conservatives had the support 
of the majority in the lower house of Parliament. It was thus difficult for 
him to pursue a line of his own choice in Russian policy. As for the 
Labour party, it had generally given scant attention to foreign affairs, and 
in view of its weak representation in Parliament and the divergent political 
creeds of the two parties, it could scarcely be counted upon to strengthen 
the Liberals' hand. 
Labour viewed intervention as an ideological problem: it was a capitalist 
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action aimed at foiling the Russian revolution. At first Labour hailed the 
Bolshevik rise to power with delight, but later the measures taken by the 
Soviet regime met with quite severe criticism. Armed intervention in 
Russian affairs was categorically opposed by the party, which demanded 
the withdrawal from Russia of all British troops stationed there. 
Of the »Big Three", the United States took the most decidedly negative 
view on intervention, which conflicted with the principle of national 
self-determination proclaimed by President Wilson. The attempts to over-
throw the Soviet Government by violent means aroused the President's 
strong misgivings, moreover, on the ground that they would only enhance. 
Bolshevism's chances of spreading. The American attitude toward the 
White Russians was one of restraint, as generally in the case of representa-
tives of an old system overthrown in war. 
When, in spite of everything, American troops took part to some extent 
in interventionist operations, it was as a gesture of solidarity with the 
other Allies. American troops were sent not only to Murmansk but also 
to Siberia, where the United States was bent not so much on fighting the 
Bolsheviks as on preventing Japan from expanding its power in the Far 
East.5 
The White Russians represented the political traditions broken by the 
revolution of 1917. From the standpoint of Finland, it was by no means 
a matter of indifference what views they might express regarding the basic 
structure of the realm. Their political thinking ran along highly obscure 
lines, which were held together by the idea of unity — the restoration of 
the Russian boundaries as they were at the outbreak of World War I. 
Interest in the future political system was very slight, if for no other reason 
than that the problem involved could be solved only after the defeat of 
the Bolsheviks. On the other hand, the very subject was generally avoided 
as long as the Whites were gathering their fighting forces for the offensive 
against the enemy, for it was feared that talking about it might lead to 
controversy and dissension. 
The burden of their past weighed heavily upon the parties that had 
wielded power in Russia and upon their leaders. It would have been strange 
to imagine that the Czarist generals and bureaucrats might ever have 
become supporters of the constitutional democratic system aspired to by 
the Cadets or that, in the light of their experiences till then, these Cadets 
could be converted in their milieu of exile into champions of autocracy. 
The vagueness of the White Russians' idea of the state was further 
disclosed in their attitude toward the right of nationalities to self-determi 
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nation. Their objective was, to repeat, the preservation of the old imperial 
boundaries and the suppression of separatist movements. Their blueprint 
for Russia called for a federal organization. They were prepared to grant 
local autonomy to national minorities provided the sovereignty of the state 
was not weakened. The limited possibilities of forming battlefronts against 
the Bolsheviks compelled the White Russians to make concessions —
notably in favor of Poland and Finland. 
Poland was conceded special consideration because its independence 
had roots dating back centuries;  and this circumstance had commanded 
significant attention during the war in the planning of the country's poli-
tical future. Thus, in the main apparently for tactical reasons, the German 
Raiser and the Austrian Emperor recognized the independence of Poland 
in October of 1916;  on March 3o, 1917, the provisional Russian Govern-
ment accorded its recognition, calculating on this measure's serving to help 
the attack on the German-held Vistula region; and in his Fourteen Points 
President Wilson affirmed it to be a task of the Peace Conference to ratify 
the sovereignty of Poland. As for the Polish boundaries, the White Russians 
expressed views open to loose interpretation: they made references, for 
example, to the boundaries of "Congress Poland» (drawn by the Congress 
of Vienna), but reserved the final decision to the future Russian National 
Assembly. 
As a political problem, Finland received less sympathetic consideration 
from the White Russians than did Poland, which was bound up closely 
with the Allied sphere of interests. As a political entity, Finland was of 
later origin than Poland. She had existed as an autonomous state for more 
than one hundred years, Ind she had declared her independence under 
favorable conditions created by the World War and the Russian Revolution. 
Even those White Russians who professed to abide by the right of national 
self-determination as -acknowledged- by the March Revolution were un-
willing to accept the Finnish claims to independence. 
The attitude of the White Russians toward the Finnish question, as 
revealed in statements issued at the beginning of 1919 by the Conference 
politique russe established in Paris, certainly made it plain that they had 
failed to shake off the fetters of their imperialistic thinking. During the 
period of Russification, the Cadets and other liberals had, it is true, display-
ed sympathy for the hard-pressed Finns. Their position changed radically, 
however, as soon as it became apparent that Finland was out to break her 
ties with Russia. The «separatist» movement was simply condemned as a 
product of German agitation. 
The Russian emigrés' center in Paris consistently upheld the stand taken 
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M 1917 by the Lvov and Kerenski governments, according to which the 
legal and political arrangement between Finland and Russia could not be 
unilaterally changed; rather would it require an accord mutuel, which only 
the National Assembly was authorized to make on the part of Russia.° 
The White Russians strenuously contended that the interests of the Russian 
realm and those of the national minorities could be harmonized within 
the framework of a federal system.7 
The White Russians would not acknowledge the politic-juridical validity 
of the Soviet Government's having recognized the independence of Fin-
land. They seem to have been irritated by the fact that Finland had taken 
steps to consolidate her new international status. Finland's declaration of 
independence, as they explained it, had been an infraction unilateral, 
which could not create a sovereign state. They went so far in their criti-
cism of Finland's course of action as to compare it with Stolypin's 
lawlessness.8 In the light of all that had happened, the White Russians 
concluded that the political situation prevailing before the October Revolu-
tion must be restored and that it was on this basis that, insofar as feasible, 
certain modifications required by the changed circumstances might be made 
in the position of Finland •- provided the Russian National Assembly 
voted in favor of them. 
Applied in practice, the imperial ideal of the White Russians would, in 
the event of the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime, have called for Fin-
land's conceding Russia military rights in Finnish territory and submitting 
to Russian control in matters of foreign policy. With respect to their 
fundamental outlook, Russian bourgeois circles underwent no change 
either during the revolutionary upheaval or afterward as far as Finland 
was concerned: they were prepared to grant her national autonomy within 
the confines of the Russian state — but no more. Broad hints were given, 
to be sure, that after seizing power the White Russians had no intention 
of preventing Finland from developing her political institutions in the 
direction of eventual »independence» — but their use of politico-juridical 
terminology was marked by considerable poetic license. The White Russian 
concept of political »independence» included, for example, restrictions 
that deprived it of its essential content. 
In expressing their views on the Finnish question, the White Russians 
presented as their basic point of departure the argument that Russia could 
not let go of Finland if it wished to preserve its position as a major power. 
An independent Finland, they argued, would pose a threat to Russian 
security, particularly that of St. Petersburg. Finland should therefore not 
be allowed to achieve a higher degree of self-sufficiency than independence 
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gouvernementale, which they were willing to establish on a basis of 
international guarantees arrived at, for instance, through a decision of the 
Peace Conference.° 
It was Russia's duty, they explained, to defend its boundaries, also in 
the Finnish sector, and this meant looking after the requirements of mari-
time defense, particularly as it related to naval operations.10 Elucidating 
the problem in more detail, the Conference's spokesmen depicted the Gulf 
of Finland as constituting a fundamental part of the defense zone of St. 
Petersburg. 
Russia must have the right, the argument ran, to close the mouth of the 
Gulf of Finland at the point of Tallinn-Baltiski by means of fortifications 
and military bases situated between Helsinki and the Hanko peninsula in 
order to give the fleet a chance to operate.1t With emphasis on the same 
points of view, the White Russians contended that a one-sided solution 
of the Aland issue in Finland's favor would violate vital Russian defense 
interests. The defense of Russia's northwestern boundary was not passed 
over in silence, either. Attention was drawn to the danger of an overland 
attack on the Murmansk railroad by a hostile power.12 To forestall any 
such aggressive move, the White Russians planned on having Finland 
surrender certain fortification zones, among which Viipuri and Ino were 
looked upon as particularly desirable. As an added justification for such 
demands, it was pointed out that the German forces that had landed in 
Finland in 1918 had advanced across the Russian frontier with the aid of 
the Finns. 
The Finland enjoying independence gouvemementale, which the White 
Russians were disposed to accept, would not have been allowed to make 
independent decisions in the spheres of military and foreign affairs. Thus, 
guarantees were desired that Finland would not conclude any political 
alliances with powers regarded by Russia as hostile." The matter was 
closely bound up with the foregoing military demands, in connection with 
which it was indicated that Finland would have to enter into a defensive 
alliance with Russia.14 
The Finnish policy of the White Russians was mainly directed toward 
the attainment of two objectives. On the one hand, they sought to win 
the Western Powers over to their point of view regarding Finland, and, on 
the other hand, they sought, again through the mediation of the Western. 
Powers, to line up Finland among the countries supporting their program 
of intervention. In their pursuit of the first of these objectives, the White 
Russians endeavored to obstruct the appearance of the Finnish question 
before the Peace Conference. 
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In its appeal of March 9, 1919, the Conference politique russe recom-
mended that the Peace Conference not deal with the question of any other 
country that had been included in the Russian domain in r914 except 
Poland as well as that it acknowledge the principle according to which no 
final decisions regarding the political status and boundaries of nations 
which had been under the rule of the Czar should be made without the 
endorsement of Russia, i.e., the White Russians' central bureau.15 What 
the White Russians wanted, in short, was that the Western Powers would 
refrain from giving their blessing to Finnish independence. They did not 
object, though, to the establishment of contact with the government organs 
of nationalities that had formerly owed allegiance to the Czar, among them 
the Finnish Government, but only for the purpose of promoting the 
cause of intervention directed against the Bolshevik regime. 
At the end of March, 1919, there appeared a couple of booklets elucidat-
ing the views of the White Russians on the Finnish question, Quelques 
considerations sur le probleme finlandais and Memoire sur la Question 
Finlandaise, the latter of whieh was also published in English.10 It was 
through these publications that the negative stand of the White Russians 
toward Finnish independence became generally known — only vague 
reports about the matter having previously been made public — together 
with the nature of their demands with respect to Finland. In their active 
efforts to prevent the Peace Conference from being confronted with the 
question of Finland's diplomatic recognition for decision, they appealed 
particularly to France, whose most prominent government personalities 
were sympathetic to their interventionist aims. They knew that if Finland 
were to succeed in stabilizing her position as a sovereign state, it would 
be harder to persuade her to collaborate in their ventures.'7 
When, at the beginning of May, 1919, the American and British Govern-
ments made their decision to accord Finland diplomatic recognition, the 
reaction of the White Russians was strong. On May 8 the conference 
politique russe issued a protest, at the same time declaring that, without 
the approval of the central Russian authority, this decision could not have 
definitive validity but must be construed merely as une mesure provisoire. 
It did not, the protest went on to state, stop Russia from seeking to press 
its vitally important demands for military concessions from Finland.18 This 
declaration was made at a juncture when the question of extending inter-
ventionist operations to the Finnish sector was beginning to force itself 
upon the attention of the Western Powers. 
ii 
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It was around the months of October and November, 1918, that the 
political activity of the Russian emigrés began to encompass Finland, too. 
Their aim at this juncture was to use Finland and the Baltic countries as 
operational bases for the organization of an interventionist front against 
the Bolsheviks. Up to the middle of October their chances appeared mini-
ma) in the light of the cold treatment accorded them, and for this reason. 
they had established their northern headquarters in Stockholm. They turn-
ed to the legations representing the Western Allies with memoranda, 
which in most cases contained requests for assistance in implementing 
schemes to capture St. Petersburg from the Bolsheviks. 
In November, 1918, there arrived in Finland from St. Petersburg General 
N. Yudenich, who had served as commander-in-chief of the Russian forces 
in Caucasia. After discussions in Viipuri and Helsinki with emigrés," he 
traveled on to Sweden, where he joined the group of White Russians 
operating from Stockholm. His contacts there with Allied diplomats reveal-
ed to him that, with the exception of the French, they all maintained an 
attitude of restraint toward interventionist plans. The same restraint was 
likewise shown by Western businessmen, most of them British, whom he 
approached. Active participation in intervention was not favored;  promises 
were given, though, to support the White interventionists with munitions, 
but no direct proposals in this matter were made.2° 
At the beginning of December, 1918, Yudenich left each of the Allied 
legations in Stockholm a memorandum, in which he requested troops, 
weapons and technical advisers for interventionist operations from bases 
in Finland and the Baltic countries. The Allies were expected to participate 
by contributing some 50,000 men to reinforce the initial army of between 
ro,000 and 12,000 Russians, whose numbers were estimated as likely to 
grow to perhaps 50,000 after the first successes.21  
The difficulties involved in Yudenich's plans appeared immediately. 
In contrast to the situation in Siberia and southern Russia, the Whites 
held no Russian territory to serve as a base for operations against St. 
Petersburg. Offers from the Baltic region to have Yudenich take over the 
command of certain military units there did not interest him, for they 
were t00 poor in quality and small in size and their operational areas 
insufficient. Thus, while he vainly waited three weeks in Stockholm for 
a response from the Western Powers to his communications,22 Yudenich's 
hopes were directed toward his getting an opportunity to organize an army 
in Finland;  for this, in his opinion, would greatly facilitate the planned 
campaign against St. Petersburg and subsequently, perhaps, against Moscow 
as well. 
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Yudenich addressed an appeal to Kolchak, requesting both material aid 
and »moral support» for his endeavors, and as a result he was granted 
monetary assistance out of Russian funds deposited in London. Kolchak 
later notified Yudenich that he was being assigned to a special task — the 
formation of a »northwestern army», which was to take part in the 
general strategy of the Whites to overthrow the Bolshevik regime. It was 
at this stage of developments, at the beginning of January, 1919, that 
Yudenich left Stockholm to reach an understanding with the Finnish 
authorities in Helsinki. 
The cold reception given Yudenich's appeals to the governments of the 
Western Powers caused him to try to create a northwestern army with the 
support of Finland. The question was not only one of obtaining part of the 
Finnish territory to serve as a field of military activity for the White 
Russians but also of persuading Finland to contribute manpower for opera-
tions against the Bolsheviks. Both aspects of the matter were complicated 
by problems of fundamental importance to the Finns, which related to the 
political status of their country. 
Yudenich's earlier efforts to contact the Finnish authorities in Helsinki, 
made in November, 1918, had not been successful. The prevailing view 
at that time in administrative circles was that Finland could undertake 
to support the White Russian's venture if the Western Allies would join 
it with troops of their own.=$ His reverses had brought Yudenich to the 
brink of despair. He knew how meager were the possibilities of the White 
Russians residing in Finland to raise men from their own ranks — they 
could, perhaps, muster a total of between two and four thousand, the 
majority of whom would be officers. Yudenich hoped that the Finns would 
provide them with weapons and other matériel as compensation for Rus-
sian property left in Finland. 
The White Russians believed that the top Finnish political leadership 
— meaning not the Regent alone but also the Government as a whole — 
sympathized with their aims but that »public opinion» prevented this 
sympathy from being displayed.24 The activities of the Russian emigres 
were quite generally looked upon in Finland as portending danger to the 
nation. Expressions of this view soon began to be made public by indi-
vidual citizens and civic groups — in the columns of newspapers and in 
the debating chamber of Parliament. The fact that the country was widely 
thought to be slipping into the danger zone was attested to by the Govern-
ment's being confronted at the beginning of 1919 by two parliamentary 
interpellations. 
 
These interpellations expressed the fear that, if the emigres were given 
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encouragement, Finland might be converted into a base of White Russian 
propaganda and military activity. The suspicion previously entertained 
was boldly voiced that the White Russians did not look with favor on 
Finnish independence and that the delay in Finland's gaining diplomatic 
recognition in the West was due to their political meddling. Criticism was 
also levelled at the Government's manner of dealing with the situation. 
It was asked whether a sympathetic attitude was appropriate with regard to 
emigre elements that were obviously working to promote the cause of 
intervention in the Finnish sector.2" Particularly sharp critical barbs were 
aimed at the highest authorities, who were accused of engaging in cland-
estine activity intended to aid and abet the strategy of the White Russians. 
The visible target was Foreign Minister Enckell, but Regent Mannerheim 
was indirectly exposed to the attack, too. 
In attempting to analyze Mannerheim's close contact with the White 
Russians, one must proceed from the fact of his long service, lasting nearly 
three decades, as an officer in the armed forces of the Czar. It had signified 
a vital link between his experience of life and the conditions prevailing in 
Russia, and in many respects this link was bound to determine his manner 
of thinking. He was the splendid product of an aristocratic social milieu, and 
his political outlook derived from a military career strongly bound to a 
solemn oath of loyalty. But this does not yet fully explain the parallel 
lines of thought followed by Mannerheim and the Russian emigre generals.  
Mannerheim evidently was motivated by a powerful ambition to lead 
a military crusade against Bolshevism. And his specific objective was to 
take St. Petersburg away from the Reds.20 The victory of the White Army 
under his leadership over the Reds of Finland in the spring of 1918 was 
an emboldening factor. Mannerheim was a soldier of tradition, who looked 
upon the revolution at bottom as an anarchistic and defeatist phenomenon; 
he could not estimate very highly its capability of organizing military 
resistance. »Bolshevism is a destructive ideal.» Since Mannerheim was 
conservative in his outlook and a representative of an aristocratic way of 
life, Bolshevism in his eyes was tantamount to mob rule, the violent 
enemy of traditional values, with which no compromise could come into 
question. 
Whereas bourgeois opinion in Finland, according to the traditional out-
look created by Czarist tyranny and strengthened by the events of 1918, 
was characterized by a tendency to brand Bolshevism as something typically 
Russian and even worse than Czarism, the basis of Mannerheim's thinking 
was different. He drew a sharp distinction between Russia and the system 
represented by Bolshevism. Toward the former — as it existed in its old 
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historical framework — he felt an attachment and, at least publicly, would 
take no critical stand;  but as far as Bolshevism was concerned, his attitude 
was one of complete opposition. To Mannerheim, Bolshevism as an ideal 
was not Russian by nature, and he believed that its influence would prove 
to be short-lived. 
Mannerheim's political outlook, rooted in gone-by traditions, became 
strongly modified, however, by his experiences during Finland's struggle 
to secure her independence and the strenuous period of crisis that followed. 
Thus, Mannerheim's thinking began to be guided out of its old, historical 
groove by the force of change, and his cosmopolitan attitude took on a 
new — or, more properly stated, revived — nationalistic color. The national 
interests of his native Finland had begun to hold in leash the will to 
action egged on by his earlier fate. 
The contradictory aspects of Mannerheim's attitude around the year 
1919 can probably be explained by the fact that in his mind there ran 
parallel lines of thought, which, representing past vicissitudes and new 
historical trends, vied for ascendancy. He was also forced to contend with 
opposed geopolitieal points of view. Mannerheim, in a sense, tended to 
wrap the solutions to the Russian and the Finnish questions up in a single 
package; what it amounted to, more or less, was a kind of »Russian-
Finnish question», with the result that his view of the Russian situation 
did not seem to have cleared up under the conditions of change.  
Mannerheim lent his role as general in command of the White Army 
of Finland broad scope with regard to both range of action and general 
objectives. He envisioned himself engaged in a crusade against all revolu-
tionary activity and everything remindful of Bolshevism. In Finland, after 
the Civil War, his figure was endowed by the Whites themselves with a 
strong nationalistic image. And he was looked upon as the policy maker 
capable of settling Eastern relations. It w^.s this figure of Mannerheim that 
personified the eventful period of 1918. The object of esteem and adulation, 
it served to unify the bourgeois ranks. Not until 1919 did he begin to 
reveal another aspect of his character — a favorable disposition toward 
interventionist activity — and this revelation caused the circles that had 
till then strongly supported him to take stock anew, mostly in silence, of 
their leader's resources in the light of historical experiences over a longer 
term. 
As a consequence, the ranks of his political supporters began to show 
signs of cleavage. Some of his following of the year before turned away. 
Indirect evidence of his weakening support was the result of the parliamen-
tary election, and by the summer of 1919 the same trend could be noticed 
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more clearly. Mannerheim's figure, as delineated by the circle of his active 
adherents, was thus losing its sharp definition and taking on vaguely drawn 
outlines as well as, to a certain extent, an »alien» appearance. 
These things had the effect of bringing uncertainty into Mannerheim's 
political position. The emergence of interpellations in Parliament concern-
ing the White Russians, accompanied by aggressive speeches from the floor 
of the debating chamber, was a disagreeable political development to him. 
The repeated appeals addressed to him by emigré circles involved him in 
matters of a delicate nature as far as his position as Regent was concerned, 
and they exposed him to the risk of being compromised in the eyes of 
the public. The emigre question was one, however, with regard to which 
it was difficult for Mannerheim even to consider committing himself to a 
public stand.27 
By the spring of 1919 the idea of intervention was in the air, stirring up 
rumors of all kinds in Finland. Both the representatives of the White 
Russians and Finns with interventionist inclinations let loose trial balloons, 
but no practical plans were at issue. 
Yudenich's switch of headquarters from Stockholm to Helsinki in Janua-
ry of 1919 was an indication of a change of mind among the White Russians 
with regard to the over-all strategy of intervention. The view had begun 
to be expressed that the fronts in Siberia and southern Russia did not 
suffice to insure success but that a special «northwestern front» would 
have to be opened up in addition, activating White military operations in 
the St. Petersburg sector.28 Two possibilities were considered in particular: 
by starting operations in this sector the White Russians (reinforced by other 
troops) might capture St. Petersburg or, then, the mere existence of a new 
interventionist front would compel the Bolsheviks to pull some of their 
troops from the other fronts to help repulse the threat there, thus indirectly 
enhancing the White Russians' chances of success on these earlier fronts. 
Looked at from Yudenich's vantage point, the central problem was to 
win Finland and Estonia over to the eause of the interventionists. In mid-
February he had turned to the White Russians' diplomatic representatives 
stationed in Paris and London with the request that they try to influence 
the Finnish and Estonian political leaders through the governments of the 
Western Allies. In order to bolster his arguments, Yudenich dispatched 
P. V. Struve to explain the situation and his objectives.20 The White 
Russians were sharply critical of the Western Powers' attitude toward the 
R.ussian question. In Yudenich's immediate circle of associates, it was 
condemned as »apathetic». Typical of these men's thinking was their 
notion that »German agents» were plotting against them in Finland, 
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seeking to keep alive the specter of revolution in the West as a means of 
intimidating the government authorities of the victorious powers. 
In response to Yudenich's aforementioned appeal, the White Russian 
envoy to London, C. Nabokoff, recommendedS0 to Kolchak that recognition 
be accorded to Finland's independence, inasmuch as it was a fait accompli, 
which the White Russians were incapable, with the resources at their 
disposal, of opposing. Besides, it was his belief that the Western Powers 
would act in the matter without lending an ear to the Russians. 
The leaders of the Conference politique russe agreed with the military 
point of view adopted by Kolchak and Denikin that the success of White 
operations presupposed the existence of a northwestern front as well, but 
they were not disposed to make any political concessions in favor of Fin-
land. They joined together the issue of recognizing Finnish independence 
and the solution to the problem of the security of »future Russia» in the 
region of the Gulf of Finland. They made the solution of this problem 
along the lines of their desire a precondition of recognition, which in 
reality amounted to an attempt to circumscribe Finland's freedom of 
political action. 
»Finland has no right to demand any pronouncement from the Russians 
that is contrary to Russian interests,»31 declared the emigre leader V. A. 
Maklakov in response to Nobakov's recommendation. D. D. Sasonov, who 
in his presentation to Kolchak supported the plan to create an army in 
Finland under Yudenich's command, explained in concurrence with the 
foregoing that recognition of Finnish independence might take place »con-
ditionally», i.e., provided Russia's strategic interests were satisfied and the 
final decision were left to the National Assembly.32 
In various connections Mannerheim had brought up in the form of a 
trial balloon the idea of a campaign to capture St. Petersburg. In the sum-
mer of 1918 he had broached it, with reference to the military resources 
of the respective powers, almost simultaneously to diplomats representing 
both Germany and Britain. Around the months of October and November 
he was entertaining schemes, as we have already noted, for the capture of 
the late Czarist capital through interventionist operations jointly carried 
out by Finland and the Scandinavian countries. At the beginning of 1919 
he broached the idea on one occasion along the variant line that Finland 
would undertake the intervention on her own, with the participation of 
the Western Powers confined in the main to moral support. In the two 
last-mentioned cases, Mannerheim indicated that he was prepared to 
accept the responsibilities of commander-in-chief. 




the interventionist plans, namely, how the Western Powers might react 
to the possible role of Finland in the plans of military strategy. This 
interest of his was displayed during his sojourn to London in November 
and December, 1918, as well as later on in his dealings on various occasions 
with Western diplomatic representatives. Furthermore, one of the special 
tasks assigned by Mannerheim to Enckell for his mission to Paris at the 
end of March, 1919, was to learn as much as he could about Allied views 
on the matter. 
Mannerheim's consistent aim was to induce the Western Powers to 
pledge their support of Finnish participation in intervention.S9 This was 
in harmony with the Regent's traditional pro-Entente sympathies. Besides, 
he evidently surmised, it would provide Finland with a secure political 
prop to take part militarily in the settlement of the issues of power politics 
in the East. At the same time, it signified a bid for diplomatic support for 
Finland against any surprise developments — also against the potential. 
threat of inimical moves by the White Russians in the future. Mannerheim 
was further motivated in his search for support in the West by the fact 
that, in estimating the forces likely to be thrown into the fray on the 
»northwestern front», he could form no favorable opinion of the White 
Russians' fitness for action any more than n( the qualifications of their 
top commander, Yudenich. 
Mannerheim's plans with regard to interventionist operations in the St. 
Petersburg sector proceeded from these premises: the conditions of political 
collaboration would have to be worked out between the White Russians 
and the Finnish Government; but militarily, if the venture was eventually 
implemented, Finland would insist upon making the central contribution, 
with the White Russians playing a secondary role in the action and the 
Western Allies providing material and moral support. 
The month of May, 1919, witnessed changes in the situation that in 
several ways placed the interventionist plans in a new light. The recogni-
tion of Finland's national independence by the Western Powers was such 
an achievement from the standpoint of the country's political status that 
the prospect of participation in military undertakings liable to jeopardize 
the political gains made became less and less popular. 
To join in support of interventionist policy was to take a definite stand 
toward the issue at stake; 
 it spelled out endorsement of action against the 
acknowledged foe. But, in view of the White Russians' negative or at least 
ambiguous attitude toward the independence of Finland, the cause for 
which the Finnish. Army was supposed to fight was obscured in the eyes 
of the great majority of Finns. If the White Russians were to win the 
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conflict, would it strengthen or weaken the position of Finland as an 
independent state? 
If Finland's policy were constructed on the basis of assistance to the 
White Russians, with the dubious prospect held out by their vague promises 
and nebulous gratitude, what, in short, it was asked, would lie in store for 
the nation? For sight was not lost of a potent factor lurking in the back-
ground — the imperial ideal of the White Russians, with its watch-words 
of territorial inviolability and the resuscitation of Czarist politics! 
The desire of Finnish circles favorably disposed toward the idea of 
intervention to receive »guarantees» in exchange for participation had 
only grown stronger in the face of the foregoing problems and the sense 
of insecurity created by them. Resistance had increased in Parliament after 
the elections, and opinion was divided in the Government, with the voices 
in opposition tending to gain ascendancy. Yudenich's attempt to advance 
against Petrograd at the head of White Russian and Estonian troops south 
of the Gulf of Finland had failed by the latter half of May. On the other 
hand, the general offensive launched by the White Russians at this junc-
ture had resulted in ground gained in Siberia and, later on, in southern 
Russia. 
The attempt to obtain support from the Western Powers had given 
rise to a fairly negative view on the chances of linking Finland's possible 
interventionist aetivities to the Allied political program. 
France was the only one of the victorious powers to urge Finland to 
take part in the intervention. For its own part, France was not prepared 
to contribute manpower to the venture but at most only to make some 
vague promises of material aid." It was also ready to pressure Finland into 
taking part in the offensive against Petrograd without any pledges being 
given by the White Russians to recognize Finnish independence or to 
sanction Finland's annexation of any territory or to grant benefits of any 
other kind. French political hopes rested simply on the swift overthrow 
Of the Bolshevik regime and the subsequent preservation of as strong a 
Russia as possible to act as a necessary counterbalance to the feared revival 
of German power in the future. 
British policy, by contrast, continued to be cautious and restrained. The 
British in their planning looked beyond the overthrow of the Bolsheviks 
and saw the problems and the dangers of the crisis that could later develop 
between Russia (under White rule) and Finland. After according Finland 
diplomatic recognition at the beginning of May, the British Government 
consistently upheld the new status achieved by this country. And it was 
expressly in response to British insistence that the joint statement delivered 
17O 	 Juhani Paasivirta 
by the Western Allies to Omsk on May 26 concerning the terms on which 
Kolchak's Government could obtain their recognition included as one 
condition the recognition of the independence of Poland and Finland. 
What Britain wanted was to prevent future disagreements over the matter 
of recognizing Finland's independence. 
The British did not try, like the French, to put pressure on Finland to 
participate in the intervention. Far from promising, for example, assistance 
in the form of munitions, Assistant Foreign Secretary Curzon and Under 
Secretary of State Hardinge actually admonished the Finns against taking 
part in the campaign to capture Petrograd.45 In certain connections it was 
also specifically stressed that the participation of Finland could not be 
accepted without the express approval of Kolchak. British diplomats were 
also inclined to criticize as »unreasonable» the demands put forward by 
Finland, notably the ones pertaining to the possession of East Karelia.38 
Britain further sought to prevent a situation in which, following Finnish 
collaboration in operations against Petrograd, not only might the White 
Russians endeavor to gain advantages at the expense of Finnish sovereign 
rights but also the Finns might claim as »compensation» certain territorial 
acquisitions,37 which — like the claims on East Karelia — the British had 
consistently opposed. It was thus aspired to remove to a maximum extent 
future causes of friction in Finnish-Russian relations. 
After the unsuccessful offffensive action launched in May on the south-
ern side of the Gulf of Finland, the White Russians could be observed 
increasing their efforts to draw Finland into the intervention operations.38 
This development was particularly reflected in General Yudenich's attitude. 
He showed himself to be willing to make concessions as a reward for Fin-
land's participation, in contrast to Kolchak, who would not go beyond 
giving general promises unsupported by any concrete guarantees. Kolchak 
emphasized as his political watch-word that he represented »great, undivi-
ded Russia».3° 
The eourse of events led at this stage to negotiations between Yudenich 
and Mannerheim. The point of departure was provided by the latter's 
favorable attitude toward military collaboration between the Finns and 
the White Russians in operations to capture Petrograd and by the former's 
readiness to make concessions as compensation to Finland for her services. 
By the latter half of June the representatives of both parties had agreed 
that »as soon as circumstances permitted» a definitive pact would be drawn 
up between Finland and (White) Russia on a basis that would include, 
among other things, the following conditions:3° Finland's independence 
would be categorically recognized; 
 Finland's access to the Arctic Ocean 
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would be decided upon by either the Peace Conference or the League of 
Nations; the right of both northern and southern East Karelia to national 
self-determination would be honored;  and Mannerheim would be com-
mander-in-chief of all the military operations.4" 
The foregoing draft agreement did not in itself reflect the views prevail-
ing in Finnish government circles. Deputy Foreign Minister Leo Ehrnrooth 
and Minister of War Rudolf Walden," who participated in the negotiations, 
represented more than anything else those circles that aspired to collabora-
tion with the White Russians. Alongside this pro-interventionist trend of 
opinion there ran a counter-current, with which several members of the 
Government belonging to the centrist political parties were identified — 
and they either took a skeptical view of the bargaining with Yudenich's 
representatives or then demanded immediate renunciation of all such 
contact.42 Their suspicions were centered on the matter of whether Yude-
nich, who had showed himself ready to make concessions to Finland, was 
authorized to take such action by Kolchak. And they wondered whether 
the support of the Western Powers could be gained by a pro-interventionist 
policy. Furthermore, they felt an aversion to any line of policy whatsoever 
that called for the launching of offensive military operations. 
The general attitude of Finnish government circles was thus — in spite 
of the contrary stand taken by certain key figures — hardly kindly disposed 
to participation in joint action with the White Russians. This line was 
strengthened by the return from Paris toward the end of June of Foreign 
Minister Holsti, who was anxious to avoid any move that was liable to 
lead to friction with the Western Powers. In a report on the situation sent 
at the beginning of July to Finland's diplomatic representatives abroad, 
Castrén's Government revealed that it intended to pursue a »very cautious» 
line43 with respect to intervention and in dealings with the White Rus-
sians. Actually, at this point things had reached a pass where Mannerheim 
and the majority of his ministers were in clear disagreement over Russian 
policy. Mannerheim, in short, was prepared to join the intervention, 
provided Kolchak would make concessions in favor of independent Finland 
and the Western Powers confirmed their stand in favor of the project. 
Yudenich's efforts to establish the political basis necessary for military 
collaboration with Finland led to trouble with Kolchak, who rejected the 
terms of the draft agreement as »fantastic». The same attitude was reflected 
in his response to the Western Powers with regard to their proposed 
conditions of collaboration. Kolchak was willing to go no farther than to 
accord recognition of Finnish independence only insofar as it was limited 
to the »internal social order and political administration».94 On the other 
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hand, Kolchak did try to influence the Western Powers to pressure Finland 
into joining the intervention. 
The idea that Finland should join forces with the White Russians in 
military operations in the Petrograd sector ran counter to the stand held 
till then by the British Government, which was determined by the desire 
to prevent subsequent conflicts. The response of the Western Powers to 
Kolchak's appeal took the form of a communication delivered to the Finn-
ish Government on July 7 with the intelligence that they had no objections 
to make with regard to Finland's participation in interventionist activity 
but that they had no intention to pressure Finland in the matter, either.44 
The issue of intervention thus remained unresolved at a point where no 
eollaboration pact had been arrived at between Finland and the White 
Russians or between Finland and the Western Allies, either. 
Mannerheim's efforts to link Finland's possible participation in interven-
tionist activity with close collaboration with the Western Allies had not 
succeeded. Furthermore, his exchange of telegrams with Kolchak had left 
open the stand of the White Russians' high command toward the demands 
set forth by the Finnish groups favorably disposed to intervention as 
preconditions. Even the very basis of every other eondition, the recognition 
of Finland's independence, remained a question mark. The failure of the 
Western Powers to come across with promises of assistance had thinned 
down the ranks of the pro-interventionists, and the attitude of the White 
Russians created suspicion and passivity. The belief of the groups opposed 
to intervention that it represented a »political adventure» apt to lead the 
the nation into unexpected dangers began to be shared by an increasing 
number of people. 
In spite of everything, the spirit of intervention persisted, and in Finland 
its proponents were Mannerheim and certain groups of Activists, or 
nationalist zealots. Since the hoped-for arrangements with Kolchak and 
the Western Powers had failed to materialize, the energies of these groups 
became concentrated upon the problem of mobilizing sufficient support 
for intervention in Finland. The question of securing support at home 
arose in mid-July, when Parliament, in view of the domestic situation, had 
hastened to vote in favor of a republican form of government. The ratifica-
tion of this measure, which had been declared urgent, was next on the 
national agenda.  
Mannerheim and the Activists' spokesmen contended that Bolshevik 
propaganda would soon threaten the security of Finland and that therefore 
preparations should be made to take counteraction. Despite Mannerheim's 
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probably already having received intelligence concerning the announce-
ment issued on July 9 by the Peace Conference in the name of its high 
council" which promised no support to interventionist measures under-
taken by Finland and despite Britain's negative response to the request 
made on Finland's behalf for assistance in the form of weapons,46 he seems 
to have entertained the notion that if the interventionists gained their 
objective, i.e., took Petrograd, the Western Powers would in the end stand 
behind him. The Finnish Regent thought the political stock of the White 
Russians was steadily rising. In his opinion Finland should not »remain 
on the sidelines» as a passive witness of this trend. 
The scheme hatched by the Activists at the beginning of July was 
highly dramatic in its political calculations." What it called for was this: 
after confirming the Form of Government, Mannerheim should, in his 
capacity as Regent, dissolve Parliament and decree the holding of new 
elections. Then, during the ensuing »political hiatus», operations against 
Petrograd could be started. 
Without paying attention to the constitutional side of the matter, the 
Activists projected their intervention on the strengh of the hope and belief 
that a successful military outcome would inspire general public gratifi-
cation. The elections could then be expected to change the proportional 
strength of the various parties drastically and lead to a retroactive vote of 
confidence in a policy boldly executed on the basis of personal initiative. 
The Activists further expected a powerful surge of popular support for 
Mannerheim at the approaching presidential eleetion. 
On July 13 Mannerheim invited some politicians from the Conservative 
party to participate in discussions in Helsinki. He notified them that he 
definitely endorsed the plan drawn up by the Activists" and that he was 
confident of its proving successful. With regard to the problems of foreign 
policy involved, he mentioned that Kolchak had given assurances no poli-
tical trouble need arise between Finland and Russia and added as his own 
conviction that Finland could expect the fulfillment of the politieal eondi-
tions presented to Yudenich in June. As for the attitude of the Western 
Allies, the Regent asserted that their governments in reality favored Fin-
land's participation in the intervention but that the negative stand taken 
by the labor movements in the respective countries made it difficult to 
deal with such matters openly. 
Examination of the internal political factors bearing upon intervention 
culminated on this occasion in the raising of the question: would it be 
possible during the »political hiatus» to set up a government that would 
go along with the Regent in implementing his military program? 
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The leadership of the Conservative party was in a key position in dealing 
with this question. Misgivings were strong in that quarter about supporting 
the interventionist measures along the lines laid down.9° On the one hand, 
it was considered constitutionally questionable to undertake action in the 
field of foreign policy — aggressive military action, at that — immediately 
after ratification of the new Form of Government, which gave the head of 
State no authority to take such radical action without the approval of 
Parliament. And, on the other hand, the launching of interventionist acti-
vity by dissolving Parliament was seen to involve domestic political risks. 
Besides, the measure appeared to threaten to divide the bourgeois ranks 
by causing the parties of the center to side with the Socialists in vigorous 
opposition. 
The outcome of the talks was that the leadership of the Conservative 
party, in which opinion favoring political support was only scantily repre-
sented, announced that it could not consider accepting partnership in the 
administration in such an exceptional situation. This response to the Re-
gent's inquiry was given on July 17, making it plain that the intervention 
project could be expected to get hardly any political support from any of 
the groups represented in Parliament. The whole plan was dropped at this 
stage. This was foreshadowed by Mannerheim's answer the day before to 
Kolchak's personal appeal to him, in which he emphasized that the primary 
requisite of parliamentary support for intervention was a guarantee of 
White Russian recognition of Finland's independence. 
During the course of the same 17th day of July, Mannerheim applied 
his signature to the new Form of Government, and this meant that Fin-
land was headed for her first presidential election. The appearance of Man-
nerheim and K. J. Ståhlberg as rival candidates reflected not only the 
political opposition of the republicans and the erstwhile monarchists but 
also the difference of view held by them on foreign affairs, notably with 
respect to the Russian question.b0 On the other hand, no difference could 
he observed between the candidates in their attitude toward the Western 
Powers. Where a difference did come in was in the fact that Mannerheim 
was the better known of the two in London and Paris. 
The victory of Ståhlberg on July 25 by a heavy majority reflected — 
besides a rejection of the Regent's domestic policies, including his formula 
for healing the breach between the Whites and the Reds — the growing 
desire to insure Finland's steering clear of intervention. According to the 
viewpoint of Ståhlberg and his adherents, the independent status of Fin-
land could be best stabilized by keeping peace along the country's eastern 
border. 
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The interventionist ideal did not die in Finland even though a strong 
opponent of intervention had been elected President. It lived on as an 
issue of foreign policy in the minds of certain private groups. 
During the fall some trial balloons were once more let loose. Thus Man-
nerheim, who at this stage held no official position, expounded his schemes 
early in the autumn for the benefit of a certain British diplomat.51 The 
matter last came up in the late fall at the same time as Yudenich's forces 
based in Estonia had started off on a new attack against Petrograd. 
Mannerheim's view at this juncture, when he was again staying in Paris 
and London, was that the day was approaching when Allied policy with 
regard to intervention would become more positive and more decisive. 
-We are nearing a decision with great strides,» he wrote to a political 
confidant of his back home.52 Obviously, in moving about in the Western 
capitals — as a private citizen, on top of everything else, and in close 
touch with former officer comrades of his from the Czar's army — Man-
nerheim gave full sway to the attraction he felt for intervention.'3 Contrary 
phenomena existent in the Allied political program, which indicated. 
alienation from interventionist activity, such as the evacuation in the 
month of September of the British expeditionary force from northern 
Russia, escaped his notice. As Regent he had been more »tied down». He 
had regarded intervention as Finland's last chanee to establish her indepen-
dence on a firm basis vis-it-vis Russia;  while the Bolsheviks remained in 
power, he believed, Finnish independence would depend on the general 
international situation. 
These observations and opinions were brought out in Mannerheim's 
»Open Letter» to the President of the Republic published around the turn 
of the months of October and November, in which a direct appeal was 
made to Ståhlberg and the Government toward winning them around to 
sanctioning intervention. At the same time, relying upon the General's 
personal influence, it was endeavored to sway public opinion and thereby 
bring to bear indireet pressure upon the governing authorities to make the 
desired change in their course of policy. The »Open Letter» speaks of 
Finland's »last chance» and expresses Mannerheim's belief that the doom 
of the Soviet system was sealed;  but it goes on to sound a warning that 
by not joining the intervention Finland could contribute to a situation 
where Petrograd would femain in Bolshevik hands. With regard to rela-
tions with the Western Powers, the letter declares that by participating in 
the intervention Finland could, in part, change the general European trend 
of political evolution. 
The »Open Letter» failed in its objective, and instead of winning support 
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for interventionist action it became the target of harsh criticism. Not even 
the rightist factions that had been Mannerheim's most dependable adherents 
raised their voices to champion the line of action he recommended but 
stayed passive. They wanted to preserve the image they had created of 
him in the light of the events of 1918 as Finland's »White General». The 
features that tended to be superimposed upon this image as recollections 
of his earlier career in the Czar's service were enhanced by his aspiration 
to become the »general of intervention» — and this latter image they 
instinctively shunned as alien.  
Mannerheim had thus been figuratively left alone. His isolation, which 
was in part self-imposed, was bound to aggravate the political antipathy 
he felt toward the circles that were directing the course of Finnish policy 
— the parties of the center, which drew a certain amount of support from 
the Social Democrats. Actually, in November, 1919, even those had turned 
their backs on Mannerheim who had been his most loyal followers. 
Europe was returning to a state of peaee and the newly independent 
nations established after the war were turning their attention to the work 
of internal construction. Domestic politics claimed the concentrated ener-
gies of governments and everything requiring military exertions was re-
garded with a sense of war weariness. As the program of intervention 
receded into the background, it was replaced in the foreground by a policy 
of collaboration between Finland and the Baltic countries, all of which 
shared the destiny of having broken the grip of Russia on their affairs. 
Finland's relations with the Western Powers were becoming established 
upon a firm foundation, and the change of head of State accomplished by 
the presidential election signified no change of policy toward Britain, 
France and the United States. At most, the episode inspired regrets in 
the West that after losing the election Mannerheim chose to withdraw 
completely from public life. 
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Chapter X 
The StabilizatiOn of Finland's Diplomatic Relations with Britain, 
France and the United States 
The British and the United States Governments' having accorded the 
independence of Finland their recognition at the beginning of May, 1919. 
and France's having ratified its prior favorable decision, conditions had 
become ripe for the stabilization of diplomatic relations between Finland 
and the victorious Western Allies. 
Following the declaration of independence by Finland, provisional arrange-
ments were sought while the Finnish deputations sent to London, Paris 
and Washington presented requests for the diplomatic recognition of their 
country. These arrangements called for the situation of unofficial Finnish 
diplomatic representatives in the main Western capitals. Owing to the pro-
German line pursued by Finland's policy makers, however, the possibilities 
open to these representatives to do anything useful proved slight or non-
existent. For this reason, during the armistice negotiations Finland maintain-
ed, as pointed out in the foregoing presentation, a temporary Charge  
d'affaires only in London. Simultaneously, by a decision made by the 
Government on October 15, the Finnish diplomatic representation in Ger-
many and the three Scandinavian countries was placed on a permanent 
basis by the appointment of Ministers to the respective capitals.' 
The aspiration to establish close ties with the Western Powers, which 
began to take on vital political importance after the month of November, 
1918, was manifested by -- in addition to the circumstances already 
discussed — a number of decisions aimed at complementing and enlarg-
ing Finland's diplomatic corps. Two representatives were sent to the United 
Slates, mainly to loOk after Finnish commercial interests, but this move 
was blocked by Washington because it was initiated by a pro•German 
administration. The Finnish deputation sent to Paris, the locale of the 
Peace Conference, was steadily augmented. Even the Foreign Ministers, 
first Enckell, then Holsti, made occasional trips to the French capital, be-
sides which the representatives of Finland stationed in London worked in 
close contact with the Paris deputation. 
In May, 1919, the situation called for the appointment of Ministers to 
London, Paris and Washington as well as for the augmentation of the 
Finnish representation in those capitals otherwise, too, and the establish- 
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ment  of the diplomatic missions on a permanent basis. The first appoint-
ment, made on May 3o, was that of A. H. Saastamoinen, who was named 
Minister to head the Finnish Legation in Washington, D.C. An expert on 
economic affairs, he had previously served as diplomatic envoy to Copen-
hagen and for a time in the spring of 1919 as a temporary representative 
of the Finnish Government in the United States. The nomination of 
Ministers to head the legations in Paris and London was delayed, however. 
The decision with respect to Paris was evidently held up by the internal 
dissension among the membership of the Finnish deputation there, which 
had developed during the spring. It was finally Carl Enckell who, on Sep-
tember 6, received the assignment to serve in France, his rival for the post 
having been Adolf Törngren. Accordingly, London was the last of the three 
capitals to see the arrival of a Finnish Minister. The post was awarded on 
October 7 to Ossian Donner, who had originally acted as Holsti's deputy 
in the British capital and later, as of July, carried out the duties of Charge  
d'affaires. Around the same time, regular appointments were made to 
consular offices: A. J. Norrgrén took over the Finnish Consulate-General 
in London and M. Nordberg the one in Paris. 
Characteristic in many cases of Finland's first diplomats — both those 
who held high positions during the pro-German period and those who 
came after — was the fact that before entering the foreign service they had 
served in some other official capicity or been active in politics. 
This previous experience naturally proved valuable to the men choosing 
diplomacy as a new career. On the other hand, this kind of experience 
frequently bred strong personal political opinions, rooted, for example, in 
activity associated with the Jaeger movement (which trained Finnish 
officers in the German Army for eventual action to free Finland from 
Russia's grip) or in pro-Allied activity or, in certain cases, in collaboration 
with the Russian regime preceding the Bolshevik seizure of power. The 
political line thus pursued at an earlier stage, with the sacrifice of strength 
and energy, was apt to determine the trend of political thinking of the 
individual concerned during his subsequent career or to form, as it were, 
a personal interest. 
The existence of such a -background factor» upon a man's embarking 
upon a diplomatic career was apt to mean that he was unwilling or unable 
to shake off the influence of his own political convictions or to resign him-
self to adhering only to the official foreign service line of policy and to 
following instructions. In practice, this line of independence was further 
manifested by the fact that the reporting done for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was highly unorthodox. Reports were not confined, according to 
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regular diplomatic practice, to analyses of the position and policies of the 
administration in office in the country to which such a diplomat was 
accredited, as well as of the activities and aims of the political opposition, 
and to prognostications based on the data accumulated concerning the 
future course of policy likely to be followed by the country. In addition, 
the reports frequently tended to offer the reporting officer's own Govern-
ment »advice» on policy and even to criticize measures already taken by 
the Government. 
It was partly due to the foregoing situation in the evolving administra-
tion of Finland's foreign relations that when, toward the end of 1918, her 
line of policy shifted to the aim of cultivating close ties with the Western 
Allies, voices were raised demanding that certain diplomats who held high 
office during the pro-German period should be wholly removed from the 
foreign service.' Action was also taken in due time against Edv. Hjelt and 
Alexis Gripenberg, who had served as envoys in Berlin and Stockholm. 
At the time the question of intervention was a topical issue, it was not 
unheard of, on the other hand, for a diplomat advocating Finland's parti-
cipation to draw — toward the end of 1919 — a reminder from the Presi-
dent of the Republic that, rather than actively airing his personal views. 
he should confine his attention to the duties »belonging» to his office. 
It was only gradually that official thinking with regard to the scope of 
authority and degree of subservience of foreign service officers crystallized. 
The following incident is likewise illustrative of the early period in the 
annals of the Finnish foreign service: When Ståhlberg was elected Presi-
dent at the end of July, 1919, causing the retirement from public office 
of the rival candidate, General Mannerheim, one Finnish diplomat,3 a 
supporter of the latter, raised the question as to whether, in response to 
this »political mistake», he should demonstratively offer his post to the 
President-elect to be filled by a replacement. 
The opposition between Ståhlberg and Mannerheim constituted a kind 
of political watershed in Finland after 1918, and even among the leading 
figures in the administration of foreign affairs there could be detected a 
division into pro-Mannerheim and pro-Ståhlberg factions. No small source 
of friction in the conduct of these affairs was the circumstance that the 
first Ministers to Paris and London belonged to the former faction and 
Foreign Minister Holsti to the latter. 
The young men starting their foreign service careers at the time condi-
tions began to become normalized in 1919 belonged to a new generation 
of diplomats, who differed in many respects from their elder colleagues 
and among whom the stresses and strains of the momentous period of 
crisis were no longer felt in the same way. 
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from the mentality governing the struggle to safeguard the nation's con-
stitutional rights against the encroachments of Czarist tyranny to vigorous 
diplomatic activity had been accomplished through drastic changes in the 
international situation as well as in the strength and influence of the 
various political factions at home. Thus did the Finnish policy makers 
learn to adjust themselves to operating in the largely strange international 
forum, where the sector formed by the victorious Western Allies proved to 
be stranger than many of the other ones. 
The administration of independent Finland had slowly shifted the course 
of foreign policy previously set. And the shift was made in the middle of 
a world crisis. Viewed with the eyes of a foreign diplomat, the men in 
charge of Finnish policy were apt to appear self-important, heavy-handed 
and lacking in imagination.' The process of reaching decisions in the field 
of foreign relations along the lines laid down by the victorious powers 
was a slow one. Finnish diplomacy had been deficient in neither activity 
nor zeal, but its capacity to achieve results was limited both by lack of 
experience and, above all, by a shortage of the resources needed to make 
one's weight felt in the sphere of power politics. 
A typical feature of the period of the breakthrough of Finland's diplo-
macy was the sharply critical attitude of the Finnish public toward foreign 
countries. It reflected, on the one hand, the characteristic tendency of the 
time to mix together the issues of the internal struggle for power and the 
differences over foreign policy. And, on the other hand, it reflected the 
human side of the politics of the period of crisis: in addition to scoring 
victories and experiencing the uplift thereby given their self-esteem, the 
representatives of practically all the political schools of thought had also 
made their full share of mistakes and known the bitter taste of failure, 
defeat and disenchantment. 
As the total outcome, however, Finland's position as an independent 
state had begun to be firmly established. It was this status that provided 
the basis on which to build the future relations between Finland and the 
Western Allies as well as, in general, to carry on the affairs of Finland as 
an active member of the post-World War I European community. 
184 	 Juhani Paasivirta 
NOTES 
' The proceedings of the Government Economic Dep't 15/10 1918. 
2 Helsingin Sanomat ao X Edustuksemme ulkomailla (Our Representation 
Abroad);  Suomen Sosialidemokraatti 7 III 1919, Suomen ulkomainen edustus  
(Finland's Foreign Representation).  
3 Ossian Donner's letter of July 3o to Törngren (Törngren's collection).  
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' The interviewees (excepting those mentioned in the Preface) either were 
engaged in diplomatic or commercial activities for Finland in 1918-19 or took 
part in politics involving the Aland Islands — or, then, in one or another 
capacity closely followed the developments discussed in these pages. 
A SURVEY OF THE ORIGINAL SOURCE 
MATERIAL AND LITERATURE 
For comments on the material borrowed from the archives of the Swedish 
and the German Foreign Ministries for use in the present work as well as in 
my earlier study »Suomi vuonna 1918», see pp. 369-371 of this previously 
published volume. 
The new category of source material, obtained from the archives of the 
United States State Department (published to some extent in the series entitled 
»Foreign Relations of the United States», which I have drawn upon before), 
contains various reports, memoranda, etc., relating to the activities of, inter 
alin, the State Department, the United States Peace Commission to Paris as 
well as its experts and assistants, the American Consul in Helsinki and the 
American Minister to Stockholm, etc. 
In addition to this American material proper, the category includes communi-
cations from British and French diplomats, etc., which cast a broader light 
upon the lines of policy pursued by the Western Allies. 
Special attention is deserved by the material relating to the plenary sessions 
of the Paris Peace Conference contained in the archives of the State Department 
(and published in part in the subsidiary section of the »Foreign Relations» 
series, »The Paris Peace Conference 1919»). Among the unpublished material, 
noteworthy is the record of the proceedings of the Baltic Commission, with 
supplements, which deals with, e.g., the Åland and the East Karelian questions 
as well as the subject of intervention. 
The accounts of the meetings of the leading bodies at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence included in the material published by the United States State Department 
give the impression, to the extent they have been referred to for the purposes 
of the present work, (e.g., the sessions of the Council of Ten held on Jan. 27 
and Feb. 27, 1919), of being somewhat l00sely interpreted and also unclear. (No 
minutes of the »summit meetings» at the conference were kept, so the record 
consists only of unofficial notes). In some part, this particular material may be 
compared to the notes on the Council of Four meetings during the period of 
March 24— June 28, 1919, published by Paul Mantoux, interpreter for the French 
delegation. (The reference to the account of the meeting held on April 28). 
Of the private collections of members of the United States Peace Commission 
kept in the Library of Congress, in addition to the ones mentioned in the 
catalogue of source material, the collections of Woodrow Wilson and Robert 
Lansing have been examined. The material dealing with the Finnish question 
(and related problems) has been obtained as copies of State Department docu-
ments or of memoranda of other members of the Peace Commission. 
With reference to the affairs of Finland, a source further worth mentioning 
is the 21-volume »My Diary at the Conference of Paris», published in a private 
edition of 5o copies, by D. H. Miller, an assistant on the staff of the United 
States Peace Commission. To the extent that it be consulted for documentary 
material, subsequent official series of publications have narrowed down its 
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significance. There being no copy of the series in the Nordic countries, the one 
in the possession of the British Museum has been used by the present author. 
The material of the State Department is complemented at certain points with 
respect to food deliveries to Finland by the material in the archives of the 
American Relief Administration at the Hoover Library situated at Stanford, 
California. A copy of the unpublished collection «H00ver-Holsti Documents 
1918-192o» included in this material has been used for the purposes of the 
present work. 
Certain portions of the material held by the British Foreign Office (which 
is not freely at the disposal of researchers insofar as it relates to the period 
following World War I) have been published in the series «Documents on 
British Foreign Policy 1919-1939». Its subseries, No. I, dealing with the period 
starting at the beginning of July, 1919, touches only at a few points — involving 
the question of intervention — the subject matter of this work. It cannot be 
denied, however, that in certain instances the series does give grounds for draw-
ing indirect conclusions, too, concerning previous months. 
The material pertaining to the activities of General Yudenich in the Archive 
of Russian and East European History and Culture consists of his wife's memoirs 
from the years 1918 and 1919 (when she had closely followed his movements) 
as well as an account, treating political and military matters, with citations 
from relevant documents, by his chief of staff, General P. Tomilov, of the same 
period. 
The portion covering the years 1918 and 1919 of Job. Hellner's »Minnen och 
dagböcker», published in 196o, corresponds to the set of notes designated as  
»Anteckningar från utrikesministertiden II» in the collection bearing his name 
in the State Archives of Sweden, which 1 had occasion to make use of in my 
earlier volume. It is on this material that the »Memorandum» on Swedish-
Finnish relations in 1917-18, which was also written by Hellner and published 
by the Swedish Foreign Ministry, is based. This last-mentioned publication, 
however, contains no account of the policies pursued by Germany. 
The material covering the years 1918 and 1919 in the archives of the Finnish 
Foreign Ministry cannot, perhaps, for several reasons be considered complete 
(Suomi vuonna 1918, p. 369). The collection of documents published by Aaro 
Pakaslahti contains an important part. In addition, the present author has used 
unpublished material, particularly with respect to many special questions.' 
Many private collections contain material that casts light upon developments 
in the field of foreign relations and related matters. 
A number of diaries, or comparable records, that deal with the events of 
October and November, 1918, have been available to the author — those of 
Haataja, Hultin, Ingman, Setälä, Thesleff and others. Of the collections of papers 
describing the diplomatic activity in London and Paris, the one containing the 
When, in certain instances, the original document could not be found in the 
archives of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the author was obliged to cite a copy 
in, e.g., Holsti's collection (p. 75, f00tnote 25); or, in the case of a missing 
telegram, to a reference to it in, e.g., the Foreign Ministry's Review of the Situa-
tion (p. 11o, note 25). Where not even a copy could be found in the Finnish 
material, it was necessary in one case to cite the copy in the German Foreign 
Ministry's archives (p. 27, note 35). 
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largest quantity of documents is Rudolf Holsti's. To a large extent, it consists 
of copies of reports, etc., sept by Holsti to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (to 
the »Senate-, or Government, while it operated out of the town of Vaasa during 
the period the Red rebels held southern Finland; and to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations). The originals of certain of the copies included in this collec-
tion cannot be found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry. Adolf Törngren's 
collection contains more material of a »private nature» (notes, etc.), which is 
not included in official archives, than Holsti's. Yrjö Hirn's collection contains 
the political observations he made during his stay in Paris in the spring of 1919, 
as written down by Karin Hirn, as well as letters dealing with the same matters. 
As for the treatment of the matter of intervention in June and July, 1919, in 
high quarters in Finland, in addition to the foregoing, the notes kept by  Kaarlo 
Castrén, among others, have been studied. More light has been shed on Man-
nerheim's position by Lauri Ingman's notes, which had been kept sealed, 
insofar as they touched on this matter, until 196o. 
With respect to the literature, such works were sought out in the line of 
research studies, memoirs, etc., as might be deemed to have significance not 
only from the direct standpoint of the subject at hand but also as background 
material likely to prove helpful in interpreting the general international situation 
after World War I. 
Generally speaking, it may be remarked that the American, British and 
French historical literature gives scant attention to matters directly bearing 
upon the Finnish question in the years 1918 and 1919. There exist works that 
deal with the crucial political and military developments of the period (e.g., G. 
B. Noble, Politics and Opinions at Paris 1919. New York 1935; W. A. Williams, 
American Russian Relations 1781--1947. New York 1952;  R. Poincaré, Au service 
de la France. Paris 1925; F. Foch, Mémoires pour servir å l'histoire de la guerre. 
Paris 193o;  C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. London 1937) but 
lack any direct mention of Finland. Certain works (e.g., David Lloyd George, 
War Memoirs VI. London 1936) contain some passing references in a critical 
tone to Finnish politics, while other works, again, include only general observa-
tions, for the most part, on the Finnish question (e.g., J. Noulens, Mon ambas-
sade en Russia Sovietique 1917-1919. Paris 1933). 
In exceptional instances, there have appeared in the countries in question 
around the period dealt with some studies dealing specifically with the politics 
of Finland (e.g., C. Jay Smith, Jr., Finland and the Russian Revolution 1917-
1922. Athens, Georgia 1958, which discusses, inter alin, the interventionist 
plans for the Petrograd sector in the light of the material published in the 
»Krasnyi Arkhiv»). 
An examination of this literature has, in any case, given the basis for the 
general, indirect conclusion that interest in the Finnish question was slight in 
the midst of momentous decisions of power politics. 
In the sphere of memoirs, Finland is given more space, especially when the 
writer was obliged to have dealings with this country in the line of duty (e.g., 
Herbert Hoover, J. D. Gregory, C. Maynard, C. Nabokov, A. Ruhl, among other 
names cited in the catalogue of sources). Only rarely in these cases is any 
general interest in Finland's politics indicated. In certain cases, moreover, the 
data given in connection with the rare mention of Finland are erroneous 
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(Esme Howard, Theatre of Life II, which refers to the Baltic Commission's 
decision of July 4, 1919, concerning the issue of the Åland Islands; actually, the 
decision was almost diametrically opposite to what it is represented to have 
been in this book of memoirs). This, too, should perhaps be regarded as a 
circumstance indirectly indicative of the amount of interest generated by the 
affairs of Finland. 
Among studies published in Sweden, the following might be mentioned: T. 
Gihl, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historfia IV 1914-19, and Arvid Fredborg,  
Storbritannien och den ryska frågan 1918-2o. 
Among works published in the U.S.S.R., noteworthy is the one by B. E. 
Stein, the original 1949 Moscow edition of which has appeared in German 
translation under the title: Die russische Frage auf der Pariser Friedenskonferenz 
1919-192o. Leipzig 1953. 
The latest general presentations of the Finnish political crisis of 1918-1919 
are contained — in association with the main subject matter — in Part I of 
Erik Heinrichs' biography of Mannerheim and Einar W. Juva's tome on Rudolf 
Walden. 
In studying the autobiographical literature written by Finns — e.g., Ossian 
Donner, Enckell, Holsti (unpublished drafts), Mannerheim — one is struck by 
the fact that the accounts of certain central matters, such as the procurement 
of relief supplies, the final settlement of the issue of the recognition of Finland's 
independence, the treatment of the Åland question at Paris in the summer of 
1919 and attitudes toward the issue of intervention, are discrepant. Neither is 
that characteristic feature of memoirs, emphasis upon the author's personal 
contribution to decisive measures, conspicuously absent, any more than is the 
influence of subsequent political developments. 
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